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Abstract
THE GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE AND RESULTS ACT AND THE 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE:  A VIEW FROM THE BOTTOM
Traditionally, research in the area of reform efforts aimed at improving 
performance in the federal government has focused more on the top levels of government, 
i.e., budget interaction of the president and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), 
top agency officials, and congressional budgeters. As a result, findings have been less than 
promising. 
At least five government-wide reform initiatives have been attempted since the 
end of World War II.  The latest is the Government Performance and Results Act 
(GPRA) passed into law in 1993. A review of literature on government budgeting 
contends that previous initiatives failed to achieve their stated objectives primarily 
because they did not alter the inherently political nature of decision-making in the federal 
budget process. Less than five years later and despite efforts to overcome many of the 
weaknesses of previous initiatives, critics of the GPRA began to sound a familiar 
theme—the GPRA was failing because it had not fundamentally altered the politics of the 
federal budget process. 
If you look for changes only at the top levels of government, the critics are not 
wrong—the GPRA has achieved no more success in altering the politics associated with 
federal budgeting than its predecessors.  There is, however, another perspective from which 
to evaluate government reform—from inside an agency at the bottom of the bureaucratic 
pyramid, i.e., the managerial and operating levels of the Executive Branch agencies.  
This research began with a single question: How does our evaluation of reform 
change when viewed from inside an agency?  To answer the question, I conducted a case 
study of 12 reform initiatives at the Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center and the Air Force 
Materiel Command from 1995 until 2003.  After the GPRA was signed, agencies focused 
on improving their internal processes used to identify and assess future needs and the 
accuracy of their future budget requests. Therefore, if evaluators look for changes in how 
the president works with OMB or the politics practiced by congressional budgeters, no
major effects are likely to be found and the reform effort will be labeled a failure.  But, 
based on the findings of this research, if you evaluate the reform initiative based on 
changes in the day-to-day activities of an agency at the operational levels, it is probable 
that you will find far more success than failure.
The guiding framework for this research was seven factors generally accepted as 
critical to the success or failure of reform initiatives: 1) impetus; 2) focus; 3) decision-
making; 4) key actors; 5) accountability; 6) knowledge and information; and 7) time.   
The twelve reform initiatives included in the case study were evaluated according to 
these factors. 
 I found all of the factors did influence the implementation of the twelve selected 
initiatives to some degree.  Only one factor, however, was significantly important to    
every initiative—focus.  Correctly identifying what is expected to change is not only 
important   to reform success in and of itself but it also impacts the other factors.  I 
concluded that the objectives for changes in the internal operations of the Executive 
Branch agencies outlined in the GPRA are being achieved in the Department of Defense 
(DoD).  I also found that these changes may be influencing, albeit indirectly, final 
budgetary decision-making by providing more accurate information to top-level     
decision-makers in the federal budget process. 
x
Preface
Budgeting, at any level, is a process of making choices.  Budgeting choices also 
reflect changing priorities. The longstanding threat of terrorist acts being perpetrated 
against the mainland United States became a reality on 11 September 2001.  The events 
of that day transformed the world’s security environment in profound ways that will take 
time to be fully understood.  However, in the short term, the events of 11 September 2001 
have served to concentrate and focus the attention of everyone, from the President of the 
United States down to the man on the street, on the defense needs and strategies of the 
United States and its allies. 
There is no doubt that the events of 11 September 2001 have resulted in 
significant changes to United States’ spending priorities. Yet, some aspects of 
governance have not changed. Much of the research for this paper was completed prior to 
the terrorist attacks and the ensuing, and continuing, War on Terrorism.  Therefore, I 
have tried to make sure that I corrected any areas that are no longer valid.  However, I 
found that, while priorities have certainly changed, the process whereby the wartime 
requirements are identified, budgeted for and procured has not undergone any dramatic 
metamorphosis as a result of 11 September 2001.  Despite shortened timelines, the 
Department of Defense (DoD) continues to plan, program and distribute resources to best 
meet the demands of its ongoing mission in the order of current US priorities.
Even though the current state of the world has not driven major changes to the 
DoD’s budget process, change is happening every day.  In fact, Secretary of Defense, 
Donald Rumsfeld, declared “war” on the bureaucracy on 10 September 2001.  It is that 
war that has had the most profound effect on organizational changes in the DoD.  The 
roadmap for this war lays not in the battle plans for the war against terrorism but in the 
xi
statutory framework carefully crafted by a Congress guided by the wisdom and lessons of 
history.  The dramatic changes directed by Secretary Rumsfeld were founded upon the 
congressional direction reflected in the Government Performance and Results Act 
(GPRA) of 1993.  Changes to the levels of accountability, development and acquisition 
of new weapon systems and even the Civil Service personnel system were all initiated in 
the name of improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the DoD.  But rather than 
replace the DoD’s Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) long used for 
resource management, Secretary Rumsfeld recently directed the expansion of the PPBS 
to include the execution phase of DoD appropriations…a move supported by a Congress 
concerned about expenditures not clearly traceable to their original budget.  This change 
is effective with the President’s budget submission for the fiscal year 2005 and is but one 
more example of how perpetual change is an ongoing fact of life for the DoD.  
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Chapter 1
Government Reform – A Great American Tradition
Change is inevitable--except from a vending machine!
                                                                                              Author Unknown
Introduction
Organizational change has been a popular subject in the worlds of business, 
government and academia since the days of America’s founding.  After all, were not the 
Founding Fathers seeking change to the organizational structure of the American 
Colonies into free and independent states?  Was not this change at least partially driven 
by Great Britain’s interference with and unreasonable taxation on American trade, i.e., 
American business? And has not generation after generation of academics sought to 
understand the intentions of the Founding Fathers through endless analysis of every 
documented word they uttered?  Clearly, reforming government—local, state and 
national—is as much a part of every-day American political life as Mom and apple pie! 
Throughout the twentieth century, the words and concepts associated with 
organizational change have become a part of boardroom, classroom and Capitol Hill 
lexicon, largely via the popular media.  Everyday, we hear of organizations—private and 
public—that are downsizing, rightsizing, re-engineering, or re-inventing themselves.  For 
some, it is a matter of survival.  For others, while still at the top of their game, 
organizational change is the means to retain their competitive edge (Hammer and 
Champy, 1993).  For government organizations, these goals traditionally have translated 
into retaining or expanding their share of the federal budget pie!
Academia has contributed a significant number of theories and models to serve as 
guides for organizations seeking the path to successful change. These theories and models 
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are then used to measure the success or failure of organizations’ attempts to change.  
Among the favorite topics for academic review and analysis are government-wide efforts 
to achieve lasting reform, i.e.,  major changes in the way federal agencies operate. 
Improving effectiveness, efficiency, economy and accountability in the federal 
government are not new concepts in the political or administrative arenas of government 
- neither are these new themes in the academic community.  Bookshelves, public and 
private, overflow with reports, articles, journals and books dedicated to analyzing, 
criticizing and even occasionally commending efforts to reform the federal government. 
Literature Review
As I said, the academic world has produced massive amounts of very laudable 
literature on the subject of reform.  Some could be called optimistic because no matter 
how many times a new reform is proposed, they tend to focus on the positive 
possibilities.  I fall into this first category…but I am not alone.  According to John M. 
Kamensky (1996), with the reinventing government movement and other similar reforms 
of the 1990s, unlike previous reorganization efforts, the focus is on “changing the internal 
culture of government agencies by changing the incentives employees face in doing their 
work, rather than investing the administration’s political capital in restructuring the 
missions and organization of the government” (p. 248).  If the reform effort is targeted on 
the managerial and operating levels of Executive Branch agencies, then that is where we 
should look to evaluate the reform.
Others, such as David Mayhew, take a more narrow and neutral approach to look 
at what is most likely to generate government-wide reform initiatives.  In his classic work 
on divided government (1991) Mayhew contends, “…efforts to alter the power, 
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capability, or political coloration of governmental institutions, through laws or 
constitutional amendments that reform structure, are normal events in the American 
system.  They have occurred during both unified and divided times”(p. 87).  Mayhew 
contends that reform initiatives are just as likely to emerge regardless of whether the 
executive and legislative branches of government are controlled by one political party or 
two.  He further finds that reform initiatives passed by Congress during both periods were 
mostly very important pieces of legislation.  So it would seem that neither quantity nor 
quality of reform initiatives is effected by which party wins the elections. 
One view of the reform efforts of the 1990s suggest, “…the National Performance 
Review and other reinvention efforts extend to elements that are new, to issues not 
addressed significantly by earlier governmental reforms” (Brudney, Hebert and Wright 
1999, p. 21) Others, however, see these same reform efforts as merely repetitions of 
previous governmental reforms that come and go in some semblance of a pattern.
In his book, The Tides of Reform: Making Government Work 1945-1995 (1997), 
Paul C. Light likens efforts to reform government to the tides of the oceans.  According 
to Light, the comparison of reform initiatives to the tides applies to all levels of 
government. However, his primary focus in this book is the national government.  Light 
argues that regardless of each new generation’s claim of new and improved ideas for 
reforming government,  “…there is truly nothing new under the sun when it comes to 
making government work.  Human beings have been reforming government ever since 
they invented government” (p.2).  Light goes on to explain that there are four basic 
philosophies for reforming government and rather than something new, these same four 
philosophies simply come and go and come again like the tides of the ocean.  But rather 
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than being governed by the moon, the tides of reform are driven by the fact that neither 
the President nor Congress can ever decide whether they trust the government or it’s 
employees at any given time.  Therefore, as the President and Congress change, a new 
reform philosophy frequently moves into dominance as well.    
The four basic philosophies of reform identified by Light are: 1) scientific 
management, 2) war on waste, 3) watchful eye, and 4) liberation management.  Each has 
its own goal, vision of government and institutional champion.  Scientific management 
and liberation management both share a view of government and its employees as 
trustworthy guardians of the public good and usually are championed by the occupant of 
the Oval Office.  Each, however, has its own distinct goal.  Scientific management holds 
that first and foremost, government must be efficient.  On the other hand, liberation 
management’s primary focus is on performance.
The remaining tides, war on waste and watchful eye, share only a common view 
of government and its employees.  Both see government and its employees as the 
infamous self-serving, unresponsive and inefficient bureaucracy with little or no regard 
for how taxpayer dollars are spent that is frequently depicted in the popular media.  
Beyond this, war on waste and watchful eye diverge quite dramatically.  War on waste is 
generally championed by the Senate and seeks economy in all government endeavors 
while watchful eye is the favored child of the House of Representatives and seeks 
fairness above all else.
For his research, Light built a list of the top 141 federal management reform 
initiatives that emerged during the fifty years covered by his book.  He then compared 
each of the initiatives against a common set of measures built around four questions:
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1) When did each initiative pass?
2) Was there any legislative controversy?
3) How was each one implemented?
4) What were the actual impacts?
From the four questions, Light coded the 141 initiatives “…into 37 variables 
broadly measuring: 1) time of passage, 2) legislative history, 3) reform philosophy,        
4) change strategy, 5) size and scale of initiative, 6) implementation approach, and         
7) impacts” (p.11).  According to Light, the final set of measures that deal with impact 
are “…simultaneously the most important and most frustrating for this analysis” because 
“the general consensus among politicians and scholars alike is” that none of the 
initiatives did much to really improve the way government works (p.12)!
Light argues that there are four primary problems with allowing the tides of 
reform to continue unabated as they have since the founding of our nation.  First, unlike 
the tides of the oceans that often erode the coastline, the tides of management reform are 
more likely to add to the administrative state than to reduce even “…paperwork, rules or 
administrative thickening” (p. 217).  Second, Light found that more and more reform 
initiatives are “…increasingly concerned with comprehensive, government-wide effects” 
that tend to increase both political and economic costs and make the impacts more 
difficult to evaluate.  It is also much easier to allow failure or terminate a smaller, more 
targeted reform initiative (p. 219).  A third problem with allowing the tides of reform to 
go on without interference is that the four tides are, generally speaking, incompatible.  
What one builds up another will come along and tear down next year or after the next 
election.  The impacts of one tide often contradict another, relegating the management of 
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government to a lifetime of uncontrolled flux (p. 221).  The fourth and final problem that 
Light identifies is that the ebb and flow of the tides seem to be accelerating.  The result is 
less time between the last reform initiative and the appearance of the next (p. 223).
Light contends, “The more government is reformed, the more Congress and the 
president thinks it needs furthering reforming” (p. 5).  He concludes that allowing the 
tides of reform to simply go on rolling in and out without any effort to control their 
impacts on the administrative coastline puts the government in danger of drowning in a 
sea of good intentions designed to make it simply work better.  
To reduce the damage of reform efforts—past, present and future—Light 
recommends three broad approaches from which to start: 
1) Build up tidal barriers to haphazard reform initiatives by 
strengthening institutional memory in Congress, the White
      House and the Executive Branch agencies;
2) Alter the climate for reform and work to restore public trust by 
renewing the focus on civic life and more active participation
      in governance by all citizens; and
3) Alter the gravitational pulls of reform by encouraging more 
experimentation in management reforms and building more 
      credible performance baselines for measuring impacts of 
      reform initiatives (pp. 223-224).
All three of Light’s recommendations hold great promise for actually improving the way 
government works.  However, it is his last recommendation regarding the gravitational 
pulls of reform that is most applicable to my own research.
Light acknowledges the difficulty in developing effective performance measures 
that will accurately reflect the true accomplishments of a government as large and 
complex as the American national government.  According to Light, “…getting 
government to make the commitment to performance-based accountability has been 
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anything but easy.”  It is, however, “…clearly possible” (pp. 232-233).  For Light, the 
passage of the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993 was the first 
step of Congress toward true commitment to performance-based accountability.  
While the GPRA is not without problems and drawbacks, Light contends, 
“Although the statute is best seen as an expression of liberation management, it holds 
significant promise for sorting through all four tides”…to actually “…use performance 
measures as a way to hold programs accountable for achieving results” (p. 233).  I 
believe this goal of the GPRA is best seen from inside an agency where the actual work 
of government is accomplished.
Another work that emphasizes the value of looking at reform implementation 
from the inside is Implementation: The Oakland Project, Third Edition Expanded (1984) 
by Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky.  In the new Preface to the Third Edition: 
Implementation and Evaluation as Learning, Pressman and Wildavsky contend, 
“Implementation and evaluation are the opposite sides of the same coin, implementation 
providing the experience that evaluation interrogates and evaluation providing the 
intelligence to make sense out of what is happening” (p. xv).  Pressman and Wildavsky 
sought to show the difficulties associated with the implementation of large-scale federal 
projects by evaluating the Economic Development Administration’s effort in the mid-
1960s to implement a program intended to help solve the problems of unemployment and 
racial unrest in Oakland, California.
Pressman and Wildavsky focused on identifying administrative, economic and 
political lessons to be learned from the Oakland Project.  Their work traces the 
implementation of the Oakland Project at multiple levels.  Starting with a view from the 
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top, Pressman and Wildavsky clearly show that sufficient money was authorized and 
appropriated by Congress.  They further show that the Economic Development 
Administration approved projects and committed funds in a manner timely enough to 
ensure success.  So why did the project fail to achieve its noble objectives?
According to Pressman and Wildavsky, the Oakland Project failed to accomplish 
its strategic goals because “…the technical details of implementation proved to be more 
difficult and more time-consuming” than anyone at any level of government  “…ever 
dreamed possible” (p. 6).  Had Pressman and Wildavsky ended their research with only 
the view from the top, they would have never seen the evidence at the operational level 
that actually demonstrated the difficulties with implementation that contributed to less 
than zealous accomplishments.  It is this lesson learned regarding the importance of 
evaluating policy success or failure from the appropriate level that I have sought to 
incorporate into my own research.
In 1995, Donald F. Kettl and John J. DiIulio, Jr. compiled the fourth volume in a 
Brookings Institute series on efforts to reform the world of public management.  The 
objective was to take a detailed look at the successes and failures of the National 
Performance Review (NPR) during its first year of implementation.  At the end of its first 
year, the NPR report, entitled From Red Tape to Results: Creating a Government That 
Works Better and Costs Less, contained 384 recommendations for improving the 
performance of federal agencies.  The recommendations covered numerous topics from 
budgeting practices and information technologies to personnel procedures to procurement 
regulations (NPR, 1993).
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Initially, the NPR report received both positive and critical reviews.  However, 
within two months after the report’s release the negative reviews far outnumbered the 
positive ones (DiIulio, p. 4).  In spite of the shortcomings of the NPR, Donald Kettl 
(1995) believed its primary objective, building a government that works better and costs 
less, was still achievable.  According to Kettl, the most promising source of glue to hold 
the reinvention movement together and, thus, build lasting reform is
…the reorganization of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) launched in 
March 1994 under the banner of OMB 2000 and the Government Performance 
and Results Act (GPRA), passed in 1993, which seeks to link budget inputs with 
performance outcomes (p. 60). 
Like Light, Kettl holds that efforts to reform the American national government 
have gone on since the founding of the Republic.  According to Kettl, the call to reinvent 
government was nothing more than the latest skirmish in 
…the ageless battle between Hamiltonians and Madisonians over the proper role
 of executive power in American democracy, and the eternal debate within 
administrative theory over how to balance central control over policy with 
decentralized power to fit policy to particular problems (p. 63).  
Unlike Light, however, Kettl finds that there are “several things” that are “clearly 
different” about the reform efforts driven by the GPRA.  
Kettl first points to the GPRA’s base in law, calling it “…the first reform 
launched by law instead of by executive order or administrative action.”  Because it is a 
law, Kettl contends that both Congress and the Executive Branch are more likely to 
continue support.  Second, Kettl suggests that the GPRA is different from previous 
reforms because it provides for learning opportunities by starting with limited pilot 
programs before moving to government-wide implementation.  Third, Kettl contends that 
the early evidence shows the GPRA has “broader and more enthusiastic support 
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throughout the bureaucracy” than previous reform efforts.  Finally, Kettl argues that the 
GPRA is different because it “…speaks with unusual clarity to problems that citizens 
want to have solved” (p. 63).  And what citizens want solved is the perceived inability of 
government to show that they are, in fact, achieving results.
Kettl stresses the importance of evaluating reform at the appropriate level because 
for any reform to achieve lasting success, “…the managers who most determine 
government’s results” are the ones who must be motivated.  According to Kettl, 
Middle managers play a critical role in the reinvention effort.  They
occupy the key positions throughout government that determine how
 well programs work.  They are the project managers, branch chiefs, 
 and section heads who shape programs and the behavior of their
 subordinates (p. 28).  
Overall, Kettl found that the GPRA held “…considerable promise for linking the big 
politics of reducing the size of government and the little politics of improving its 
performance” (p. 63).  Others, however, find nothing new or positive about the reforms of 
the 1990s or historical reform efforts.  According to Daniel W. Williams, “Public 
administration experiences periodic reform movements that exhibit the enthusiasm of a 
tent revival, but the success of the Soviet economy” (2000, p. 522)
This is certainly not a complete review of the literature on organizational change 
or government reform.  However, I believe it accurately reflects the full spectrum of 
opinions regarding government-wide reform efforts.  Throughout the remainder of this 
paper, there will be references to other literature that also provided direction, focus and 
challenges throughout this entire research effort.
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Evaluating Reform
According to the Government Accounting Office (GAO), at least four 
government-wide initiatives have been attempted since the end of World War II:  1) The 
Hoover Commissions; 2) Planning-Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS);                 
3) Management By Objectives (MBO) and 4) Zero-Base Budgeting (ZBB).  Literature on 
government budgeting contends that each of these initiatives failed to achieve their 
objectives primarily because they did not fundamentally alter the inherent political nature 
of decision-making in the federal budget process (GAO/AIMD-97-46; Schick, 1995 and 
1973; Gosling, 1992; Wildavsky, 1992).  Each of these will be discussed in detail in 
Chapter 3.
Government reform in the early 1990s, however, had a new look.  Rather than 
initiatives emanating solely from the Oval Office, the latest efforts to improve 
government performance claim the force of law.    As former Vice President Al Gore was 
announcing plans to reinvent government, Congress had already begun erecting a 
statutory framework aimed at improving the effectiveness, efficiency, economy and 
accountability of all federal programs.  The centerpiece of that framework is the 
Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993 (GAO/T-GGD-97-43).  
Conventional wisdom suggests improved strategic planning and performance-
based budgeting are critical means to enhancing government performance.   
Traditionally, however, research in this arena has focused more on the top levels of 
government, i.e., budget interaction of the president and the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB), top agency officials, and congressional budgeters. Findings from this 
perspective have been less than promising (Joyce, 2003).  It was not long after passage 
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that criticisms of the GPRA began to sound a familiar theme---the GPRA had not 
fundamentally altered top-level decision-making in the federal budget process (Radin, 
1998).  But, have reform efforts such as the Hoover Commission, the PPBS, MBO, ZBB 
and, now, the GPRA really failed to improve government performance?  Or, have we 
simply studied and analyzed their implementation from the wrong perspective?  
The criticism generally directed at these initiatives reflects a very traditional view of 
decision-making in the federal government and an equally traditional academic approach to 
judging reform initiatives---from the top down.  From this perspective, the GPRA has achieved 
no more success in altering the inherent political nature of government budgeting than its 
predecessors.  However, the problem may not be the GPRA or its predecessors.  The problem 
may be the traditional perspective and approach to measuring the success or failure of 
government-wide reform.
The traditional, top-down perspective generally leads to the conclusion that most 
government-wide reform efforts have failed because they did not take the politics out of 
budgetary decision- making (Joyce, 2003).  Implementation of government-wide reform, 
however, simply cannot be fully understood, studied or evaluated strictly from the top 
down.  The perspective does not provide a totally complete explanation of reform 
because it fails to:
• Correctly identify key players;
• Clearly define what government agencies currently do and what is expected to 
change; 
• Adequately develop appropriate and accurate measures of success; and
• Recognize the opportunities for use of performance information at other levels 
of budget development.
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By studying reform initiatives at lower levels but from inside the agency, the focus is on 
the people that must actually implement change—the managers and operators described 
by Kettl.  This focus facilitates a more accurate understanding of what government 
agencies actually do and how the doing of it is related to attaining goals and objectives.  
A view from inside an agency also more clearly demonstrates how long-term 
change is attained and institutionalized within government agencies. This is especially 
evident when we look at how the overall impression and evaluation of the GPRA’s 
success changed dramatically over time. Many in Washington and in academia declared 
the GPRA dead in March 2000 (Laurent, March 16, 2000), much as Allen Schick 
described the alleged demise of the PPBS as a Death in Bureaucracy in 1973.  By 2001, 
however, the GPRA had become a key facilitator of the President’s Management Agenda
(PMA) initiated by George W. Bush shortly after he took office.
Research Problem
The primary question addressed by this dissertation is:  How does our evaluation 
of reform efforts differ when viewed from inside an agency?  In general, this research 
focused on government-wide reform efforts from inside a working agency.  When 
evaluated at the managerial and operating levels of an agency, some reform efforts are 
found to have achieved more success than previously reported. The proof of this will be 
demonstrated in a case study focusing on the implementation of the Government 
Performance and Results Act (GPRA) in the Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) of 
the Department of Defense (DoD) conducted specifically for this research.  
Scope of Study 
While all agencies, with few exceptions, are subject to the directives of the 
GPRA, this research is limited to only one – the Department of Defense (DoD).  This 
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study also is not a complete analysis of reform initiatives in the Department of Defense.  
That is an unachievable task within the confines of one research project.  Rather, the 
scope of this research is limited to a long-term case study of changes within one of the 
DoD’s managerial agencies, the Air Force Materiel Command, and one of that 
command’s operating levels, the Propulsion Management Division located in the 
Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center.  
A long-term case study of Air Force managerial and operating levels as a means 
to address changes in the DoD is appropriate for several reasons. The Air Force Materiel 
Command, headquartered at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base outside of Dayton, Ohio, is 
the DoD agency responsible for equipping the Air Force warfighter. The mission of the 
Air Force Materiel Command is 
To develop, acquire, and sustain aerospace power needed to 
defend the United States and its interests...today and tomorrow.
With annual budget authority on the order of $35 billion, the Air Force Materiel 
Command employs approximately 90,000 people (military and civilian) and is 
responsible for the operation of a $45 billion physical plant at 22 major installations 
located in ten states. Through the integrated management of research, development, test, 
acquisition and support, the Air Force Materiel Command advances and uses technology 
to acquire and sustain superior systems in partnership with their customers and suppliers. 
They perform continuous product and process improvement throughout the lifecycle of 
Air Force systems.  As an integral part of the Air Force war -fighting team, the Air Force 
Materiel Command contributes to combat superiority, readiness and sustainability 
(Barzelay and Thompson, 2003).   
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Among the most demanding responsibilities for the Air Force Materiel Command 
is the operation of a world-wide supply system for acquiring and maintaining spare parts 
needed to sustain all Air Force weapon systems.  Those systems range from the 1970s 
vintage AWACS E-3A to the new C-17 transport and the aging B-52s to the state-of-the-
art F-117 and B-2 stealth aircraft.  Spare parts are the repair parts and components, 
including kits, assemblies, and subassemblies (both repairable and non-repairable) 
required for the maintenance of weapon systems.  Repairable items are those that are 
returned to the supply system to be repaired when they are no longer in working 
condition.  Non-repairable items are called consumables, which means they are 
consumed in use or cannot be repaired economically (GAO-03-18).  
Because of rapid technological changes and funding constraints, acquiring and 
maintaining spare parts has become an increasingly important issue in discussions of the 
key measure of Air Force effectiveness as directed by the DoD—combat readiness.   
According to former Director of Logistics for the Air Force Materiel Command, 
Brigadier General Stanley A. Sieg, readiness had been dropping since 1992.  As the Air 
Force downsized, funding for spares was cut.  It took a long time to get into that low state 
of readiness and there was certainly no quick fix for the problem (Livingston, 1999).
One of the operating levels experiencing great difficulty in the acquisition and 
maintenance of spare parts is the Propulsion Directorate at the Oklahoma City Air 
Logistics Center.  Traditionally, engines are frequently the most costly and complex part 
of weapon system sustainment.  According to the Director of Propulsion at the Oklahoma 
City Air Logistics Center, the largest share of the Center’s annual budget and resources 
(human and monetary) are allocated to the sustainment of engines assigned to Oklahoma 
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City.  As a result of the Base Realignment and Closure Commission’s (BRAC) 1995 
decision to close the Propulsion Directorate at San Antonio, Texas and transfer the 
workload to Oklahoma City, the Propulsion Directorate’s average share of approximately 
80 percent of the budget and other resources is not expected to decline in the foreseeable 
future.  Therefore, the effectiveness, efficiency, economy and accountability the 
Propulsion Directorate’s Management Division achieves is significant to the success of 
the Air Force Materiel Command, the Air Force and the DoD in achieving the desired 
outcome of improved combat readiness.  After all, without engines even the state-of-the-
art B-2 Bomber is nothing more than a static display!
While improved combat readiness was not expected to be achieved overnight, it is 
the basic outcome at which reforms within the DoD as a whole are directed.  The Air 
Force translates the DoD’s goal to achieving better support for the warfighter.  Numerous 
initiatives focused on acquisition, logistics and financial reform have been implemented 
within the Air Force Materiel Command to improve support to the warfighter.  Since 
1993, several of these initiatives also were intended to facilitate compliance with the 
letter and intent of the GPRA and other components of Congress’ statutory reform 
framework such as the Chief Financial Officers Act (Hale, 1999) and the Federal 
Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 (Beck, et al. 1997).   
A second reason for studying Air Force management and operations to learn 
about the DoD is their shared history.  The call for the establishment of a single defense 
structure to serve as an umbrella for management and budget purposes originated with 
early air power theorists such as Italian, Giulio Douhet and American, Billy Mitchell, as a 
necessary partner to the establishment of a separate and independent Air Force.  In 1947, 
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when both the Air Force and DoD finally were established, a primary goal was to bring 
greater coordination to the management and budget allocations of the very independent 
and competitive military services.  While the military services remain quite independent-
minded, their fortunes are becoming increasingly connected as a result of numerous 
initiatives directly related to the GPRA and reinvention agendas.  Of the four major 
services, the Air Force appears to be the most adamant and vocal opponent of many 
efforts associated with consolidation and interservicing.
Finally, I served as a civilian employee of the Air Force Material Command 
assigned to the Propulsion Management Division at the Oklahoma City Air Logistics 
Center from 1982 until 2000.  After 1993, I was involved in numerous initiatives 
associated with the GPRA.  My positions provided me the opportunity to actually 
participate in the initiatives and gave me access to pertinent data and other participants 
necessary to complete this research.  In June 2000, I began a two-year assignment on a 
Career Broadening position in the Combat Support Division of the Air Staff at 
Headquarters-Air Force, the Pentagon.  My assigned duties were that of a Budget and 
Appropriation Manager.  This position provided additional data access and resource 
availability. Serving on the Air Staff afforded me the opportunity to better see the big 
picture—meeting the needs of the total Air Force rather than a single command.  It also 
allowed me to see how changes directed at and accomplished by the operating and 
managerial levels actually worked their way back up the chain to become the heart and 
soul of the Air Force budget submission to Congress.  
I returned to the Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center in October 2002 and was 
assigned to a new directorate, the Acquisition Center of Excellence (ACE).  There are 
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Acquisition Centers of Excellence at all operational Air Force facilities. The Acquisition 
Centers of Excellence are intended to further advance acquisition reform and operate 
under the authority of the Under Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition and Logistics. 
This new position has given me the chance to see and work with the results of acquisition 
reform initiatives begun during my previous tour at the Oklahoma City Air Logistics 
Center. My career path has provided many unique opportunities to participate in activities 
that also have supported my academic research.
Contents
The objective of this dissertation is to determine how our evaluation of reform 
efforts differs when viewed from inside an agency.  Chapter 2 is the description of the 
methodology employed in this research.  Chapter 3 provides an historical background for 
government-wide reform by summarizing the four previous initiatives attempted since 
WWII:  1) The Hoover Commissions; 2) Planning-Programming and Budgeting System; 
3) Management by Objective; and 4) Zero-Base Budgeting. 
An overview of the GPRA is the subject of Chapter 4.  The goal of this chapter is 
primarily to show how Congress applied lessons learned from the four previous 
initiatives to enhance the GPRA’s chances for successful implementation and the 
achievement of lasting, fundamental reform.  Excerpts from the GPRA are provided as 
reference in Appendix A.
The objective of Chapter 5 is essentially two-fold.  First, the intent is to more 
completely explain why a case study of the DoD is valuable and appropriate.  The second 
objective is to present an overview of the PPBS as the means DoD uses to manage its 
resources and project budget requirements.  It is noted in this chapter that, while the 
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attempt to impose the PPBS on all government agencies in 1965 failed, the PPBS has 
been and remains the mainstay of the DoD budget process since 1961.  However, there is 
no executive order or Congressional mandate requiring its continued use.  Therefore, 
understanding how the PPBS operates not only is important because DoD’s budget 
documentation and justification that go to Congress come from the PPBS, it also is a 
major reform effort that has been institutionalized in the DoD without the benefit of law 
or executive order.  
Chapter 6 is devoted to the actual case study and includes a summary of the 
findings associated with each initiative.  Chapter 7 is the concluding chapter. This chapter 
will include summaries of the findings for each of the critical factors used to evaluate the 
multiple initiatives as well as survey and interview results.  I will speculate on the future 
of the GPRA in the Air Force, the DoD and as a tool to assist the President and Congress 
in the very complex and political federal budgetary process.  
Importance of the Research
Looking at reform efforts from inside a working agency provides a more accurate 
assessment of the success or failure of the GPRA.  This perspective also enhances our 
understanding of how large organizations actually achieve and maintain major, long-term 
changes in the way they do business. It is my hope that this case study will encourage 
others to take a closer look from inside an agency at reform initiatives at the managerial 
and operational levels of the organization before declaring the reform efforts a success or 
failure.  After all, neither the DoD nor any other Executive Branch agency is a vending 




There are many different ways to study government-wide reform —experiments, 
surveys, archival analysis, histories or case studies.  All methods have strengths and 
weaknesses. From the beginning, I intended to do a long-term case study because I 
believe true and lasting reform takes time to accomplish.  However, I did this knowing 
that many social scientists frequently view case studies as a weak method of academic 
research.  Therefore, a brief discussion of the case study as a method for academic 
research seems appropriate.
Case Study As A Method For Research
  According to Graham Allison (1983), accumulating extensive case evidence on 
public managers is an appropriate means for developing the knowledge base of public 
management.  Robert K. Yin (2003), a recognized advocate of case study research, 
suggests one reason why case studies frequently are used for thesis and dissertation 
research is because “…the case study method allows investigators to retain the holistic 
and meaningful characteristics of real-life events” (p. 2).  Others, however, consider case 
studies of limited academic value.  
The typical view of the case study is that it is only useful during the preliminary, 
explanatory stages of research strategy but not appropriate for describing some 
phenomena or testing hypotheses.  Yin (2003) argues that case studies are valuable 
explanatory tools but that they also can be successfully designed to describe some 
phenomena and then test applicable propositions.   While he acknowledges the 
distinctions are often blurred, Yin (2003) also contends that the three types of case 
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studies (explanatory, exploratory, and descriptive) are not mutually exclusive.  Elements 
of each may be found in a single case study.  
Recognizing that there are other research strategies, such as experiments, surveys, 
archival analysis and history, Yin (2003) suggests that the case study method is most 
useful when three conditions exist:
1. In answer to “How” and “Why” questions;
2. When the investigator has little control; and 
3. Focus is on Contemporary Phenomenon with real-life context.
The other research strategies are also appropriate for addressing at least one of these 
conditions.  However, Yin contends that “…there are large overlaps among them…” and 
the goal always should be to use the strategy that is most informative (p. 5). 
Despite its popularity with some actively involved in social science research, the 
case study approach also has an abundance of critics.  The predominant criticisms of case 
study as a research method are:
1. Lack of rigor;
2. Insufficient precision;
3. Lack of objectivity; 
4. Provides very little basis for scientific generalizations; and
5. They take too long, result in massive amounts of data and extraordinarily 
lengthy narratives (Yin, 2003).
The criticism that case studies frequently lack scientific rigor generally is overcome by 
addressing each of the other concerns.  
First, following systematic procedures and maintaining complete and accurate 
records of all data collected and analytical processes used can enhance research precision.  
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Second, maintaining an objective position throughout the research process is critical. One 
way of helping to ensure that you do not succumb to the potential for researcher bias is 
by simply being aware of the tendency for bias views to influence the direction of the 
research.  Remaining academically objective was a particular challenge for me because I 
was an active part of my research subject from the beginning. Therefore, the potential for 
researcher bias inherent in this study is acknowledged.  I believe, however, the use of 
multiple sources and types of data sufficiently mitigate this concern.
Third, rather than trying to generalize to populations or a universe, concentrate on 
generalizing to theoretical propositions.  Limiting this research to one managerial agency 
and one of its operating components could limit the generalization of the study.  
However, I believe this limitation is mitigated by two related facts:  1) Multiple tasks that 
generate many types of data fall within the responsibility of the Air Force Materiel 
Command and the Propulsion Directorate at the Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center and 
2) There is the potential for numerous theoretical propositions to be derived from this 
case study and ultimately applied to other future academic research.
Finally, case studies do not have to take a long time or produce unreadable 
documents.  The time a case study takes is determined primarily by the subject matter and 
research question.  I spent approximately nine years compiling information on what may 
be best described as mini-case studies in order to complete the overall case study that was 
focused on evaluating major reform initiatives over time.  The length of time required 
also impacts the ultimate length of the academic document produced.  However, as Yin 
points out, it is not necessary to follow traditional writing schemes that have previously 
resulted in extremely long manuscripts.  Rather, Yin (2003) suggests researchers should 
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explore alternative ways of writing the final report that will reduce or may even eliminate 
the lengthy narratives altogether.
While they may have some unique characteristics and challenges, case studies are 
still “…an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its 
real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are 
not clearly evident” (Yin, p.13).  As such, the same four tests commonly used to establish 
the quality of any type of empirical social science research are also applicable to case 
study research.  Because these same tests are relevant in judging the quality of research 
designs for all social science methods, they have been summarized in many textbooks:  
1. Construct Validity:  Establishing correct operational measures for the 
concepts being studied;
2. Internal Validity:  (For explanatory or causal studies only) Establishing a 
causal relationship, whereby certain conditions are shown to lead to other 
conditions, as distinguished from spurious relationships;
3. External Validity:  Establishing the domain to which a study’s findings 
can be generalized; and 
4. Reliability:  Demonstrating that the operations of a study, such as the data 
collection procedures, can be replicated and will yield the same results.
Construct validity can be particularly problematic for case studies.  One way of 
addressing this problem is to use multiple sources of data.  Pattern-matching and 
explanation-building are two tactics for enhancing the internal validity of case study 
research.  External validity can become a major obstacle for the case study researcher.  
To avoid the problem, case study research should focus on analytical rather than 
statistical generalization.  Very simply, instead of trying to generalize to a sample or 
some universe, the case study researcher should seek to generalize a set of results derived 
from the case study to some broad theory.  Finally, to meet the standards of the reliability 
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test, researchers who choose to conduct case studies must diligently and accurately 
document all procedures and should also maintain a detailed record of all data collected 
and analyzed during the course of the research.  The remainder of this chapter will 
discuss how my research was designed and conducted to meet these standards.
Research Design
While always focused on doing a case study, the study was never intended to be 
or is it a complete review of reform throughout the DoD.  Therefore, my goal in 
conducting this research was to develop a detailed description of reform efforts within a 
limited area of the DoD as a means of assessing and evaluating certain conventional 
wisdom on government-wide reform.  It is my hope that this case study will assist in 
analyzing other cases on agencies’ efforts to comply with government-wide reform 
directives…past, present and future.
I began this research in 1995 and intended to complete it in 1999 with the 
submission of the program budget required by the GPRA.  Ultimately, however, I did not 
actually complete the data gathering until 2003.  Among the reasons for the extension 
was that Congress postponed the deadline for the program budget to fiscal year 2000.  In 
addition, I took the Career Broadening assignment to the Air Staff and I thought this 
opportunity would provide additional information and experiences pertinent to my 
research.  Finally, when I learned I would be reassigned to the Acquisition Center of 
Excellence upon my return to Oklahoma City, I simply could not resist the opportunity to 
see how acquisition reform initiatives I worked on in my previous assignment had turned 
out.  I have included those findings in my final report, as well.
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The primary question addressed by this dissertation is:  How does our evaluation 
of reform efforts differ when viewed from inside an agency?  Initially, I intended to track 
the various metrics used by the Propulsion Directorate, the Air Force Materiel Command 
and the Air Force designed to gauge their support to the warfighter and measure the 
changes overtime that could be clearly attributed to the GPRA reform effort.  I then 
planned to compare these findings to those of more conventional analyses to identify any 
differences.  However, very early on I learned that I could not accurately evaluate the 
impact of reform by looking at metrics alone.  
When looking for impacts at the managerial and operating levels inside an 
agency, I had to look at much more.  In particular, how the managers and operators 
actually perceive the reform is critical to whether or not it becomes institutionalized.   
Therefore, I decided to utilize a type of research Richard Fenno once called “soaking and 
poking.” Officially referred to as participant observation, I started listening to more 
discussions and asking more questions instead of simply tracking changes in the metrics. 
In the beginning, I did not know what specific activities I would observe and participate 
in for my research.  I read GAO reports to learn what areas of DoD’s business 
performance held the most interest for Congress.  I then selected those areas also 
addressed by the GPRA and in which I was most likely to be involved during the 
upcoming years.  
An overall area of great interest to Congress is the DoD budget process.  
Therefore, since the submission of a program budget is a key component of the GPRA, 
this study includes a review of the DoD’s resource management system, the Program-
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Planning and Budgeting System (PPBS) and the changes within the Air Force to improve 
it’s budget preparation and approval process.  
Beyond the budget process, a key concern for Congress, DoD and the Air Force is 
combat readiness.  I looked for areas most likely to have a significant impact on Air 
Force readiness.  The first area selected was developing clear and concise mission 
statements upon which strategic plans would be built and applicable metrics identified.   
Next, I looked at issues related to inventory management such as requirements 
development and the accuracy of submitted budgets as compared to the requirements.   
Finally, I included activities related to acquisition reform.
In conducting this research, I reviewed theories of change and government-wide 
reform from academia and organizational change experiences from corporate and defense 
organizations.  I sought out reports on government and commercial organizations that 
have undergone successful and sometimes not-so-successful change to learn what made 
them successful as well as how they learned from their less successful efforts.  In a few 
cases, I was able to follow up the documentary research with personal interviews and 
more informal discussions with actual participants in the change initiatives.  From these 
initial efforts I identified factors that are generally important to reform success. 
There are numerous factors believed to contribute to the success or failure of 
reform efforts.  Seven such factors, however, appear to enjoy fairly widespread 
consensus:  impetus, focus, decision -making, key actors, accountability, level at which 
knowledge and information is concentrated, and time for implementation.  By using these 
seven factors to guide my research, I hoped to learn just how much of an impact the 
GPRA was having on the Propulsion Directorate at the Oklahoma City Air Logistics 
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Center.  The first step was to define the seven factors and identify their relationship to 
reform success or failure.  
Critical Factors 
The first critical factor is impetus…or who is driving the reform train.  Any one 
of the three branches of our government—the Congress, the Executive or the Court—can 
direct government-wide reform.  However, which branch actually directs that changes be 
made may significantly impact the likelihood of successful implementation because 
statutes generally have more staying power than executive orders. 
As was sadly demonstrated during the lengthy battle over school desegregation, 
the Supreme Court has no enforcement capacity (Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1983).  While 
the Executive Branch has a constitutional obligation to execute the laws, it also has the 
capacity to enforce its own executive directives.  However, the limited tenure of all 
presidential administrations seriously restricts long-term implementation plans for 
reform.  The President and the Executive Branch political appointees who fill the top-
level agency positions are really only temporary government employees (Jones, 1994; p. 
101).  While the President may serve for up to eight years, the average political 
appointee’s tenure is generally much less.  In the DoD, for example, two years or less is a 
political appointee’s average tenure (Beck, Brokaw, and Kelmar, 1997).  Therefore, it is 
relatively easy for career civil servants to simply shuffle papers and give lip service to 
reform efforts directed by executive order while waiting for the next administration.  
In Congress, all are required to stand for periodic re-election.  However, the 
reform directives issued by Congress do not necessarily, nor easily go away after the next 
election because these directives have the force of law.  Certainly, laws can be changed 
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but it is conceivable that agencies take a more serious approach to directives from those 
who control the budget pie!   
The originating entity for reform does not change with the perspective.  It is, 
however, a critical factor to the ultimate success or failure of any reform initiative.  
Although how the reform was originally directed does not change, the influence it has on 
a different set of key actors does.  
The second contributing factor is focus…or what is expected to change.  Focus is 
defined in a variety of ways.  But whether one calls it a target (Pressman and Wildavsky, 
1973), the target group (Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1983), desired performance (Ripley 
and Franklin, 1986) or simply a preferred outcome, correctly identifying the focus is 
essential to successful reform and mandatory to accurate evaluation of that reform.   As 
previously discussed, the five major government-wide reform efforts initiated since 
WWII, including the GPRA, have been academically declared “failures” because they  
did not fundamentally alter the inherent political nature of decision-making in the federal 
budget process (Joyce, 2003; Radin, 1997 and 1998; GAO/AIMD-97-46; Schick, 1995 
and 1971; Gosling, 1992; and Wildavsky, 1992).  However, the focus of these initiatives 
was not external, i.e., congressional behavior, but rather internal in which the objective 
was to change or improve how the Executive Branch agencies conduct day-to-day 
government operations.   The results of this research show that before it can be decided 
whether or not change has been successfully implemented, we must be certain of what 
the policymakers intended to change.
Once the focus is identified, the next critical factor is decision-making…or how 
change is expected to be implemented. Charles Lindblom’s theory of incrementalism in 
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the policy process has long been a staple in the study of public administration.  Most 
typically applied to studies of the federal budgetary process (Schick, 1995; Wildavsky, 
1992; and Gosling, 1992), Lindblom’s theory essentially contends that limited, 
incremental changes yield the most desirable policies because they allow for inherent 
limitations on rationality and compromise among competing interests.  While Lindblom 
does not preclude the possibility of major policy change, he does warn of the potential for 
inefficiency and failure in the implementation of drastic changes.  President Johnson’s 
failed attempt to impose the DoD’s PPBS on all federal agencies within six months lends 
significant credence to Lindblom’s warning.  President Nixon’s equally shortsighted 
efforts to impose MBO and President Carter’s failed attempt to implement ZBB in single 
budget cycles further enhance Lindblom’s arguments.
There is, however, another view of the value of incrementalism in the policy 
process.  Using the Vietnam War as an example, Michael Hayes contends, “From 
observation, it is plain that incrementalism cannot always be relied upon to yield good 
public policy” (1992).  Recognizing the inherent danger in using words such as “always” 
or “never” in matters involving politicians or bureaucrats, there may be another 
alternative.  Perhaps incrementalism, while it may not always guarantee good public 
policy, is also not the true antithesis for major change Lindblom suggests. Rather, 
incremental decision-making, when guided by a well-defined strategic plan, seems to be 
the most viable means to achieving the major changes sought by government-wide 
reform efforts such as the GPRA (Zall, 1997; Nolan, Goodstein, and Pfeiffer, 1993; and 
Kirst and Jung, 1982). 
30
Now that we have the what and the how, it is time to look at the who…who are 
the key actors in successful reform implementation?  Obviously, who the key actors are 
depends on what is expected to change and how change is expected to be accomplished.  
This relationship is woefully overlooked by the traditional top-level view of reform.  The
traditional perspective tends to focus on the President, Congress and the identity, beliefs 
and decisions of the top-level officials of an agency.  While leadership certainly is critical 
to successful reform, effecting lasting change requires the support and compliance of 
those who actually perform the day-to-day tasks of government operations (Beck, et al, 
1997; Hersey, Blanchard and Johnson, 1996; Rainey, 1991; Wilson, 1989; and 
Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1983).  Therefore, to accurately evaluate reform efforts such as 
the GPRA, it is imperative that we look at the managerial and operating level to 
determine if change has, in fact, occurred and how has the change affected performance. 
The fifth factor of importance to successful reform is accountability…or who is 
minding the store.  The primary focus of much of the conventional literature is on the 
potential for disparity between the policy objectives driving congressional decision-
making and the actual outcomes of the executed policy.  Often this potential is studied in 
terms of congressional control versus agency discretion and flexibility (GAO/T-AIMD-
99-188; Peters, 1993; Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984; and Woll, 1963).  However, while 
agency discretion and flexibility are key components of the GPRA, the degree of control 
exercised by Congress is not a simple measure of reform success or failure. 
While the words were written long before the GPRA, Archibald (1970) clearly 
recognized the importance of evaluating implementation efforts at lower levels of 
government to achieve a more realistic view:
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              I am not merely saying that an alternative when implemented may 
              not produce the consequences expected.  Rather I am saying that
              the policy alternative actually executed is quite likely to have 
              undergone radical revisions at the hands of the operating levels. 
             And since a policy is no better than its implementation, this suggests 
             that analysts need to pay attention to the feasibility of a policy
             alternative at operating levels (p. 86).
The GPRA, like its predecessors, seeks to improve effectiveness, efficiency, 
economy and accountability in actual governance. Since the founding of our government, 
bureaucrats at all levels have insisted that they must be able to exercise their professional 
judgment in day-to-day operations if performance is to improve.  Therefore, one critical 
measure for reform initiatives is whether or not managers and operators are allowed to 
and actually use their professional judgment to make significant changes in their day-to-
day activities to improve performance.  When viewed from inside an agency, it may also 
be seen that better accountability is not incompatible with enhanced bureaucratic 
discretion and flexibility.
The sixth factor is the level at which knowledge and information is believed to be 
concentrated.  The traditional perspective assumes knowledge and information is greatest 
and most concentrated at the top of a hierarchical bureaucracy (Carnevale and Hummel, 
1996).  While this may be true, the knowledge and information at the top is very broad 
and lacks sufficient detail necessary to the development of appropriate measures for 
evaluating reform efforts. Other important measures of reform initiatives’ success or 
failure lie in an agencies’ ability to clearly define their mission; define and develop 
strategic plans; identify applicable measures of performance with established targets and 
goals; and, finally, to accurately relate those measures to both budget proposals and 
actual spending decisions.   Defining an agency’s mission and strategic goals are the 
purview of the upper level executives.  However, each level of management within an 
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agency must define their mission and their short-, mid- and long-term goals in accordance 
with the agency’s overall mission and strategic goals.  In addition, identifying applicable 
measures of performance with established targets and goals and accurately reflecting 
those measures in both budget proposals and actual spending decisions occur at much 
lower levels than agency directors.  Turning a plan into successful action requires not the 
broad knowledge at the top of the hierarchy, but the detailed and experiential knowledge 
found at the managerial and operating levels.  Therefore, it is the concentration of 
knowledge and information at the lower levels and top-level recognition of that fact that 
are most critical to reform success.
The seventh and final factor is time…specifically, the time allowed by 
policymakers for implementation of reform initiatives. The time policymakers allow for 
implementation is critical to the ultimate success of reform initiatives seeking major 
change.  Viewing reform initiatives at the managerial and operating levels of an agency 
more accurately demonstrates the actual time needed for successful implementation.  
Implementation of any large-scale reform, such as the GPRA, within the federal 
government is no easy task.  It is unlikely that it can be accomplished in a short period of 
time, especially not a single budget cycle (Schick, 1995; Osborne and Gaebler, 1992; 
Ripley and Franklin, 1986; Nakamura and Smallwood, 1980; Salamon, 1979 and 
Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973).  However, government reform initiatives are often 
viewed as short-lived endeavors.  A primary reason for this is the notorious short 
attention spans of many politicians (March and Olsen, 1983).  Although I will show that 
the lifetime of some previous reform initiatives is actually longer than frequently 
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depicted, the longevity of the GPRA is noteworthy in and of itself.  It, thus, provides an 
excellent opportunity to evaluate reform over a longer period of time. 
These, then, are the seven factors I used to structure my research and interview 
questions.  Once I had identified the factors I wanted to track and defined them, I created 
files for each and began collecting data.  
Data Collection
In addition to the review of archival materials already discussed, the data 
collection methods for this research include personal participation, direct observation, 
semi-structured discussions and structured interviews.  From 1995 to 2002, I participated 
in or observed more than two hundred meetings and briefings that focused on reform 
initiatives related to the GPRA.  I requested and was granted permission by my 
supervision to use information garnered from these meetings and briefings in my 
academic research.  There were, however, some restrictions.  The most important 
restriction was also the most obvious… I could not use any information that was in any 
way classified or proprietary.  Secondly, I could not ask questions during a meeting or 
briefing that were intended to gain additional information strictly for my academic 
research.  I could, however, contact participants at a later time for follow-up questions. 
 The third restriction involves attributing statements to meeting participants or a 
briefer by name.  The DoD has a strict non-attribution policy that is applicable to the 
working environment and professional military educational settings (See Appendix B).  
Therefore, unless explicit permission was granted or statements were included in publicly 
available published material, only professional titles are used in reference to any direct 
quotations.   Finally, the Air Force was not willing to pay my salary for me to conduct my 
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research while on duty.  In my professional role, I generally take extensive notes and then 
transcribe them into a more coherent and detailed form when I return to my desk.  During 
non-duty hours, I transcribed any notes I intended to use in my academic pursuits a 
second time in a format organized to support my research.
Over the years, I actually spoke with 167 individuals to gain information for my 
research.  A total of 98 interviews were conducted.  Some were formal and some were 
more informal and came about because an opportunity unexpectedly presented itself.   
These interviews included individual operators such as program managers, item 
managers, equipment specialists, logistics management specialist, contracting officers 
and budget specialists.  Also included were managers at all levels from first and second 
level supervisors and division chiefs at the Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center to one-, 
two-, and three-star generals and members of the Senior Executive Service at the 
Pentagon.  Some reflected a very positive view of the changes brought about by the 
GPRA.  Others were more skeptical and a few were quite pessimistic about the success of 
any attempt to reform the DoD.  All, however, provided valuable insight into how reform 
initiatives evolve inside an agency, sometimes become a permanent part of the agency’s 
activities and sometimes fail to survive even the initial implementation efforts.  
The range of attitudes, experience and expertise is wide in an organization as 
large as the Air Force and the DoD, and organizational change is, for many, a very 
emotional issue. In many cases, my findings are best reflected in the actual words of the 
people to whom I talked.  All 167 individuals spoke openly and freely, however, all but 
two also insisted on remaining anonymous.   Again, I agreed to adhere to the DoD’s non-
attribution policy (See Appendix B). However, I believe I have provided sufficient 
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information to give readers the best feel for what people are thinking and to illustrate the 
wide range and depth of feelings for organizational change under the GPRA.  
The seven critical factors provided the initial outline for all interviews and 
discussions.  I always included questions that would address all seven factors I selected to 
track.  However, in some cases, interviewees and discussion groups tended to focus only 
on the questions most related to their field of expertise and they were not willing to 
venture an opinion even with a guarantee of anonymity.  Others were more than willing 
to express an opinion…often in great detail!  
Finally, I employed two surveys to learn more about how people feel about 
reform in general as well how they feel about changes ongoing in their own 
organizations.  The first survey was not original. It was the Air Force Organizational 
Climate Surveys conducted in 1997.  Every Air Force Chief of Staff since 1997 has 
directed the Air Force Manpower and Innovation Agency to conduct a climate 
assessment survey every two years.  The purpose of the survey is to provide actionable 
feedback for leadership to use in improving their units. The survey "taps the pulse" of the 
Air Force by soliciting feedback from those that make it work, including all Air Force 
members, Appropriated and Non-Appropriated Fund civilians, and Air National Guard.
I was able to obtain the specific results for the Propulsion Management Division
at the Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center from the 1997 survey.   Therefore, for a 
comparative analysis, I decided to conduct a limited version of the survey specifically for 
this research in the fall of 2001.  Although I included other sections, my primary focus 
was on Core Values and Unit Flexibility.  I wanted to see if the survey would reflect any 
significant changes in how employees of the Propulsion Management Division at the 
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Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center viewed the levels of accountability and flexibility as 
they related to their daily job responsibilities (See Appendix C for Survey Instrument).    
I obtained permission to distribute the surveys to the item managers and 
equipment specialists in the Propulsion Management Division at the Oklahoma City Air 
Logistics Center.  I distributed 200 surveys with stamped, self-addressed envelopes 
included so the surveys could be returned conveniently and anonymously.  I was assigned 
to the Air Staff at the Pentagon in Washington D.C. at that time and maintained a 
personal post office box at the Pentagon post office.  I distributed the surveys on 1 
August 2001 and asked that they be returned by 30 September 2001 to the Pentagon post 
office address.  Sadly, September 11, 2001 occurred between those two dates.  By the end 
of September I had received only thirty-seven responses.  I decided to extend the return 
period to 30 November 2001.  I sent a notice to all the employees that received the 
original surveys advising them of the extension. By 4 November 2001, I had received a 
total of eighty-one completed surveys.   
On 5 November 2001, the Defense Protective Service notified me that my 
personal mailbox had tested positive for anthrax.  The entire post office was closed and 
most of the mail coming into it was later sent to Ohio to be radiated.  Unfortunately, my 
mail was confiscated and all mail without a return address was destroyed after it was 
tested for anthrax contamination.  The survey participants had been specifically directed 
not to put a return address on the envelope.  I do not know how many surveys might have 
actually been returned but destroyed.
I include the above explanation because I decided to go ahead and look at the 
results of the eighty-one surveys I received even though the sample number is much 
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smaller than I planned to use.  I acknowledge that the information gained from the 
analysis of these surveys could be quite skewed.  However, I did find the results 
somewhat interesting and informative and worthy of being included.  
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Chapter 3
The Road to GPRA
Previous Initiatives
America and the structure by which she is governed are products of an 
experimental, evolutionary journey that began more than two hundred and twenty-five 
years ago.  Some experiments were more successful than others.  Some sought to 
significantly alter the framework put in place by the Founding Fathers while others 
merely attempted to improve the performance of the federal structure by employing 
established business practices.    The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 
(GPRA) is not the first effort, nor is it likely to be the last, whose stated objectives 
include improving effectiveness, efficiency, economy and accountability in the federal 
government.  To improve the GPRA’s chances for successful government-wide 
implementation, the crafters of the GPRA utilized several important lessons learned from 
previous initiatives. Therefore, to truly understand the GPRA, it is necessary first to look 
at the road traveled to get there. 
According to the Government Accounting Office (GAO), at least four 
government-wide efforts aimed at improving the performance of the federal structure 
have been initiated since the end of World War II:  1) The Hoover Commissions;            
2) Planning-Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS); 3) Management By Objectives 
(MBO) and 4) Zero-Base Budgeting (ZBB).  Literature on government budgeting 
contends that each of these initiatives failed to achieve their objectives primarily because 
they did not fundamentally alter the inherent political nature of decision-making in the 
federal budget process (GAO/AIMD-97-46; Schick, 1995 and 1973; Gosling, 1992; 
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Wildavsky, 1992). However, fundamental changes in the budget interaction of the 
president and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), top agency officials, and 
congressional budgeters were not the goal of these initiatives.  Rather, the objectives 
focused on behaviors within the Executive Branch agencies.  When the federal budget 
process is viewed from inside an agency, it becomes more evident that these initiatives 
have left a lasting legacy not readily identifiable from the more conventional view.  
Consequently, it is important to understand the environment in which these initiatives 
came about; the principles on which they were based; the stated goals and objectives; and 
the methods of implementation. 
The Hoover Commissions
In 1945, America celebrated a victorious conclusion to WWII, enjoyed a strong 
and prosperous economy but mourned the death of her President, Franklin D. Roosevelt. 
Harry Truman came to the Oval Office committed to preserving the soul of FDR’s legacy 
but not necessarily the war-inflated bureaucratic structure supporting it.  Although 
Truman clearly recognized and respected FDR’s qualities as a leader, he never thought 
his former boss was a particularly good manager. Truman believed his first responsibility 
as President after the end of WWII was to achieve an orderly re-conversion of the 
American economy from a wartime to a peacetime basis while avoiding a recession or a 
return to depression that frequently follows major conflicts (Moe, 1982).  
Believing reorganization of the Executive Branch to be the necessary means to 
achieving his desired ends, President Truman requested, and Congress approved, the 
Reorganization Act of 1945 (59 Stat. 613).  Truman strongly believed governmental 
“reorganization was peculiarly a presidential responsibility of a continuing nature” (Moe, 
1982; p. 23).  Therefore, under the grant of authority contained in the 1945 Act, Truman 
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submitted six separate reorganization plans and saw four of them approved by Congress.  
However, some, most notably Republican critics, viewed Truman’s efforts as a piecemeal 
approach not likely to achieve the significant reforms needed.  
In 1946, the Republicans gained control of both the House and the Senate. Shortly 
after the elections, Republican Congressman Clarence Brown introduced a bill in the 
House and Senator Henry Cabot Lodge introduced an identical bill in the Senate to
establish a commission for the expressed purpose of reorganizing the Executive Branch 
of the government.  The final bill had a smooth, rather uneventful journey through 
Congress (Moe, 1982).  In early 1947, with few serious questions and little opposition, 
Congress established by statute (61 Stat. 246, July 7, 1947) a Commission on 
Organization of the Executive Branch of Government.  It soon became more popularly 
known by the name of its chairman, former President Herbert Hoover.  
When Congress established a second study commission (67 Stat. 184, July 10, 
1953) with the same official name and also chaired by Herbert Hoover, the commissions 
became known simply as the First Hoover Commission (1947-1949) and the Second 
Hoover Commission (1953-1955).  The name, however, was not the only characteristic 
shared by the two commissions.  Both were unusual in that while they were 
congressionally mandated, they also enjoyed presidential support and cooperation.  An 
important feature of both Hoover Commissions was their comprehensive and, generally, 
bipartisan nature. In the case of the First Hoover Commission, an absolute bipartisan 
makeup of six Republicans and six Democrats was required by statute. Although no such 
strict requirement was contained in the statutory language establishing the Second 
Hoover Commission, general bipartisan consensus was still achieved.   
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Both commissions also strongly reflected the philosophical beliefs of their 
chairman, Mr. Hoover, regarding the proper role of the President in the administrative 
structure of the American national government.    According to Ronald Moe (1982), 
“…both Commissions sought to reduce the role of the Federal Government in the life of 
the Nation, reorganize Federal agencies to produce greater economy and efficiency in its 
operations, and generally strengthen the President and departmental secretaries as 
administrative managers of the Executive Branch” (p. 1) – a very succinct and accurate 
statement of Mr. Hoover’s own personal views.  To this end, the First Hoover 
Commission focused primarily on reorganizing the structure of the Executive Branch 
agencies and expanding the managerial authority of the President.  The Second Hoover 
Commission was more concerned with the functions performed by the Executive Branch 
and the rewriting of associated policies.
The First Hoover Commission held its initial meeting at the White House on      
29 September 1947.  According to its congressional direction, the Commission was to 
submit its report within ten days after the 81st Congress convened in January 1949 and 
disband within the following ninety days.  To meet this schedule, the First Hoover 
Commission established twenty-four separate task forces as the basic work units and 
adopted a comprehensive work schedule. By September 1948, the Commission was 
generally meeting on a weekly basis for two or three days at a time (Moe, 1982).
The stated objectives of the First Hoover Commission were:  
 Create a more orderly grouping of the functions of Government into major 
departments and agencies under the President.
 Establish a clear line of control from the President to those department and agency 
heads and from them to their subordinates with correlative responsibility from these 
officials to the President, cutting through the barriers that, in many cases, have made 
bureaus and agencies partially independent of the Chief Executive.
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 Permit the operating departments and agencies to administer for themselves 
             a larger share of the routine administrative services, under strict supervision 
             and in conformity with high standards (General Management of the Executive 
           Branch, 1949; pp. 7-8).
While the influence of the 1937 Brownlow Committee report is clearly evident in the 
stated objectives, the First Hoover Commission declared that both legitimacy and 
historical precedence for their actions were firmly anchored in the words and intentions 
of the Founding Fathers to promote a vigorous executive (Moe, 1982).  Hoover strongly 
believed that the Federal Government could operate in a more economical and efficient 
manner.  However, Hoover equally was committed to the belief that this outcome was 
only possible if the responsibility for making policy and setting standards was firmly in 
the hands of the President and the departmental secretaries.  It was these two beliefs that 
formed the basic doctrine for both Commissions.  Also, enhancing and expanding the 
institutional presidency through the concentration of greater power and authority not only 
for the President but also for departmental secretaries and agency chiefs was among the 
most significant and enduring accomplishments of the First Hoover Commission (Moe, 
1982)…a legacy that remains with us today.
Although the members acknowledged the broad grant of authority intended by the 
statute, the First Hoover Commission did not believe its mandate extended to the writing 
of policy.  By the time the Second Hoover Commission was created, however, the 
statutory language clearly provided the Commission the authority to rewrite any 
applicable policy or write new policy when needed (Moe, 1982).  According to the 
enabling legislation for the Second Hoover Commission,
       The most important difference between this bill and the Hoover Commission 
statute (1949) is found in the declaration-of-policy section.  These paragraphs 
are intended to make certain that this Commission has full power to look into 
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the activities of the Federal Government from the standpoint of policy and to
             inquire, ‘Should the Government be performing this activity or service, and
             if so to what extent?’ This commission must ask questions of this nature which 
the original Hoover Commission did not ask (Establishment of Commission on 
Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, p. 4).
Clearly, the underlying philosophy that guided Congress and Mr. Hoover in the 
establishment and activities of the Second Hoover Commission was a belief that 
Government had simply grown too large.  Ironically, although reducing the size of 
government is among the cornerstones of conservative wisdom, the Second Hoover 
Commission never enjoyed the same level of support from Republican President Dwight 
Eisenhower that Democrat, Harry Truman had given the First Hoover Commission.  This 
may be one reason for the different perceptions of the Commissions’ overall success 
(Moe, 1982).
For the most part, the First Hoover Commission is viewed as the more successful 
of the two.  The First Hoover Commission never submitted a single, consolidated final 
report to Congress.  Rather, the twenty-four Task Forces completed nineteen individual 
reports that were submitted to Congress over a three-month period with the final report 
reaching Congress in May 1949 (Moe, 1982).  Contained in these nineteen reports were 
more than two hundred and seventy separate recommendations aimed at reorganizing the 
Executive Branch to achieve greater effectiveness and efficiency.  Of these, it has been 
estimated that as many as one hundred and ninety-six recommendations were actually 
implemented to some significant degree (GAO-97-46, p. 30).
For the purposes here, the most important of the recommendations viewed as 
successfully implemented was the call for a performance-based budget for the Federal 
Government.  The Commission defined performance budgeting as a process where
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            …attention is centered on the function or activity—on the accomplishment
of the purpose—instead of on lists of employees or authorizations of 
purchases…this method of budgeting concentrates congressional
             action and executive direction on the scope and magnitude of the 
             different Federal activities.  It places both accomplishment and cost
             in a clear light before the Congress and the public (GAO-97-46, p. 31).
The Executive Branch acted immediately to implement the Commission’s 
recommendation for a performance-based budget with the submission of the President’s 
Budget for fiscal year 1951.  Prior to 1951, less than forty-five percent of all budget 
accounts included in the annual budget submission contained information on obligations by 
activities.  However, after the 1951 budget, all budget requests contained sections that 
provided –
 Listings of all programs or activities imbedded within a budget account;
 Separated operating and capital expenses; and
 Established breakouts for grants and other fixed charges.
Also, unlike previous budgets, the budget submitted in 1951 also contained 
narrative statements regarding the program and performance for each account and summary 
information on employment levels (GAO-97-46, p. 31).
Surprisingly, Congress acted with equal speed and fervor in passing two laws 
intended to require performance budgets from all Federal agencies.  The first of these was 
the National Security Act Amendments of 1949 (63 Stat. 578, August 10, 1949).  Section 
403 of this Act required
The budget estimate of the Department of Defense shall be prepared,
presented, and justified, where practicable so as to account for, and
report, the cost of performance of readily identifiable functional activities,
with segregation of operating and capital programs…(GAO-97-46, p. 32).
Although actual presentation formats have continually evolved over the last fifty years, this 
requirement remains in effect for the DoD even today.   
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The second law passed by Congress in response to the Hoover Commission’s 
recommendations was the Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950 (BAPA, 64 Stat. 
832, September 12, 1950).  This law was intended to impose requirements similar to those 
already required of the DoD on all federal agencies.  However, following a lengthy debate 
on the floor of Congress, the BAPA contained no language specifically requiring a 
performance-based budget submission from other agencies.  Arguing that the term 
performance budget was unnecessary for legal enforcement of the new law, BAPA simply 
states in part:
The Budget shall set forth in such form and detail as the President may 
determine—(a) functions and activities of the Government...
Despite the less than specific language, Congress believed it had fully implemented 
the Hoover Commission’s recommendation for a government-wide performance budget 
with the enactment of BAPA.  Although BAPA does not specifically call for a performance 
budget, it institutionalized the requirement for all agencies to provide sub-account level 
information to the Congress via the obligations by activities section.  While this section is 
now called program activities, the requirement laid out in BAPA remains in force today 
(GAO-97-46, pp. 32-33).
Like its predecessor, the Second Hoover Commission utilized nineteen task forces 
to produce twenty individual reports on assigned research topics that were ultimately 
submitted to Congress over a period of several months.  However, unlike the First 
Hoover Commission, the Second Hoover Commission also submitted a summary Final 
Report, as well.  Overall, the reports contained three hundred and fourteen separate 
recommendations.  According to a report by the Citizens’ Committee charged with 
monitoring the implementation process, more than two hundred of the recommendations 
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had been fully or partially implemented by 1958.  However, none of the major budget 
and accounting recommendations was implemented.  This may account for much of the 
criticism levied at both Hoover Commissions in literature on government budgeting 
(Moe, 1982). 
Both Hoover Commissions left their indelible mark on the structure of the Federal 
Government.  In addition, the concept of study commissions to address difficult issues, i.e.,
the Base Realignment and Closure Committee (BRAC)), continues to be highly touted 
today in both the halls of Congress and the Executive Branch agencies.
The Planning-Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS)
The Planning-Programming and Budgeting System as it pertains to the Department 
of Defense will be discussed in detail in subsequent sections.  This section will focus only 
on the attempt to impose the PPBS on all government agencies.
President Lyndon B. Johnson’s approach to government-wide implementation of 
the PPBS in 1965 was distinctively different than the approach previously taken by DoD.  
The DoD utilized several hundred analysts and more than ten years of contractor-assisted 
development to implement the PPBS.  In contrast, President Johnson directed that 
government-wide implementation of the PPBS be accomplished in less than six months.
On 12 October 1965, less than two months after Johnson’s formal announcement, 
the Bureau of the Budget (BOB) issued Bulletin 66-3 to provide agencies guidance and 
instructions for the government-wide implementation of the PPBS.  Bulletin 66-3 
directed twenty-two executive departments and seventeen smaller agencies to designate 
an official responsible for implementing their PPBS system and report the selection to 
BOB within ten days.  Bulletin 66-3 further directed the agencies to:
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 Make tentative decisions on their broad program categories within 
twenty days;
 Forward instructions, procedures or regulations regarding their PPBS 
implementation to the BOB within two months; and
 Deliver a final Program Structure, approved by the agency director, 
to the BOB by 1 February 1966 (GAO/AIMD-97-46, p. 36. 
Through the use of Program and Financial Plans (PFP), Program Memoranda (PM) and 
Special Studies, agencies were to provide data on program structures “to illustrate how they 
would achieve national needs, showing costs and effectiveness of alternative objectives, 
program types, and level of operations,” including any “assumptions and uncertainties on 
the cost and criteria used to support agency recommendations and estimates” 
(GAO/AIMD-97-46, p. 37).
In addition to the unrealistic implementation time frame, Bulletin 66-3 created an 
additional obstacle to government-wide success for the PPBS by specifically separating the 
PPBS from the President’s annual budget submission to Congress:
The introduction of the Planning, Programming and Budgetary system
             will not, by itself, require any changes in the form in which budget
             appropriation requests are sent to Congress.  Further, this Bulletin is
not to be interpreted to set forth changes in the format of annual budget
             submissions to the Budget Bureau.
BOB later tried to address the separation between the PPBS process and the 
President’s budget when it issued a second BOB Bulletin (No. 68-2) in July 1967 directing 
agencies to provide crosswalks between their PPBS and appropriation structures.  This two-
track system, however, only added to the already overwhelming implementation burden of 
the PPBS caused by lack of training and expertise due to unreasonable time frames.  
BOB issued subsequent guidance calling for agencies to integrate their PPBS and 
appropriation structures, but each new directive merely served to further confuse agencies 
and complicate an already complex budget process.  Government-wide implementation of 
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the PPBS seems to have been doomed to failure from the beginning by a lack of 
preparation and foresight on the part of its very proponents.   
Was the PPBS truly new and revolutionary?   Could the PPBS result in rational 
decisions?  From the beginning, reactions to the PPBS varied.  Many predicted the PPBS 
would displace performance budgeting in government in an effort to determine how 
funds should be allocated among competing programs based on priorities (Henry, 1992).  
Allen Schick (1966), however, contends there were actually three reactions to Johnson's 
directive.  The first group was comprised of individuals who clearly shared Johnson's 
high expectations.  This group heralded the PPBS as a "revolutionary development in the 
history of government management." As Henry (1992) also suggests, they saw the PPBS 
as markedly different from anything previously used in government decision-making.  
Others, however, were not as impressed with the PPBS or its potential for 
accomplishing revolutionary changes.  Schick calls this group “old-timers” because they 
viewed the PPBS as nothing more than “…a revival of the performance budgeting 
venture of the early 1950s."  They simply did not see that the PPBS was substantially 
different.  For the old-timers, the PPBS was simply a new way to package techniques and 
give new, distinctive names to activities already in use. 
The third response to the PPBS described by Schick seems to be the one he, 
himself, shared.  In that interpretation, the PPBS was seen as offering "…a radical change 
in the central function of budgeting" while remaining "anchored to half a century of 
tradition and evolution."  In 1966, Schick called the PPBS, "the first budget system 
designed to accommodate the multiple functions of budgeting."  He also contended the 
"success story" of the PPBS in the DoD had undoubtedly "pushed ahead by several 
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years" the implementation of the PPBS throughout the federal government.  Schick 
concluded that the PPBS would lead to future budget decisions "influenced by explicit 
statements of objectives and by formal weighing of the costs and benefits of alternatives."  
This, in fact, is exactly what the PPBS was designed to accomplish.  
As often is the case, however, a new administration brought new opinions and a 
new round of reorganization for the Executive Branch.  In the late 1960s, Defense 
Secretary Melvin Laird (appointed by President Nixon) was seen by many as trying to 
"dismantle" the Pentagon's "well-controlled and highly centralized PPB system."  Laird 
tried to gain support for what he called "participatory budgeting" by stressing that it 
would allow the admirals and generals "to participate more fully in budget formation" 
than did the PPBS.  Ultimately, Laird's efforts failed because the PPBS was already well 
institutionalized in the DoD (Henry, 1992). 
During this same time period, President Richard Nixon reorganized the Executive 
Office of the President to include a domestic council that would focus on policy and 
planning.  In addition, in 1970, Nixon replaced the Bureau of the Budget with the new 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The OMB was to focus on management and 
effectiveness.  Again, according to Henry (1992), this division of responsibilities between 
the Domestic Council and the OMB created "additional layers of authority between 
budgeters and policymakers" and demoted "the function of the budget examiner"(p. 205). 
OMB wasted very little time in directly attacking the PPBS.  On 21 June 1971, 
OMB issued the following memorandum: 
Agencies are no longer required to submit with their budget submissions 
the multi-year program and financing plans, program memoranda 
and special analytical studies or the schedules that reconcile information 
classified according to their program and appropriation structures.
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Allen Schick (1973) declared the OMB memorandum a "death notice" for the PPBS in 
the federal government.  Despite the great expectations that had accompanied the 
introduction of the PPBS less than ten years before, Schick contends the OMB death 
notice rendered the PPBS an unthing.  
According to Schick (1973), the PPBS failed because it did not impact budget 
decisions in "civilian departments" as it had in the DoD. Schick credits the success of the 
PPBS in the DoD to organizational changes made in the DoD in the 1950s, the suitability 
of systems analysis for major procurement decisions and, perhaps most importantly, the 
leadership and determination of then-Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara to develop 
a system specifically designed to meet the needs of the DoD.  Schick concludes, these 
conditions were "weak or absent" in the civilian departments.  Therefore, the PPBS failed 
to penetrate their budget processes and decisions. 
Guy Peters (1993) seems to take a similar stance in his analysis of the failure of 
the PPBS in the federal government. Peters contends, "PPBS was a dagger pointed 
toward the central role of the agency in policy-making in the federal government, and as 
such it could not really have been expected to succeed, except perhaps in organizations 
such as the Department of Defense"(p. 137).  Like Schick, Peters points to a strong leader 
(McNamara) committed to the concept of program budgeting as a primary reason for the 
success of the PPBS in the DoD.  Other federal agencies did not have this same strong, 
committed leadership when directed to implement the PPBS. 
Peters also suggests the nature of the DoD's mission contributed to its success 
with the PPBS because the system "produced extremely nebulous results that could only 
be tested against simulations or scenario-building exercises"(p. 137).  Finally, Peters 
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includes the DoD's limited number of "potent political enemies" as another reason for the 
success of the PPBS in that agency.  Overall, Peters concludes, for other agencies with 
greater political opposition and real clients demanding real services, PPBS was "doomed 
to failure from the beginning"(p. 137). 
Henry, Schick and Peters all contend it was factors and circumstances unique to 
the DoD that account for the success of the PPBS in that agency.   Henry (1992) suggests,  
“PPBS often seems to be used most effectively in organizations centered around hard 
technology, such as the Department of Defense, which, in fact, has never discontinued 
the PPB systems introduced by McNamara"(p. 204). Henry bases his argument on the 
relative ease and accuracy of measuring costs and benefits of new aircraft or other 
weapon systems as opposed to measuring costs and benefits of the variety of services 
provided by agencies such as the Department of Health and Human Services.  
James J. Gosling, in his book, Budgetary Politics in American Governments
(1992), contends, "Except for the continuation of selective special analyses, PPBS as a 
ubiquitous structure in federal budgeting was allowed a quiet death"(p. 33).  According to 
Gosling, while the PPBS was not really new in its "use of policy analysis to evaluate 
alternative solutions to public problems. What was new was the attempt to incorporate 
analysis systematically into the fabric of budgeting through program budgeting--to make 
analysis an inherent part of budget developments and review"(p. 32). 
Gosling's conclusions regarding the demise of the PPBS in the federal 
government seem to reflect the general opinions of the academic community. The most 
common reasons given for the failure of the PPBS include:  
  Programs and objectives are difficult to define in terms that are
both logical and useful to budget participants.
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 Because of its complexity, budget participants never really 
             understood nor learned how to do program budgeting.
  Program budgeting was resented by lower- and middle-level
                                  management and Congress because they viewed it as a means of
     promoting "top-down decision-making" and enhancing the influence 
                                  of the President in the budgetary process.
 Budget participants never became comfortable with the PPBS 
                                 because they preferred the more "traditional" line-item method 
                                 of developing and reviewing budgets.
Although this review is limited, there seems to be little disagreement among the 
academic community regarding the complete failure of the PPBS in federal agencies 
other than the DoD.  There is, however, another slightly different opinion of the PPBS 
that must be addressed…for the works of Aaron Wildavsky frequently are cited and 
referenced in all the literature pertaining to the PPBS, especially its demise.  In his book, 
The Politics of the Budgetary Process, Fourth Edition (1984), Wildavsky contended he 
was unable "to find a single example of successful implementation of PPBS"(p. 195) 
…including the DoD!  In contrast to the other academicians reviewed, Wildavsky 
contended the PPBS did not succeed in the DoD because it made no significant changes 
in DoD's budgetary decisions and had no major impact on the agency's final budget. 
Wildavsky carries his argument even further and suggests PPBS could not have 
succeeded because it never actually existed in the DoD or anywhere else.  Wildavsky 
bases his argument on the contention that no one, not even program budget practitioners, 
was able to adequately define programs or assess their costs.  His final argument actually 
may be the most extreme.  According to Wildavsky, the PPBS could not result in rational 
decision-making because the PPBS, itself, is irrational!  He further contended that the 
PPBS cannot improve the allocation of resources; it cannot produce better analyses 
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because of limited human and/or mechanical capacities; and, finally it is not cost 
effective. Wildavsky concluded, “the PPBS only produces costly rationales for inevitable 
failures"(p. 200).  
A final view of the attempt to implement the PPBS throughout the Federal 
Government is that of Alice M. Rivlin.  In her book, Systematic Thinking for Social 
Action (1971), Rivlin describes the PPBS as “simply a commonsense approach to 
decision-making" in which organizational objectives are clearly defined; definite methods 
are established to account for money spent and outputs achieved; alternatives are 
evaluated and analyzed; and, finally, systematic procedures are established to ensure 
relevant information is available when it is time for decisions to be made.   
The PPBS President Johnson imposed on federal agencies in 1965 was designed 
to achieve precisely the objectives Rivlin describes.  For it is not the technical 
terminology nor the complex analytical processes that provide the foundation for the 
PPBS.  Rather, the PPBS represents a belief that a relationship can and should exist 
between planning and budgeting with programming providing the bridge.  Unfortunately, 
instead of imposing the concept of the PPBS, Johnson attempted to install across all 
agencies a system specifically designed for the DoD.  Add to that Johnson’s unrealistic 
expectation that the PPBS could be learned and installed in all agencies in only six 
months and the failure of the PPBS to become part of the institutional fabric of 
government budgeting could have been accurately predicted long before the OMB issued 
its death notice in 1971. 
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Management By Objective
Management by Objective (MBO) first was introduced in the private sector in the 
mid-1950s (Drucker, 1954).  Although the definitions associated with MBO shift to some 
degree with each iteration, a basic definition is “a process whereby organizational goals 
and objectives are set through the participation of organizational members in terms of 
results expected” (Jun, 1976, p. 3).  In other words, MBO essentially is a decentralized 
approach to management that seeks to establish specific but broad objectives, measure 
the progress of particular programs and then evaluate the contributions of those programs 
to achieving the established objectives.  More important, perhaps, is what MBO does not
do—it does not look for alternative approaches to meeting the stated objectives.  
Therefore, MBO will not tell decision-makers if there is more than one effective solution.
MBO first was implemented in the federal government in April 1973 during the 
last Nixon administration.  President Nixon’s support of MBO was ironic because of 
MBO’s emphasis on decentralization and President Nixon and his advisors basically were 
distrustful of anyone or any program not rigidly controlled by the White House.  In a 
memorandum issued to twenty-one federal agencies that constituted approximately 
ninety-five percent of the budget and federal employees, President Nixon declared:
I am now asking each department and agency head to seek a sharper
          focus on the results which various activities under his or her direction
         are aimed at achieving…This conscious emphasis on setting goals and
         then achieving results will substantially enhance federal program
         performance (GAO/AIMD 97-46, p. 42).
To ensure adequate White House control of an initiative bent on decentralizing 
the federal government, responsibility for implementing and monitoring the progress of 
MBO was firmly established in the recently created Office of Management and Budget 
55
(OMB).  Thirty new management associate positions were created within OMB to assist
other departments with their MBO implementation efforts.
The management associates provided “day-to-day assistance to the departments in 
preparing objectives, tracking progress, working closely with OMB budget examiners, 
and providing technical assistance to agency staff and OMB top management to help 
implement the initiative” (GAO/AIMD-97-46, p. 43).  An additional responsibility of the 
management associates was to ensure the agencies’ objectives did not stray from nor 
conflict with administration goals and objectives.
OMB’s implementation plan called for agencies to identify ten to fifteen of their 
most important objectives to be achieved within a year but without additional resources.  
These would be known as Presidential Objectives.  Depending on the agency, proposals 
were to be submitted within two to eight weeks after the official announcement in April 
1973.  After proposals were approved, the agency staff was to meet, face-to-face, with 
OMB approximately every two months to discuss agencies’ progress toward achieving 
their objectives.  In the first year, no direct connection between the budget process and 
MBO was established.  In February 1974, however, OMB directed agencies to base their 
1976 budget requests on their presidential and agency objectives.  Despite a formal link 
to the budget process, MBO’s implementation was soon overshadowed by the collapse of 
the Nixon administration in August 1974.  Although a newly appointed President Gerald 
Ford enthusiastically endorsed agencies’ 1975 Presidential Objectives, no further 
presidential objectives were ever requested under MBO.
MBO, as implemented, was quite attractive to most federal agencies because its 
perceived flexibility offered relief from the alleged inflexibility of the PPBS.  MBO also 
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was quite popular with lower levels of government.  However, although MBO continued 
to be used by many state and local governments well into the 1980s, MBO as a formal 
initiative in the federal government died quietly in 1976.  MBO’s short life clearly was 
the result of its initial separation from the formal budget process and problems 
encountered in identifying and measuring objectives.  Not so clear, however, is the effect 
the resignation of President Nixon had on its overall implementation.  But, as we shall 
see in later chapters, to some extent the basic concepts of MBO live on in the federal 
government, today.
Zero-Base Budgeting
Zero-Base Budgeting (ZBB) came to Washington in 1977 with the inauguration 
of a new president, Jimmy Carter.  As Governor of Georgia, Carter had introduced ZBB 
to the public sector as a means of improving both the effectiveness and efficiency of 
Georgia’s state government.  During his tenure as Governor, Carter allegedly used ZBB 
to reduce agency budget requests and force some major reallocations of resources that 
included the total elimination of some programs (Phyrr, 1977).  However, ZBB did not 
stand alone in Georgia.  Rather, ZBB was used in conjunction with sunset laws to achieve 
its objectives.  Sunset laws provide 
…that, unless the legislature specifically acts otherwise, public programs
or agencies are disbanded after a set period of time…Programs and
agencies are reviewed periodically by the legislature under this threat of 
                          termination, with the idea that over lapping jurisdictions and inefficient
                          programs can be eliminated or possibly reworked (Henry, 1992, p. 207).
In February 1977, President Carter issued a memorandum “mandating the use of 
zero-base budgeting for all fiscal year 1979 agency budget requests” (GAO/AIMD-97-
46, p. 46).  While President Carter could direct agencies and departments to use ZBB to 
formulate the Executive Branch budget, he could not mandate sunset laws, ZBB’s 
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Georgia partner.  Only Congress can issue such a mandate.  And, although Congress did 
conduct hearings on proposals calling for sunset laws, no such legislation was ever 
passed.  Therefore, on 19 April 1977, when OMB issued Bulletin 77-9 as the final 
guidance for the implementation of a new budget formulation process, ZBB was expected 
to replace the existing process as a stand-alone initiative.
Theoretically, under ZBB, all programs that require funding still must compete 
for that funding but they start from an equal base – zero – rather than from any previous 
funding level.  ZBB requires the preparation of packages called decision units as the basis 
for all budget requests.  These packages were to present thorough evaluations of all 
proposed funding program activities including the level of funding needed to achieve 
stated program goals and objectives as well as alternatives based on varying levels of 
funding.  Unlike previous implementation plans for the PPBS and MBO, OMB did not 
establish a special staff to facilitate the implementation of ZBB.  Rather, federal 
managers and existing budgeters were expected to implement this new budget 
formulation process in their normal course of business.
The lack of a specialized staff was not the only impediment to ZBB 
implementation.  OMB also did not provide specific structural guidelines.  Top agency 
officials and program managers were expected to establish objectives as “explicit 
statements of intended output, clearly related to the basic need for which the program or 
organization exists” and to identify “measures of effectiveness, efficiency, and workload 
for each decision unit” (GAO/AIMD-97-46, p. 48).   However, because OMB did not 
specify a basis for the decision units, some agencies used their account structures while 
others focused on their program activities.  Many of the alternatives presented were based 
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on nothing more than arbitrary percentages of their current funding.  Some agencies also 
opted to consolidate decision units at high organizational levels.  All of these factors 
made accurate measurement difficult and frequently impossible.  
In addition to the technical difficulties associated with ZBB, agency officials 
complained that they were not given sufficient time to appropriately implement ZBB and 
the additional paperwork required created an overwhelming burden on agency personnel.  
But, despite the complaints and obstacles, ZBB was successfully implemented in the 
sense that the required documentation in the appropriate format was submitted by the 
agencies – and on time!  There is, however, no evidence that the extensive decision
packages submitted to OMB had any subsequent impact on Congressional actions.
As a formal budget process initiative, ZBB did not survive the change of 
presidential administrations in 1980.  In August 1981, OMB quietly rescinded its circular 
A-115 that required federal agencies to maintain a ZBB system.  Some of the budget 
process requirements introduced by ZBB, however, did survive – at least for a period of 
time.  Agencies continued to identify and prioritize decision units until 1986.  Until 1994, 
OMB continued to require agencies to submit budget requests reflecting three levels of 
funding and consolidated priorities (GAO/AIMD-97-46).
There were no more formal government-wide reform initiatives specifically 
aimed at improving government performance after ZBB until the 1990s.  But, as 
discussed in the next chapter, many of the concepts associated with and the lessons 
learned from the Hoover Commissions, the Planning-Programming and Budgeting 
System, Management by Objectives and Zero-Base Budgeting did survive and continue 
to influence the federal budget process in the twenty-first century.     
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Chapter 4
Overview of the GPRA
Government reform in the early 1990s had a new look.  Rather than initiatives 
emanating solely from the Oval Office, the latest efforts to improve government 
performance claim the force of law .    For as former-Vice President Al Gore was 
announcing plans to reinvent government, Congress already had begun erecting a 
statutory framework aimed at improving the effectiveness, efficiency, economy and 
accountability of all federal programs.  The centerpiece of that framework is the 
Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993 (GAO/GGD-97-109 and 
GAO/T-GGD-97-43).  
At a very basic level, performance based budgeting simply is the linking of plans 
and performance to resource distribution.  This is the heart of the GPRA.  The GPRA 
seeks more accurate, reliable and consistent information in a user-friendly format to assist
the President and Congress in making appropriate budgetary decisions (GAO/GGD-97-
109 and GAO/T-GGD-97-43). It is important to note here, however, that the stated goals 
of the GPRA do not include fundamentally altering Congressional behavior or political 
processes.  So what does the GPRA actually say?
What It Says
The overall objective of the GPRA, as stated at the beginning of Public Law 103-
62: Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, is:
To provide for the establishment of strategic planning and performance
             measurement in the Federal Government, and for other purposes.
Congress justified a need for the GPRA based on three formal findings:
(1) Waste and inefficiency in Federal programs undermine the 
      confidence of the American people in the Government and
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     reduces the Federal Government’s ability to address
     adequately vital public needs;
(2) Federal managers are seriously disadvantaged in their efforts
      to improve program efficiency and effectiveness, because of
      insufficient articulation of program goals and inadequate 
      information on program performance; and
(3) Congressional policymaking, spending decisions and program 
      oversight are seriously handicapped by insufficient attention
     to program performance and results (Public Law 103-62).
These findings reflected the widespread belief in the 1990s that the federal 
government needed to be run in a more businesslike manner.  As private companies are 
held accountable by their shareholders, the federal government is accountable to 
taxpayers.  As budget deficits ballooned as never before, taxpayers began demanding that 
their tax dollars be managed and spent more responsibly.  But more stringent fiscal 
responsibility was not the only demand.  The tax paying public was also demanding that 
the federal government improve services while lowering total costs---and do so with 
fewer employees.
Over the years, the GAO, acting on behalf of Congress, had conducted countless 
studies of federal agencies’ fiscal management and mission performance.  Their findings 
were frequently the same—“federal agencies often fail to appropriately manage their 
finances, identify clearly what they intend to accomplish, or get the job done effectively 
and with a minimum of waste” (GAO/GGD-96-118; p. 1).
 Congress already had passed legislation to begin addressing issues associated 
with federal agencies’ financial management.  Now the GPRA would focus on efforts 
aimed at improving agencies’ mission identification, strategic planning, performance 
measures and relating those measures to proposed and actual expenditures. This clearly is 
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stated in the six purposes set forth by Congress in the law.  Congress wrote:  The 
purposes of this Act are to –
(1) improve the confidence of the American people in the capability of 
     the Federal Government, by systematically holding Federal agencies
    accountable for achieving program results;
(2) initiate program performance reform with a series of pilot projects
      in setting program goals, measuring program performance against 
      those goals, and reporting publicly on their progress;
(3) improve Federal program effectiveness and public accountability
      by promoting a new focus on results, service quality, and customer
      satisfaction;
(4) help Federal managers improve service delivery, by requiring that 
     they plan for meeting program objectives and by providing them with
     information about program results and service quality;
(5) improve congressional decision making by providing more objective
      information on achieving statutory objectives, and on the relative 
 effectiveness and efficiency of Federal programs and spending; and
(6) improve internal management of the Federal Government (Public 
Law 103-62, 1993).
History Guides the Way
To improve the GPRA’s chances for success, Congress drew on many of the
lessons learned from previous government-wide reform initiatives.  The GPRA’s crafters 
considered factors that influenced both the success and failure of previous initiatives to 
formulate the concepts and provisions of the GPRA, a time schedule and plan for 
implementation and even supporting legislation.  From the lessons of history, the crafters 
of the GPRA clearly recognized that:
 a law has both strength and longevity that executive orders lack;
 lasting reform requires ongoing collaboration and cooperation between the 
Executive Branch and the Congress;
 no one piece of legislation alone can improve the performance of government;
 institutionalized reform takes more than one or two budget cycles;
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 test cases facilitate learning and long-term success.
 budgetary reforms should be incorporated into the existing process;
 alternative solutions and funding levels must be required not merely suggested;
and
 not all important measures are quantitative
Perhaps one of the most critical historical lessons reflected in the GPRA is the 
simple fact that it is law.  Both Congress and the Executive Branch knew that if 
government-wide reform was to succeed in the 1990s, it had to have not only the force of 
law behind it but the longevity of the law, as well.  Interest in government-wide 
implementation of the PPBS, MBO and ZBB quickly faded into history as the 
presidential administration changed. Because these initiatives were founded in executive 
orders, it made it relatively easy for disgruntled career bureaucrats to simply shuffle a 
few more papers until the next election.  The Hoover Commissions, however, are 
considered more successful.  Because they had the support of both the White House and 
the Congress, many of the Commissions’ recommendations did, in fact, become law and 
remain institutionalized in our government today.  But even the second Hoover 
Commission failed to achieve some of its objectives because President Eisenhower did 
not lend the same support to managerial reform as had President Truman.
Just knowing, however, that government-wide reform needed a statutory 
framework did not mean the construction of one would be easy.  In our system of 
separated powers, even short-term cooperation and collaboration between the executive 
and legislative branches of government can be a challenge.  Constructing and maintaining 
an ongoing, long-term partnership focused on reform would be a formidable task.  The 
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reason is simple — the two branches approach reform from two very different 
perspectives and harbor often competing expectations.
When it comes to reform, especially possible budgetary reform, the legislative 
branch tends to focus on its role as overseer of the public’s purse.  In their oversight role, 
Congress and its staff stress “near-term program performance, consistency over time in 
information presentations, and accountability” (GAO/AIMD-97-46; p. 3).  This often 
leads Congress to expect not only more bang for the buck but relatively immediate 
results, as well. Officials in the Executive Branch agencies, on the other hand, are more 
concerned with “long-term goals, adaptability to changing needs, and flexibility in 
execution” (GAO/AIMD-97-46; p. 3).  
Previous reform initiatives failed to even consider these inherent differences in 
the perspectives of the two branches of our government.  Consequently, past attempts at 
reform made no provisions for reconciling or overcoming conflicting approaches.  
Reminiscent of the task force approach utilized by both Hoover Commissions, the GPRA 
seeks to overcome this obstacle by requiring frequent, regular and formal consultations 
among all affected stakeholders.  To further enhance its chances for success, the GPRA 
calls for collaboration to begin in the earliest possible stage – when strategic plans are 
developed and formalized. 
Strategic planning had long been considered the exclusive purview of executive 
agency officials without direct Congressional involvement.  The GPRA, however, 
recognized the need for a basic understanding of program goals by all stakeholders if 
resources are to be successfully linked to results.  Therefore, under the GPRA, not only 
must final strategic plans be submitted to the Congress for review and approval, 
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legislative staffers actively participate in the formulation and development of strategic 
goals and objectives.
The next lesson of history exerting a strong influence on government-wide reform 
efforts in the 1990s was the knowledge that true and lasting reform required resolution of 
numerous complex issues...issues so complex that they could not be adequately addressed 
in any one, single piece of legislation.  Therefore, while the GPRA is the centerpiece of 
the statutory reform efforts of the 1990s, it was not the first nor the only law passed 
whose goal was change in the way the federal government conducted its daily business.
The first rung on the statutory ladder to government-wide reform was the Chief 
Financial Officer Act (CFO) of 1990.  The focus of the CFO Act was to subject federal 
agencies to the same financial scrutiny and accountability long required of state and local 
governments and private business concerns (GAO/GGD-96-118; p. 1).  A key feature of 
the CFO Act was to establish chief financial officer positions in twenty-four major 
agencies and departments that account for approximately ninety-eight percent of the 
federal government’s gross budget authority.  A multiyear implementation plan called for 
annual reports on the financial status of government agencies.  Congress further 
expanded the scope of federal financial reform in 1994, when it added the Government 
Management Reform Act (GMRA) to the statutory reform framework.  Under the 
GMRA, for the first time, federal agencies would be required to produce independently 
auditable financial statements that would account for capital assets, liabilities and 
inventories (GAO/GGD-96-118; p. 7).  
The focus on financial management reform was soon joined by a look at how 
government acquired its assets, liabilities and inventories.  In the 1980s, numerous 
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governmental studies and short-term commissions made recommendations to improve the 
acquisition process and systems used to procure goods and services for government 
agencies (Beck, Brokaw and Kelmar, 1997; p. 2-4).  Largely due to a lack of good 
financial information and tracking capability, the results fell far short of expectations.  
Present day acquisition reform began with the creation of the Acquisition Law Advisory 
Panel (Section 800 Panel), mandated by the fiscal year 1991 National Defense 
Authorization Act.  Practitioners with actual experience in the government acquisition 
system and a vested interest in the outcome of the panel’s work were selected to sit on the 
Section 800 Panel.  At the same time and inspired by world events such as the end of the 
Cold War and the victory in Desert Storm, the American public began clamoring for a 
peace dividend from downsizing and re-engineering the U.S. military establishment.  In 
addition to the opportunity to improve the government acquisition process, the Section 
800 Panel also provided Congress a vehicle for responding to public demands.  Congress 
ultimately directed the panel to actually rewrite statutory code, the Federal Acquisition 
Regulation (FAR), based on the panel’s findings.  The panel’s findings, submitted to 
Congress in January of 1993, became the foundation for the Federal Acquisition 
Streamlining Act (FASA) of 1994 (Beck, et al, 1997; p. 2-2).
The Federal Acquisition Reform Act (FARA) soon followed the Federal 
Acquisition Streamlining Act.  New reform initiatives emanating from these acts of 
Congress opened the door to government use of the best acquisition practices already 
achieving measurable success in the private sector.  It was envisioned that use of these 
best practices would improve the acquisition process and help ensure that new systems, 
especially expensive military and space systems, are acquired in the most efficient, 
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effective, and economical manner possible (GAO/IAP-97-1).  The Federal Acquisition 
Streamlining Act and Federal Acquisition Reform Act would also facilitate government-
wide implementation of the GPRA by giving agencies a new means for improving 
performance and results.
In 1996, Congress passed more legislation to again facilitate the mandates of the 
GPRA.  The Information Technology Management Reform Act of 1996 calls for 
agencies to review and evaluate the way they gather, maintain and utilize massive 
amounts of information.  The information technology (IT) world has undergone dramatic 
change, as computers small enough to fit in the palm of the human hand have become a 
part of every day American life.  For government agencies to improve their performance, 
they must take full advantage of modern IT capabilities.  The Information Technology 
Management Reform Act forces agencies to look for new solutions to acquiring and
maintaining information by requiring agencies to “set goals, measure performance, and 
report on progress in improving the efficiency and effectiveness of operations through the 
use of information technology” (GAO/GGD-96-118; p. 1).  Very simply, massive 
independent computers with multiple unique, legacy systems no longer meet the needs of 
the federal government nor the expectations of the Congress or American taxpayer.
From the experiences of history, the crafters of the GPRA drew on two more 
important lessons.  First, lasting reform cannot be achieved in one or two budget cycles.  
Second, even when your objective is government-wide reform, the federal government is 
simply too large and diverse to implement a one-size-fits-all reform in every agency at 
the same time.  Test cases or pilot studies offer reformers the opportunity to test theories 
and new processes in a more manageable environment.  Incremental implementation also 
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provides the opportunity for feedback; multiple vector checks and course corrections 
while reform modifications are still practical and economically feasible.  These are both 
lessons reflected in the GPRA’s time schedule and planned incremental implementation. 
Unlike previous reform initiatives that called for immediate implementation in the 
current budget cycle, the GPRA directs a “multiyear, iterative implementation process” 
(GAO/AIMD-97-46; p. 19).  The period of time the Congress mandated for the 
implementation of the GPRA was seven years from the initial pilot projects until the first 
government-wide performance reports were due to Congress as a required part of the 
agencies’ annual budget submission for 1998 (Public Law 103-62).  During the seven 
years, the OMB was to select a variety of organizations within the major agencies and 
departments to implement pilot projects for strategic and performance planning and 
identification and development of appropriate outcome measures.  This protracted 
implementation schedule also gave other organizations, not participating in the pilot 
projects, adequate time to formulate their own plans for complying with the directives of 
the GPRA – the law!
Included in the GPRA’s incremental implementation approach was a mandate for 
at least five agencies to conduct two-year pilot projects of alternative approaches to 
performance budgeting.  The performance budget pilots were scheduled to begin in fiscal 
year 1998 to allow agencies time to collect performance data and to gain experience in 
preparing strategic and performance planning.  In fiscal year 1999, the second year of 
these pilot projects, the selected agencies were required to include performance-based 
budget presentations with their President’s Budget submission to the Congress.  The 
OMB was then required to evaluate the results of the performance-based budget pilots 
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and submit their findings, including an assessment of the need for further legislation 
requiring performance budgets, to the President and the Congress not later than 31 March 
2001 (Public Law 103-62).
Two additional key features of the GPRA that reflect the lessons of history are 
that it allows for qualitative measures of performance and it requires alternative 
solutions and funding levels be included in performance documentation.  Previous 
initiatives called almost exclusively for quantitative measures of performance.  When 
agencies found it difficult or impossible to define desired outcomes in quantitative terms, 
they resorted to simple output, process or workload measures that could not be 
adequately related to program goals and objectives.  Recognizing the difficulty of 
measuring outcomes in strictly quantitative terms, the GPRA calls for a range of 
measures that may incorporate simple output, process and workload measures but must 
also include, even if qualitative in form, measures that address desired outcomes 
(GAO/AIMD-97-46).
Previous initiatives, most notably ZBB, suggest agencies consider alternative 
solutions to meeting program objectives.  The GPRA, however, not only requires that 
alternative solutions and funding levels be considered, but it also requires that these 
alternatives be included in agencies’ performance plans and submitted to the President 
and the Congress (Public Law 103-62).  This information is intended to greatly enhance 
the ability of decision makers to more clearly evaluate the impacts of requests for 
budgetary increases or proposed budget cuts.  
Finally, the GPRA recognizes that institutionalized reform can only be 
successfully implemented as a part of the existing budget process.  Chaos does not 
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facilitate reform.  Previous initiatives attempted to supplant or add to the existing process, 
thereby frequently fostering chaos via overwhelming workloads.  The crafters of the 
GPRA realized that “the process of budgeting is inherently an exercise in political 
choice” in which scarce resources must be carefully allocated among competing needs 
and priorities (GAO/AIMD-97-46).  However, the crafters of the GPRA also believed 
that performance information can and should be one of the factors decision makers have 
at their disposal when making critical choices.  Very simply, the crafters of the GPRA 
sought to make more accurate, reliable and consistent information in a more user-friendly 
format available to assist all decision makers – including those at the lower levels of 
government agencies – in making appropriate budgetary choices.
Expectations of a Law
With the purposes of the GPRA clearly stated, Congress then articulated what 
federal agencies were expected to deliver in order to comply with the intent of Congress:
No later than September 30, 1997, the head of each agency shall 
            submit to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget
            and to the Congress a strategic plan for program activities (Public
            Law 103-62).
Congress went on to stipulate that agencies’ strategic plans must include six components:
 Concise mission statement;
 Agency-wide, long-term goals and objectives for all major functions
       and operations;
 Approaches (or strategies) for and the various resources needed to 
       achieve the goals and objectives;
 A relationship between the long-term goals and objectives and the 
       annual performance goals;
 An identification of key factors, external to the agency and beyond
       its control, that could significantly affect the achievement of the
       strategic goals; and
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 A description of the program evaluations used to establish or revise 
      strategic goals and a schedule for future program evaluations.
In addition to strategic plans, beginning with fiscal year 1999, the GPRA also 
requires federal agencies to prepare and submit annual performance plans covering 
program activities set out in the agencies’ budgets.  The six basic requirements 
established by the GPRA call for these performance plans to:
 establish performance goals to define levels of performance to be achieved;
 express those goals in an objective, quantifiable, and measurable form;
 briefly describe the operational processes, skills and technology, and the 
             human capital, information, or other resources required to meet the goals;
 establish performance measures for assessing the progress toward or 
achievement of the goals;
 provide a basis for comparing actual program results with the established
             goals; and
 describe the means to be used to verify and validate measured values.
Agency discretion and flexibility are key components of the GPRA.  Recognizing 
this, the GPRA specifically provides a means for enhancing and expanding agencies’ 
discretion and flexibility:
Beginning with fiscal year 1999, the performance plans required under
 section 1115 may include proposals to waive administrative procedural 
requirements and controls, including specifications of personnel staffing
levels, limitations on compensation or remuneration, and prohibitions or 
restrictions on funding transfers among budget object classification 20
            and sub classifications 11, 12, 31, and 32 of each annual budget submitted 
            under section 1105, in return for specific individual or organization 
            accountability to achieve a performance goal. (Public Law 103-62)
In an effort to preclude misunderstandings, the GPRA clearly defines critical terms, such 
as outcome measure, output measure, etc.  The GPRA also calls for a series of pilot 
projects to test each of its main provisions before government-wide implementation is 
attempted.  These pilot projects, however, do have limited time spans.  Finally, the GPRA 
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lays out a plan and time schedule for full-scale implementation. These features of the 
GPRA can be reviewed in more detail through excerpts from the actual Results Act 
contained in Appendix A.
The structure of the GPRA suggests that the key determinants of effectiveness, 
efficiency, economy, and accountability are within the entities tasked with executing 
government programs—the Executive Branch agencies.  Therefore, the important 
measures of the GPRA’s success or failure lie in agencies’ abilities to comply with the 
intent of Congress as outlined in the GPRA.   
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Chapter 5
The Department of Defense and Organizational Change
Ultimately, the overall objective of the GPRA, like its predecessors, is change—
change that results in improved government performance.  However, this is not a word 
generally used in a positive context regarding the propensity or willingness of any 
bureaucratic organization to effect change.  It especially is not a word frequently 
associated with the bureaucracy known as the Department of Defense (DoD).  In reality, 
however, ongoing change is one of the few certainties in the day-to-day activities at the 
managerial and operating levels of the DoD (Beck, Brokaw, Kelmar, 1997).  This is but 
one reason why the DoD is an appropriate agency for evaluating the implementation of 
the GPRA.  Other reasons include its common activities, foundation in reform, size, 
budget, annual spending and purchasing authority, and its more than forty years of 
experience in using the Planning-Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) for 
resource management.
Differences and Commonalities
The mission of the DoD is to support and defend the Constitution of the United 
States; to provide for the common defense of the nation, its citizens, and its allies; and to 
protect and advance U.S. interests around the world. Based on this mission statement, 
conventional academic discussions often make a distinction between the DoD and 
civilian agencies.  As the largest single department in the federal government and because 
of its unique role in providing national security, the DoD does engage in many activities 
not found in other Executive Branch agencies. However, from an administrative and 
managerial view, there are no activities engaged in by other agencies that also are not 
accomplished within the DoD (GAO/NSIAD-98-188R). This includes identifying 
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missions, strategic planning, measuring performance, evaluating programs and 
budgeting—all target areas for improvement under the GPRA. 
At the managerial and operating levels the commonalities become even more 
evident.  Every month the DoD cuts 5 million paychecks, accomplishes 920,000 contract 
or purchase actions, fits troops with 50,000 pairs of boots and serves 3.4 million meals.  
On any given day the DoD buys enough fuel to drive a car around the world 13,000 
times, maintains 12,000 miles of waterways, operates twenty four percent of America’s 
hydropower capacity, manages 225 schools and provides day care for 200,000 children.  
In fact, the DoD is the world’s largest employer-sponsored day care provider and has 
been recognized by the White House as a model for other agencies and private business 
concerns to follow (Introduction to the Department of Defense, 7 May 2001). As you can 
see, a great deal of time, training and resources are required to ensure the DoD always is 
ready to accomplish its primary mission of defending the nation.  What also should be 
apparent is that the administrative activities in the DoD are much the same as those in 
other federal agencies or large corporations.  
Born of Reform
The administrative and managerial structure of the United States’ military did not 
simply appear overnight.  Rather it has evolved over more than two hundred years.  In 
reality, with the exception of the Air Force, the American military services actually are 
older than the nation.  The Army lays claim to be the oldest but was soon followed the 
Navy and Marine Corps.  The cabinet-level War Department was formed in 1789 after 
the ratification of the new Constitution.  Nine years later, the Navy formed its own 
department to manage Naval and Marine Corps affairs while the Army remained under 
the War Department.  This organizational structure of the American military remained 
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basically the same until the end of World War II. Experiences during that conflict proved 
that unified control of the military at the national and major command levels was critical 
to national defense. 
In 1947, as a part of the National Security Act, Congress established a civilian 
Secretary of Defense with cabinet rank; created a new overreaching department called the 
National Military Establishment; created a new service, the Air Force, with its own 
department; and converted the War Department to the Department of the Army.  
Congress also placed all the services under the direct control of the Secretary of Defense.  
To further consolidate authority, a 1949 amendment to the Act established the agency as 
an executive department, renamed it the Department of Defense and withdrew cabinet 
level status for the three service secretaries.  For more than fifty years, now, this 
organizational structure has remained essentially intact.
 Size...or Its Hard to Ignore a Thousand Pound Gorilla
The DoD is the nation’s largest employer, with approximately 1.4 million men 
and women on active duty, 672,000 civilians and another 1.28 million volunteers serving 
in the Guard and Reserve.  The DoD is comprised of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine 
Corps, Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and 24 defense 
agencies such as the Defense Logistics Agency and the Defense Information Agency.  
DoD employees are found at approximately 600 fixed facilities and more than 40,000 
properties located in more than 130 countries. Whether on land or at sea, no other 
company can match the size of the DoD (Introduction to the Department of Defense, 7 
May 2001; GAO/NSIAD-97-219R and DoD Directive 5100.1, 1987).
Since its peak in 1985, the DoD budget as a percentage of the federal budget as a 
whole was in decline until 2002.  However, at more than $250 billion, the DoD budget 
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remained the largest single component of discretionary budget authority annually 
appropriated by Congress (GAO/NSIAD-97-219R).  In addition to annual procurement 
expenditures of approximately $40-$60 billion (GAO/NSIAD-98-188R), the DoD also 
leads all other agencies as a contractor for goods and services from the private sector 
(Light, May 1999).  If initiatives driven by the GPRA improve the effectiveness, 
efficiency and economy of expenditures this size and, thus, ensure the resources 
necessary to accomplish DoD’s critical missions, the GPRA can legitimately claim some 
significant degree of success.
Resource Management in the DoD
When the National Security Act of 1947 created the DoD, a primary goal was to 
bring greater coordination to the management of the very independent and competitive 
military services.  In some measure, due to the size of the new department, this goal 
remained largely elusive until the introduction of the Planning-Programming and 
Budgeting System (PPBS) in 1960 under the guidance of then Secretary of Defense, 
Robert S. McNamara.  McNamara recognized the particular importance of resource 
management for an agency the size of the DoD if it was to accomplish its mission 
effectively, efficiently and economically while ensuring appropriate accountability.  
Prior to 1961, budget preparation in the DoD hardly reflected a coordinated or 
rational allocation of resources.  Lawrence Korb (1977) describes a DoD approach to 
budgeting in those years that was fraught with weaknesses, both in substance and 
process.  These included: 
 Little or no relationship between budget decisions and planning;
 Duplicated services among the independent military departments;
 Independent military departments' insistence on their fair share regardless
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  of the effectiveness of their programs or the security needs of the nation; 
 A budget process primarily focused only on next year's budget with little 
             concern for the impact current decisions could have on future years;
 Little data or formal analysis was available for the Secretary of Defense to 
             use when faced with making choices among competing services or proposals.
Overall, before 1961, DoD's budget essentially was an uncoordinated compilation of 
independent budget proposals from competing military departments.  These proposals 
reflected only the individual interests of each military department.  The Office of the 
Secretary of Defense (OSD) provided little guidance.  OSD also lacked the information 
and ability needed to review these proposals in regard to overall defense needs. 
When Robert McNamara was appointed Secretary of Defense in 1961, he 
intended to be less of a figurehead and to actually exercise managerial control of the 
DoD.  McNamara saw the budget process as a means of achieving the coordinated 
management and rational policy-making he sought to build in the DoD.  To accomplish 
these goals, McNamara introduced the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System 
(PPBS) into the DoD (Joint DoD/GAO Working Group, 1984).  The PPBS was designed 
to institutionalize the planning and budgeting functions and to develop a third function, 
programming, as a bridge linking planning to budgeting (Air Force Institute of 
Technology, June 1992). 
The PPBS, as implemented by McNamara, was actually developed in the 1950s 
by operations researchers and economists working under the direction of Charles Hitch at 
the Rand Corporation under contract to the Air Force (Dunn, 1994).  This non-
governmental team was looking for rational, analytically founded answers to traditional, 
politically inspired budget questions.  Specifically, Hitch and associates sought to 
determine “…how the country could purchase national security in the most efficient 
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manner--how much of the national wealth should be devoted to defense, how the funds 
allocated to defense should be distributed among the different military functions, and 
how to assure the most effective use of these funds" (Greenberger, Crenson and Crissey, 
1976, p. 32). 
Under the PPBS, the budget process for DoD was divided into three phases.  The 
planning phase was designed to provide an integrated multi-year overview of defense 
needs to guide the development of programs in the second phase, programming.  In this 
second phase, programs were to be evaluated and selected on the basis of achieving near-
term (0-2 years), mid-term (3-10years) and long-term (10-20 years) military goals and 
objectives of national security policy.  In the third phase, budgeting, DoD's budget 
requests were originally divided into ten (10) major force programs (MPF) for the 
purposes of funding (Joint DoD/GAO Working Group, 1984).  Major force programs are 
mission area divisions of the DoD program and budget.  Major force programs cross 
Service lines and each Service contains a portion of those major force programs relating 
to its mission.  The number of major force programs has fluctuated over the years and 
now stands at eleven (11) (Headquarters, USAF Planning, Programming, and Budgeting 
Basic Course Student Study Guide, April 2001).
How the PPBS actually operates will be discussed later.  This abbreviated 
description of the design of the PPBS is intended to show McNamara's determination to 
coordinate and rationalize decision-making and, thus, overcome the weaknesses of earlier 
approaches to budgeting in the DoD.  The key concepts of the PPBS for McNamara were 
its planning orientation, multi-year focus and its identification of objectives in terms of 
programs that cut across individual military departmental boundaries.
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The PPBS:  Forty Years and Counting1
Opinions in the academic community may vary regarding the survival of the 
PPBS in the DoD.  However, those in the DoD are most likely to compare the alleged 
demise of the PPBS in Defense to the infamous premature report on the death of Mark 
Twain--"greatly exaggerated!"  The fact is, for more than forty years, the PPBS has been 
and is the DoD's resource management system and the mainstay of its budget process. 
Just as many opinions have been expressed regarding its demise, there are 
numerous reasons for the success of the PPBS in the DoD, as well.  Several of these 
already have been mentioned. The PPBS has survived and evolved through multiple 
administrations of both political parties for precisely the reasons given for its initial 
success in the DoD by Peters, Henry, and Schick. Furthermore, although her work was 
directed at social agencies, Alice Rivlin captured the essence for the success of the PPBS 
in the DoD. The reasons for the success and survival of the PPBS in the DoD include: 
1) As a result of Robert McNamara's strong commitment to the 
principles of program budgeting and his determination to control 
and coordinate the DoD, the PPBS was well institutionalized early on.
1 A variety of government pamphlets and training manuals contain information on the PPBS.  To 
avoid using repetitive sources, unless otherwise noted, the information in this section represents a 
compilation drawn from the following government documents: The Department of Defense's 
Planning, Programming and Budgeting System prepared by The Joint DoD/GAO Working Group 
on PPBS, September 1984; Air Force Pamphlet (AFP)-172-4, The Air Force Budget Process
prepared by the Department of the Air Force, October 1984; Textbook for Provisioning 
Management LOG260-0 prepared by the School of Systems and Logistics, Air Force Institute of 
Technology(AFIT), May 1991; Introduction to Acquisition Management prepared by Captain 
Terry Adler for AFIT, September 1991; Acquisition Planning and Analysis System 200, Volume I 
"Planning the Program" prepared by the School of Systems and Logistics, AFIT, April 1992; 
Principles of Acquisition Management prepared by the School of Systems and Logistics, AFIT, 
June 1992; The Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) & The Air Force
Corporate Structure (AFCS) Primer, 10th Edition, January 1999; and Headquarters, USAF 
Planning, Programming, and Budgeting Basic Course Student Study Guide, April 2001. While 
the PPBS operates throughout the DoD, I have greater access to Air Force documentation. 
Therefore, these documents make-up the primary source for descriptions of the PPBS in the DoD, 
today.  While there may be some differences in terms and formats, the concepts and procedures 
inherent to the PPBS are the same for all the military departments.
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The DoD is not the ideal Weberian bureaucracy it often is purported to be.  
However, the concept of obedience to orders from above is well entrenched.  In addition, 
civilian control of the military has been a fundamental principle of this nation since the 
ratification of the U.S. Constitution more than two hundred years ago.  Therefore, when 
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, a civilian, directed the military departments to 
develop programs consistent with DoD's mission and subsequent objectives, to analyze 
alternatives in accordance with those objectives and to prepare budgets that accurately 
reflect the costs of attaining the objectives, it was generally accomplished. 
That is not to say that there was not and is not a certain degree of grumbling
regarding the preparation of the extensive and complex documents.  However, once the 
services understood the PPBS was not a passing fad, but a system McNamara was 
committed to developing and one that would better serve their interests, the independent 
military departments began to develop and improve the analytical skills necessary to 
support their programs.  To further enhance the analytical component necessary to assess 
alternatives and review programs proposed by the individual military departments, 
McNamara created the Office of Systems Analysis (OSA).  The OSA was staffed with 
civilian analysts who assessed programs and budget requests independent of the military 
services.  The establishment of the OSA further enhanced the rapid institutionalization of 
the PPBS in the DoD.
2) DoD's mission is an ambiguous one in which simulations and 
scenario-building exercises often are the only means of evaluation 
and analysis.
The mission of the DoD is, as is the mission of most government agencies, quite 
ambiguous.  Essentially, the DoD's mission is to direct the operations of the nation's 
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armed forces to ensure the security of the United States and to support the nation's 
policies and interests around the world.  America's worldwide interests and commitments 
are vast and varied. However, they are also the basis for determining the threats that may 
challenge those same interests and commitments.  For this reason, much of what the DoD 
does revolves around planning, training and preparing to meet a vast array of uncertain, 
but possible, challenges.
Although it is by no means easy or conducive to achieving consensus, defining 
the potential threats to U.S. security interests is the starting point for all defense planning 
and subsequent events in the PPBS. The DoD often is criticized for planning to fight the 
"last war."  In reality, the DoD plans to face the next challenge to U.S. interests based on 
what we learned in previous conflicts and modified by the current environment.  No one 
can know for certain what will happen in the future.  Therefore, simulations and scenario-
building exercises are often the only means for assessing DoD readiness capabilities. 
The PPBS is uniquely designed to analytically assess the results of these 
simulations and exercises.  While the PPBS cannot make value judgments, it can 
accurately assess and identify any gap between current capabilities and those needed to 
accomplish near-, mid- and long-term objectives.  In this manner, the PPBS ensures that 
budgetary decisions and the allocation of resources for national defense are more directly 
related to the mission and goals of the DoD.
3) While there is much discussion regarding the cost of national defense, 
there are no "potent political enemies" advocating the dissolution of 
the DoD.
After the fall of the Soviet Union and the collapse of its empire in Eastern Europe, 
but before 11 September 2001, discussions regarding reductions in DoD spending could 
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be heard from the beaches of the West Coast to the diners of the Midwest to the halls of 
Congress in Washington, D.C.  Prior to 11 September 2001, the majority seemed to 
support "downsizing" to some degree.  However, no one suggested the armed forces be 
totally eliminated.  In many ways, the DoD is much like an insurance policy--something 
the nation needs but hopes it does not have to use.  There are a wide variety of opinions 
regarding just how much the nation should pay for that insurance coverage. However, the 
price American taxpayers and Congress seem willing to pay has increased significantly 
since 11 September 2001.
4) The costs and benefits of "hard technologies" often are easier to 
measure than those of social policies.
In general, the ease with which costs and benefits of specific programs can be 
accurately determined actually depends on how the programs are defined.  As Wildavsky 
(1984) said, "Programs are not made in heaven. They must be manufactured by men"(p. 
187). Wildavsky further argues that no one can accurately define what a program should 
be or instruct agencies in how to identify their programs. It may well be true that an 
outsider cannot instruct an agency in exactly how to define programs. However, the DoD 
defined its own programs in terms applicable to its own mission. 
Essentially, the DoD uses general descriptions of its outputs to define its
programs. These descriptions are very broad because the original designers of the PPBS 
realized that detailed, specific descriptions would result in a cumbersome structure 
difficult to comprehend and would also undermine efforts to unify the military 
departments and other DoD agencies.   Currently, the major force programs used in the 
PPBS for DoD are: 
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1) Strategic Forces 
2) General Purpose Forces 
3) Command, Control, Communication, Intelligence and Space 
4) Airlift and Sealift 
5) Guard and Reserve Forces 
6) Research and Development 
7) Central Supply and Maintenance 
8) Training, Medical, and Other General Personnel Activities 
9) Administration and Associated Activities 
10) Support of Other Nations 
11) Special Operation Forces
The major force programs are nothing more than simple aggregations of their 
individual building blocks or program elements.  However, they are specific enough to be 
meaningful while remaining general enough to describe activities in which all elements 
of the DoD are involved.  For example, the term "Strategic Forces" refers to 
intercontinental weapons delivery capability.  The program elements identify specific 
capabilities such as the Air Force's long-range bombers and intercontinental missiles and 
the Navy's sea-based missile systems.  Determining the costs and benefits of the Strategic 
Forces Program then becomes a matter of accurately identifying the costs and benefits of 
each program element. This task is accomplished via an extensive database called the 
Future Year Defense Program (FYDP).  The Future Year Defense Program maintains 
information on force levels, personnel and costs for all DoD approved programs.
5) Success in defense depends on clearly defined objectives and 
thorough evaluation and analysis of alternatives.
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The Future Year Defense Program is the central database created to provide the 
programmatic and multi-year focus of the PPBS, the heart and soul of McNamara's 
system. The Future Year Defense Program makes it possible for the DoD to clearly 
define its objectives and thoroughly evaluate and analyze alternatives to achieve those 
objectives.  The Future Year Defense Program is the official DoD database that 
summarizes resources or Total Obligation Authority (TOA), personnel and forces 
associated, by fiscal year, with DoD programs, as approved by the Secretary or Deputy 
Secretary of Defense.  The Future Year Defense Program consists of data relating to 
program forces, personnel and costs over a specific period of time.  The Future Year 
Defense Program accurately projects costs and personnel for six years into the future.  
This data is termed "priced" because it identifies quantities in terms of input necessary to 
produce specific outputs.  Due to the longer time frame often necessary to develop and 
acquire new systems, the Future Year Defense Program contains force projections for 
nine years into the future. The information on forces identifies specific weapon systems 
by type, model and specific organizations such as brigades and wings. 
Prior to 11 September 2001, the Future Year Defense Program was regularly 
updated three times a year during the budget events associated with the PPBS Cycle:  in 
May to reflect the Program Objective Memorandum (POM), in September to reflect the 
Budget Estimate Submission (BES), and in January to reflect the President’s Budget 
(PB).  As a result of 11 September 2001, the Program Objective Memorandum for 
FY2003 had to be adjusted to meet the new threat.  Therefore, the Program Objective 
Memorandum and Budget Estimate Submission are now worked together and submitted 
in September.  The President’s Budget continues to be finalized in January.  After each 
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update to the Future Year Defense Program, the changes made become the departure 
point or baseline for developing the Air Force program for the next budget event.  The 
Future Year Defense Program’s structure allows decision makers to rearrange program 
elements in order to develop alternatives. The Future Year Defense Program further 
makes it possible to analyze "trade-offs" by comparing various "mixes" of forces within 
any major force program. The Future Year Defense Program retains historical data on all 
DoD programs since the establishment of the PPBS in 1961.  
6) DoD's budget is complex and requires a system specifically designed 
to accommodate the multiple functions of its budgeting process as 
well as the ever-changing environment in which the DoD must 
accomplish its mission. 
Finally, the Future Year Defense Program is a computerized and comprehensive 
data management process specifically designed to accommodate the multiple functions of 
the DoD's budgeting process in an ever-changing environment.  Not only does the Future 
Year Defense Program retain information on processes and outputs, it converts this 
information into the input terms specifically required for budget proposals.  In designing 
the PPBS, for the DoD, McNamara and company recognized their inability to totally alter 
the way Congress appropriates money.  While DoD planners focus on outputs to achieve 
objectives, Congressional appropriations are made in terms of inputs.  Therefore, to be 
successful, the PPBS must be able to define inputs necessary to achieve specific outputs.  
In 1950, the number of Congressional appropriations was reduced from more than 
2000 to approximately 375, with each appropriation now covering a broader range of 
items and services to be purchased with government funds.  The DoD regularly receives 
approximately 85 appropriations that fall into the following five general categories: 
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1) Military Personnel
2) Operations and Maintenance 
3) Procurement 
4) Military Construction 
5) Research, Development, Test and Evaluation 
Each of these general areas actually represents multiple appropriations.  For example, the 
Air Force alone receives three appropriations covered under the general heading of 
"Operations and Maintenance": 1) One for day-to-day operations of the active duty 
component; 2) a separate appropriation for the operation of the Air National Guard; and 
3) a third appropriation for the operation of the Air Force Reserve. 
The actual processes whereby outputs are converted to inputs useful for 
Congressional budget decisions and reviews are necessarily extensive and complex.  In 
brief, Congress uses the major force programs to aggregate dollars and identify areas of 
spending.  Appropriated funds are then laid into DoD accounts in accordance with 
appropriation codes.  Appropriation codes are categories by which Congress funds the 
DoD budget request.  There are twenty-two such codes that generally are referred to as 
colors of money, each with a specific intended use.  Table 5.1 shows Air Force 
appropriation codes and their individual life spans:
Table 5.1                                   Colors of Money
         CODE         APPROPRIATION    LIFE SPAN
3010 Aircraft Procurement 3 Years
3020 Missile Procurement 3Years
3080 Other Procurement 3 Years
3300 Military Construction 5 Years
3400 Operations & Maintenance 1 Year
3401 Operations & Maintenance 2 Years
3500 Military Personnel 1 Year
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3501 Military Personnel 2 Years
3600 Research, Development, Test
& Evaluation (RDT&E)
2 Years
3700 AF Reserve Personnel 1 Year
3701 AF Reserve Personnel 2 Years
3730 AF Reserve Military 
Construction
5 Years
3740 AF Reserve Operations & 
Maintenance
1 Year
3741 AF Reserve Operations & 
Maintenance
2 Years
3830 Air National Guard Military 
Construction
5 Years
3840 Operations & Maintenance 
Air National Guard
1 Year
3841 Operations & Maintenance 
Air National Guard
2 Years
3850 Military Personnel Air 
National Guard
1 Year
3851 Military Personnel Air 
National Guard
2 Years
7040 Family Housing Construction 5 Years
7045 Family Housing Operations 
Fund
1 Year
4930 Defense Working Capital 
Fund (DWCF)
1 Year
Appropriations expire if not obligated within the required time frame. Using program 
element codes (PE’s), the basic building blocks used by the DoD to update the Future 
Year Defense Program and the Force and Financial Plan, the appropriations are then 
distributed among the major force programs.  There are over 600 program element codes 
within the Air Force, each of which identifies the resources needed to support a specific 
program.  Each program element can have multiple appropriation codes embedded with 
resources attached.  In this manner, the appropriation inputs used by Congress are 
converted to the program outputs needed by DoD.
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Overall, these reasons seem to represent the commonsense approach to budgeting 
suggested by Alice Rivlin more than thirty years ago.  However, one final reason for the 
success of the PPBS in the DoD has been alluded to throughout this discussion but not 
directly addressed.  The PPBS has been and is successful in the DoD because it is not a 
single best way of planning, programming or budgeting. Rather, it is a dynamic process 
that has been in an almost constant state of evolution since its inception in 1961.  There is 
no reason to believe that this evolution will cease anytime soon as the DoD and the 
individual services continuously strive to improve the PPBS.
The ABCs of the PPBS
Over the years, the PPBS has successfully served Presidents and Secretaries of 
Defense whose management philosophies and styles favored centralized control and 
direction as well as those who preferred a more decentralized approach.  However, its 
basic components and concept---three phases, program and budget guidance to the 
services from the Secretary of Defense, review of the service programs and budget 
proposals by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the use of quantitative analysis 
to choose among competing programs—have remained. A brief review of the purposes, 
sources and relationships among the three phases of the PPBS will demonstrate its 
flexibility, adaptability and its continuing importance in the DoD.  The purpose of the 
Planning Phase is to reflect the wishes of the President, the Secretary of Defense and the 
National Security Council.  The two documents produced during this phase are the 
National Military Strategy Document and the Defense Planning Guidance. 
The National Military Strategy Document contains advice from the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff (JCS) to the Secretary of Defense on military strategy and force levels to satisfy 
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national security objectives.  Specifically, the National Military Strategy Document 
includes an appraisal of the threats to U.S. interests, recommendations for some national 
military objectives and some advice on the type of force levels needed to achieve those of 
objectives.  The sources used to develop the National Military Strategy Document are the 
Chairman's guidance, the Joint Chiefs of Staff long-range forecast of world events, the 
long-range planning of individual services and the Commanders- in-Chief of the Unified 
and Specified Commands (CINCs), current and projected U.S. worldwide obligations, 
and intelligence estimates of long-range threats and shortfalls in current capabilities.  
The Defense Planning Guidance is the main link between planning and 
programming and the key document of the planning phase. It provides broad planning 
guidance to military departments and defense agencies for developing their individual 
program proposals.  The Defense Planning Guidance contains the Secretary of Defense's 
policy, strategy, resource planning, fiscal guidance and an approximate overall budget for 
each service.  The sources of the Defense Planning Guidance are policy statements made 
by the President, Congressional directions, Defense Planning Guidance and Program 
Decision Memorandums and the President's budget proposals from previous years, 
projections from the Future Year Defense Program and inputs from individual services 
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The National Military Strategy Document also provides 
input to the Defense Planning Guidance.  The Defense Planning Guidance is usually 
published in October and marks the end of the planning phase.  
The second phase of the PPBS is the Programming Phase.  There are essentially 
four purposes to be accomplished during this phase: 
1) To structure the proper number of forces and their support to achieve
              the objectives established in the Defense Planning Guidance. 
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2) To turn the planners' ideas into specific numbers of forces, munitions, 
              training, spare parts and other support needs.
3) To describe these forces in terms which can be put into specific programs. 
4) To estimate the cost of these programs.
The documents produced during this phase include the Program Objective Memorandum 
(POM), the Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA), Issue Papers and Program Decision 
Memorandum (PDM).  
The Program Objective Memorandum is the first document produced during the 
Programming Phase.  The Program Objective Memorandum, derived from the Defense 
Planning Guidance, represents the individual services' response to the direction provided 
in the Defense Planning Guidance.  It lists the forces by mission and identifies all the 
resources needed to build and support a force or weapon system. In the next chapter, I 
will show how the Program Objective Memorandum is actually initiated from the bottom 
up—starting at the lowest levels of the Air Force structure.
The Chairman’s Program Assessment is the risk assessment of the services' 
composite Program Objective Memorandums prepared by the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). It is derived from the Program Objective Memorandum and gives 
the Secretary of Defense and his staff the opinion of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff regarding the capabilities and balance of forces contained in all the Program 
Objective Memorandums. 
Issue Papers represent counterproposals or alternatives to the programs identified 
in the services' Program Objective Memorandums.  While they are initially derived from 
the individual services' Program Objective Memorandums, alternative proposals can also 
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be raised by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Commanders-
in-Chief and Office of Management and Budget staffers. 
The Program Decision Memorandum is the Secretary of Defense's approval of the 
services’ Program Objective Memorandums as modified during the issues process.  It is
derived from the Program Objective Memorandums and issues.  The Program Decision 
Memorandum is usually published in August and marks the end of the Programming 
Phase.  However, it is also the baseline for the Budgeting Phase. 
The third phase in the PPBS is the Budgeting Phase. The purposes of this phase 
are three-fold: 
1) To reprise and update the approved programs from the previous 
             Programming Phase. 
2) Accurately establish final program costs before submitting the budget
             for approval.
3) Check the approved programs to see if they are, in fact, executable,
i.e., have enough money to do the job. 
The Budgeting Phase includes only two primary documents: The Budget Estimate 
Submission (BES) and the Program Budget Decisions (PBDs).  The Budget Estimate 
Submission is the first document of the Budgeting Phase and represents the services' 
estimate of the cost of the approved programs.  It is derived from the Program Objective 
Memorandum and Program Decision Memorandum.  The Program Budget Decisions 
represent the Secretary of Defense's or his Deputies' decision/approval of the service 
budgets as modified by the major budget issues process.  It is derived from the Budget 
Estimate Submission and major budget issues process. The Program Budget Decisions 
approve the final service budget that will be incorporated into the President's Budget 
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Proposal. The submission of the President's Budget to Congress signals the end of the 
Budgeting Phase. 
While this review of the PPBS in the DoD and its operation today is necessarily 
limited, it is sufficient to demonstrate that the PPBS is alive and well in the DoD--the 
agency it originally was designed to serve.  The question is now what becomes of the 
recommendations generated through the PPBS process and how do they support the 
GPRA.  For the answer, we turn our attention to the Congressional arena where the PPBS 
has demonstrated its greatest degrees of flexibility, adaptability and influence. 
Congress and the PPBS:  Do They Pay Attention? 
While there is ample evidence that the DoD continues to use the basic PPBS 
designed and implemented by Robert McNamara, if Congress does not use the 
information the PPBS provides to determine DoD's final budget, then it is nothing more 
than an expensive and complex means of killing trees!  The fact is, however, while the 
PPBS does produce massive volumes of paperwork, the program recommendations, 
analyses of alternatives and the Future Year Defense Program are used extensively by 
Congress to formulate DoD's final budget. 
Many argue that the fragmented nature of our political system and the very 
organizational structure of Congress with its tangled and overlapping system of 
committees and even more numerous subcommittees simply are not compatible with the 
processes of the PPBS (Schick, 1973; Wildavsky, 1984; Heineman, Bluhm, Peterson and 
Kearny, 1990; Gosling, 1992 and Peters, 1993). However, McNamara recognized the 
potential limitations the structure and nature of Congress could impose on any budgeting 
process.  He also recognized that it was unlikely any single individual could change 
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congressional processes as quickly or as dramatically as he had changed the budgetary 
process in the DoD. Therefore, McNamara essentially designed the PPBS to work within 
the organizational structure of Congress, as it existed in 1961. However, over the years, 
congressional review of DoD's budget has changed in many important ways.  Many of 
these changes are the result of influence exerted by the PPBS.  At the same time, the 
PPBS has continually evolved, often in ways suggested and/or mandated by 
congressional activities (Joint DoD/GAO Working Group, 1984). 
Because Congress is a collegial organization rather than a hierarchical one, 
changes usually are accomplished more slowly as they must represent a consensus.  
However, dramatic changes are possible.  The Budget and Impoundment Act of 1974 
constituted a dramatic change in the way Congress considers budget proposals. As a 
result of this Act, Congress must now address the fiscal consequences of its actions.  The 
evaluation and analysis of alternatives that comprise a major concept of the PPBS and the 
Future Year Defense Program's capability of converting outputs into inputs are uniquely 
suited to help Congress evaluate DoD's budget requests. As a result, Congress now 
generally reviews DoD's budget requests in output terms while authorizations and 
appropriations continue to be enacted in terms of inputs (The Planning, Programming, 
and Budgeting System (PPBS) & The Air Force Corporate Structure (AFCS) Primer, 10th
Edition, January 1999 and Headquarters, USAF Planning, Programming, and Budgeting 
Basic Course Student Study Guide, April 2001). 
James J. Gosling (1992), among others, has contended, “Within Congress, 
Appropriations Committee members, accustomed to line-item budgeting, never became 
comfortable with program budgeting, retaining their desire for organizationally related 
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numbers”(p. 33).  What Gosling and others have failed to recognize is that the PPBS does 
provide Congressmen the line-item numbers they are comfortable using.  For in the 
PPBS, the program elements or "building blocks of the Major Force Programs" are line 
items Congressmen can comprehend, discuss and debate.   While there are many 
examples of Congressional debates over program elements, one in particular stands out—
largely because it was well-covered by the media.
In February 1995, Congress directed the DoD to conduct a study of the purchase 
of 20 additional B-2 Stealth Bombers (a program element of the Strategic Forces 
Program) in terms of program requirements and cost effectiveness. Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition and Technology, Paul Kaminski, said the study would address 
several options "…in the context of (conducting) two major regional conflict scenarios--a 
Southwest Asia and a Korean scenario." The options to be considered were:
1) Keeping the bomber forces at the present levels of 20 B-2s, 95 B-1Bs and 
             66 B-52Hs through the year 2014.
2) Doubling the B-2 force to 40 and dropping the B-1B, while keeping the 
             B-52Hs, during the same time period. 
3) Doubling the B-2s and keeping the same number of B-1Bs and B-52Hs 
             through 2014. 
It also should be noted that Northrop-Grumman Corporation, the designer and 
manufacturer of the B-2 was proposing to sell the 20 additional B-2s to the Air Force for 
approximately one-half the cost of the original 20 aircraft.  Congress appropriated $4.5 
million to conduct the study but also directed the DoD to complete this first part of the 
study not later than 15 April 1995 (Tinker Take Off, 17 February 1995).  
The PPBS structure and processes in the DoD made it possible to complete this 
congressionally mandated study by the required date.  According to the Military 
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Newswire Service edition of 4 May 1995, the study recommended that the Pentagon not 
buy more than the 20 B-2 Bombers then on order.  The Newswire Service further 
reported, "the study found additional quantities of guided munitions and planned 
conventional-mission upgrades to the B-1B bomber were shown to be more cost effective 
than buying 20 additional B-2s."  
While the PPBS clearly determined that the purchase of additional B-2s was not 
the most cost effective option nor did it provide the best support for overall program 
requirements, the DoD also knew that Congress responds to factors other than logical 
analysis. After a lengthy and highly publicized debate, Congress ultimately appropriated 
$493 million in the fiscal year 1996 defense budget ostensibly to secure the procurement 
of twenty additional B-2 stealth bombers. However, although Congress appropriated the 
funds in the legislation that became public law 1 December 1995, the Congressional 
Quarterly (February 10, 1996) later reported,  “The White House announced February 8 
[1996] that the $493 million Congress added to the fiscal 1996 budget for B-2 stealth 
bombers will not be used to lay the groundwork for buying additional aircraft.”  
Congress had the benefit of publicly demonstrating their support for maintaining 
the jobs in Northrop-Grumman’s California district.  At the same time, Congress also 
ensured that the $493 million would, in fact, be used where it would be most effective 
and efficient—for the procurement of additional smart weapons.  Congress was able to 
do this because they appropriated the funds simply as part of the Air Force’s numerous 
appropriations without including specific language directing a limited use of the funds.  
In this way, Congress frequently meets the expectations of some constituents while 
actually serving the preferences of the American taxpayer by making spending decisions 
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on the basis of efficiency and effectiveness.  This example demonstrates the importance 
of considering congressional concerns and priorities in the early programming and 
budgeting phases of the PPBS (Joint DoD/GAO Working Group, 1984). 
Perhaps the best evidence to support the influence of the PPBS on congressional 
decision-making is the Joint DoD/GAO Working Group on the PPBS, 1984, already 
frequently cited in this paper.  The GAO, a watchdog agency that monitors the Executive 
Branch for the Congress, undertook the cooperative study of the PPBS with the DoD 
“…to develop descriptions of PPBS and its phases and to identify potential 
improvements" and to, hopefully, "…contribute to the interchange of financial 
management ideas and concepts throughout the federal government."  
The joint study ultimately identified nine areas where potentials for improvement 
in the DoD's PPBS structure exist. None of the recommendations involved the 
dismantling of McNamara's PPBS structure and most of the weaknesses identified in 
1983 have since been addressed and improved.  One of the most notable changes to come 
out of this study involves the time frame Congress felt was needed to allow the PPBS to 
operate most effectively. 
The PPBS is very complex and is not particularly well suited to annual budgeting. 
Because of its success and importance in the DoD, Congress directed in its 1985 DoD 
Authorization Act that the DoD portion of the President's Budget would thereafter be 
submitted on a biennial basis.  An actual DoD budget request is therefore submitted only 
in January of the odd-numbered years.  The even-year DoD portion of the President's 
Budget requests only necessary adjustments to the second year of the DoD submission 
made the previous year (AFIT, April 1992).  An example of this is the recent discussions 
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by Senate and House Conference Committees regarding the supplemental appropriation 
for FY2002 to cover the DoD’s expenses related to the ongoing war on terrorism. DoD’s 
readiness accounts for FY2002 are already depleted and funds have been transferred from 
personnel and training accounts to continue covering the day-to-day expenses for the war.  
Ironically, the DoD has never had a separate appropriation for the expenses related to 
actual war fighting.  In the aftermath of 11 September 2001, a new demand will now be 
placed on the PPBS.  Beginning with FY2003, the PPBS now forecasts requirements for 
a separate fund to support ongoing and future real-world conflicts.
The primary objective of this chapter has been to demonstrate the appropriateness 
of studying the DoD as a means to understanding government-wide organizational 
change.  A secondary objective has been to provide an overview of the DoD’s resource 
management system, the PPBS.  There are clearly a variety of opinions in the academic 
community regarding the success and survival of the PPBS in the DoD but there are no 
doubts within the DoD or in Congress regarding the existence or usefulness of the PPBS 
in the DoD. It is not, however, exactly the same system implemented by Robert 
McNamara.  For it continues to evolve to meet the needs of the changing environment in 
which budget decisions are made.  
Over the last forty years, it has even acquired a new name in the DoD. As a result 
of the changes mandated by Congress in the DoD Authorization Act of 1985, the PPBS is 
now actually the Biennial Planning, Programming and Budgeting System or BPPBS. The 
change in name, however, does not significantly alter the concepts or the familiar three 
phases of the coordinated and controlled decision-making process envisioned by 
McNamara.  The DoD's PPBS continues to be an extensively developed and flexible 
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resource allocation system that supports its decision-making. Few, if any, other federal 
agencies have done as much to systematically set goals and objectives, establish needed 
fiscal resources, and review the results of their activities as has the DoD.  In the next 
chapter, I will show how the Air Force uses the PPBS to meet the demands for change 




When the Air Force set out to implement the Government Performance and 
Results Act (GPRA), a new organizational structure for the Air Staff soon initiated the 
process of change at the managerial and operational levels.  It is at this working level that 
change must be institutionalized to succeed in meeting new demands.  How the new 
structure at the top led to changes at the bottom that ultimately worked their way back to 
the top is the subject of this chapter.  
Leading the Way - Air Force Corporate Structure
As discussed in the previous chapter, the objective of the DoD’s Planning-
Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) is to obtain the necessary resources, 
manpower, facilities, weapon systems and operating funds necessary to overcome the 
threats against the United States and its interests.  The PPBS includes an analysis of the 
threat, establishment of program requirements to fulfill the strategy, the programming 
and the commitment of resources.  But, for the PPBS to assist the DoD in achieving its 
objectives, it must be implemented.  Because of differences in primary missions and 
operational environments, each service and DoD agency develop their own 
organizational structure and strategy for implementation of the PPBS.  
In response to the demands of the GPRA and the other reform initiatives of the 
1990s such as the Chief Financial Officers Act (1990) and the Acquisition Streamlining 
Act (1994), the Air Force reorganized its headquarters to more nearly reflect the structure 
of private corporations.  Prior to the reform initiatives of the 1990s, the actual path 
programs traveled for inclusion in the final Air Force budget were less structured and 
more program unique.  Beginning in 1995, the means through which the Air Force 
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implements the PPBS became known as the Air Force Corporate Structure (AFCS)2.  
Only military or DoD civilian personnel assigned to the Air Staff or Office of the 
Secretary of the Air Force may serve as members of the corporate structure.  Prohibiting 
contract employees from membership in the AFCS ensures that the federal government’s 
best interest remains the focus of all Air Force decision-making. 
Table 6.1 summarizes the findings regarding the seven critical factors and the 
implementation of the Air Force Corporate Structure.  A detailed accounted of the case 
study will follow.
Table 6.1                   Air Force Corporate Structure Case Summary
• Link to the GPRA:  Strategic Plans, Performance Plans and Program Budget.
• Impetus:   The Air Staff decision to reorganize was driven by the Congressional
mandates associated with the GPRA.  However, the working managers and operators
    were most concerned with obeying Air Staff directions rather than the fact that the 
    GPRA is a law.     
• Focus:  All actions involved in reorganizing the Air Force budget process were
    directed at internal day-to-day operations.
• Decision Making:  Incremental decision-making was critical to the successful   
 implementation of and the attendant transition to the Air Force Corporate Structure.
    Problems were addressed as they arose and adjustments made without throwing the 
    entire Air Force budget process into chaos.  
• Key Actors:  The Integrated Product Teams, made up of managers and operators, 
were clearly the most critical players in the successful transformation of the Air Force 
   budget process
• Accountability:  Enhancing accountability was an important objective of the 
   implementation of the Air Force Corporate Structure. The Air Staff also stated that 
   they had sufficient discretion and flexibility under existing laws to make the changes
   without making special requests to Congress.
• Knowledge & Information:  The type of knowledge and information necessary to
 make the Air Force Corporate Structure work resided in the managers and operators 
   that made up the Integrated Product Teams.  Their knowledge of the programs, the 
2 The following description of the Air Force Corporate Structure and how it operates is drawn from The 
Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) & The Air Force Corporate Structure (AFCS) 
Primer, 10th Edition, Jan 1999.
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   funds required to manage the programs and the budget development process at the 
   operational level were critical to successful implementation and unmatched anywhere 
   else in the Air Force.
• Time:  The time allowed under the GPRA for government-wide implementation was 
    critical to the success of the reorganization because it took more than three years for 
    the full transition of the Air Force budget process.  
• Results of Change:  Improved linkage among planning, programming and budgeting. 
The AFCS with its attendant resource allocation process is used as the basic 
instrument in all the PPBS phases.  Through the resource allocation process, planners, 
programmers and budgeters work together to produce the quality, integrated information 
necessary for AFCS review.  The AFCS is based on three underpinning philosophies:  
 Air Force resources should be allocated according to the Air 
             Force strategic plan;
 The Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Air Force make all final 
             decisions as to how to allocate all Air Force resources; and
 The AFCS should provide a seamless garment between the PPBS phases.
The foundation of the AFCS is 70 Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) made up of 
Program Element Monitors (PEMs) and other functional representatives associated with a 
particular weapon system or mission support service.  The Integrated Product Teams 
comprise the multifunctional working-level infrastructure and information network that 
supports the AFCS as well as the functional staff, the Air Force Reserves and the Air 
National Guard.  There is an Integrated Product Team for every major program in the Air 
Force but there can be only one Integrated Product Team per program.  The ultimate 
goals of the Integrated Product Teams are to:
1) Provide a multifunctional cross-staff perspective on all key 
            Air Force programs;
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2) Cut across organizational barriers to improve the corporate 
             decision-making process; and
3) Enhance responsiveness to program issues, provide information
             and support corporate decision-making through interaction with 
            14 Mission and Mission Support Panels.
The Panels are the Air Force centers of expertise for their areas and the first level 
of corporate deliberation in the Air Force Corporate Structure.  The Panels are aligned 
according to the major mission and mission support areas that directly support the Air 






There are nine Mission Support Panels:
1) Research, Development, Test and Evaluation
2) Logistics
3) Battle Labs
4) Special Access Required
5) National Foreign Intelligence Program
6) Installation Support
7) Competitive Sourcing and Privatization
8) Communication/Information
9) Personnel/Training
Panels consist of core members who are expected to attend all meetings and 
advisory members who participate as required according to the issues being discussed.  
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Panel members are drawn from all the functional organizations, the Air Force Reserves 
and the Air National Guard based on both Panel Chair recommendations and functional 
inputs.  The Panel Chairs are Air Force colonels or civilian equivalents appointed by the 
appropriate Deputy Chief of Staff or Assistant Secretary.  The panels must be the Honest 
Brokers for the Air Force and 
 Assess the guidance from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and 
the Joint Staff for fiscal do-ability;
 Recommend changes to OSD and Joint program guidance;
 Develop Air Force Annual Planning and Programming Guidance (APPG);
 Scrub all programs and program elements; 
 Assess programs and program elements against the integrated priority lists;
 Identify potential disconnects and initiatives;
 Validate, adjust if necessary, and recommend Major Command, Direct 
             Reporting Unit and Forward Operating Activity program adjustments;
 Provide options for consideration of issues;
 Manage zero-based-transfers within the portfolio;
 Balance programs and program elements within the portfolio;
 Advocate for core competency but use corporate hat to ensure final 
recommendation best meets the needs of the Air Force;
 Provide coordinated, comprehensive and balanced recommendations;
 Provide selective expertise and assessment capability;
 Ensure rationalization, standardization, and interoperability requirements
             and capabilities are addressed;
 Interface and integrate with other panels; and 
 Review issues, plans, forces, programs and technical proposals and make 
recommendations to the next level within the Air Force Corporate Structure.
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Above the panels, the Air Force Corporate Structure (AFCS) is made up of three levels:  
1) the Air Force Group; 2) the Air Force Board; and 3) the Air Force Council.  The 
members of each level are independent of the others.  
The Air Force Group is the entry point to bring proposals and issues into the 
AFCS.   The Air Force Group is the first level of the corporate structure that integrates 
Air Force mission areas into a balanced Air Force program.  It provides senior-level 
(colonel and civilian equivalent) review of resource allocation proposals as well as other 
issues requiring corporate decision-making and is chaired by a one-star brigadier general.  
Specifically, the Air Force Group meets at the discretion of the Chair to:  
 Review program options for compliance with Air Force Annual Planning and 
Programming Guidance;
 Validate cost, schedule and completeness of program options;
 Develop new options as needed; entertain new initiatives to meet core 
             competencies or requirements; and
 Receive briefings as necessary to make informed decisions on specific Air 
             Force programs.  
After the Air Force Group completes its review of issues submitted by the Panels and 
Integrated Product Teams, it provides them with feedback and guidance on their 
activities.  The Air Force Group Chair presents the integrated Air Force program to the 
Air Force Board for further review and refinement of significant or critical issues.  
The Air Force Board provides flag-level (2-star and civilian equivalent) review of 
decisions submitted by the Air Force Group.  The Air Force Board core and non-core 
membership includes General Officers (one-and two-star) or Senior Executive Service 
level members from a wide breadth of functional disciplines.  The Air Force Board Chair 
is a two-star from the operational Air Staff except when the issue concerns the budget.  
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For budget formulation matters, a representative from the Secretary of the Air Force’s 
Office of Financial Management chairs the Air Force Board.  The Air Force Board 
directs the focus of the Air Force Group in resolving issues and refines the integrated 
program developed by the Air Force Group for submission to the Air Force Council.
The Air Force Council provides Deputy Chief of Staff, Assistant Secretariat-level 
and selected Directorate-level cross-functional review of resource allocation and other 
significant issues.  The Air Force Council Chair is the four-star Air Force Vice Chief of 
Staff.  The Air Force Council reviews and evaluates programs and issues, guides 
corporate processes, coordinates functional interests, and tasks the other members of the 
Air Force Corporate Structure.  It is the final Air Force Corporate Structure body that 
makes recommendations to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, the Secretary of the Air 
Force and the Secretary of Defense.  
The programs approved by the Air Force Group, the Air Force Board and the Air 
Force Council are the basis of the Air Force budget requests submitted to the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and, ultimately, to the Office of Management and Budget 
for inclusion in the President’s budget request to Congress.  Although final approval 
comes at a very high level, the programs that make their way through the Air Force 
Corporate Structure begin much further down in the Air Force organization.  The 
requirements, the first step in developing the budget, begin at the operational level of the 
Air Force.  In response to the Air Staff reorganization, each major command, forward 
operating activity and direct reporting unit had to overhaul their own organizations to 
better work within the new Air Force Corporate Structure and to comply with the 
directives of the GPRA..
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Letter of the GPRA  - Setting the Standard
The letter of the GPRA refers to what the law specifically demands.  First, the 
GPRA calls for strategic plans.  Remember that Public Law 103-62 stipulated that 
agencies’ strategic plans must include six critical components:
 Concise mission statement;
 Agency-wide, long-term goals and objectives for all major
             functions and operations;
 Approaches (or strategies) and the various resources 
        needed to achieve the goals and objectives;
 A relationship between the long-term goals and objectives 
             and the annual performance goals;
 An identification of key factors, external to the agency 
                          and beyond its control, that could significantly affect the 
                          achievement of the strategic goals; and
 A description of the program evaluations used to establish
                          or revise strategic goals and a schedule for future program 
                          evaluations.
In addition to strategic plans, the GPRA also requires federal agencies to prepare 
and submit annual performance plans covering program activities set out in the agencies’
budgets.  As discussed in Chapter 3, the six basic requirements established by the GPRA 
call for these performance plans to:
 establish performance goals to define levels of
                          performance to be achieved;
 express those goals in an objective, quantifiable, and measurable form;
 briefly describe the operational processes, skills and technology, and the 
             human capital, information, or other resources required to meet the goals;
 establish performance measures for assessing the progress toward or 
             achievement of the goals;
 provide a basis for comparing actual program results with th
                   established goals; and
 describe the means to be used to verify and validate measured values.
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In accordance with the time frame set out in the GPRA, the Government 
Accounting Office (GAO) reviewed the DoD’s mission statement, strategic goals and 
stated objectives in 1997.  In brief, the GAO found that the DoD had met the 
requirements of the GPRA in providing a "concise mission statement" that adequately 
explains the existence of the agency and what it does (GAO/NSIAD-97-219R). The DoD 
submitted the following statement:  
The mission of the Department of Defense is to support and 
                  defend the Constitution  of the United States, to provide for
                  the common defense of the United States, its citizens and its 
                  allies, and to protect and advance U.S. interests around the world.
The GAO also found the DoD's goals and objectives that cover its major functions 
and operations to be acceptably outcome oriented. The DoD uses these same goals and 
objectives as the basis for their GPRA-required performance plans.   The DoD identified 
six major goals and objectives:
1) Harness the unmatched capabilities of the U.S. Armed Forces to 
--shape the international security environment in favorable ways by 
promoting regional stability, preventing crises and reducing threats, and deterring 
adversaries on a day-to-day basis;
--respond to the full spectrum of crises- from deterrence to smaller-scale 
contingency operations to major theater war-when it is in the U.S. interests to do so 
and maintain the capability to deter and, if necessary, defeat large-scale, cross-
border aggression in two distant theaters in overlapping time frames, preferably in 
concert with regional allies; and
--prepare now to meet the challenges of an uncertain future by    
transforming U.S. combat capabilities and support structures to be able to shape 
and respond effectively well into the 21st century.
2) Recruit and retain well-qualified military personnel and provide them with an equal 
opportunity and a high quality of life.
3) Support friends and allies by sustaining and adapting security alliances, enhancing 
coalition war-fighting, and forging military relationships that protect and advance 
U.S. security interests.
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4) Pursue a focused modernization effort that maintains U.S. qualitative superiority in 
key war-fighting capabilities, exploits the Revolution in Military Affairs, and 
supports the joint operational concepts delineated in Joint Vision 2010.
5) Maintain the U.S. edge in combat readiness while seeking efficiencies and improved 
operating procedures.
6) Fundamentally reengineer the DoD and achieve a 21st century infrastructure by 
reducing costs and eliminating unnecessary expenditures while maintaining required 
military capabilities across all DoD mission areas.  Employ modern management 
tools and exploit the Revolution in Business Affairs.
The mission statements, goals, objectives, and day-to-day activities of managerial 
and operating levels of the Air Force are derived from those of the DoD.  The measures 
employed by the GAO to evaluate the DoD's mission statement, goals and objectives for 
compliance with the GPRA are:  
 Conciseness
 Measurability (GPRA does allow for qualitative measures)
 Utilization by stakeholders and decision-makers
In June 1998, the GAO completed its requested review of the DoD's annual 
performance plan for fiscal year 1999 submitted to Congress in February 1998.  To 
accomplish their review, the GAO collapsed the six stated requirements of the GPRA into 
three critical questions:
 To what extent does the agency's performance plan provide a clear 
picture of intended performance across the agency?
 How well does the agency's performance plan discuss the strategies 
and resources the agency will use to achieve its performance goals?
 To what extent does the agency's performance plan provide confidence 
 that its performance information will be credible?
These are the criteria against which I evaluated the mission statements, selected goals and 
objectives of the Air Force Materiel Command and the Propulsion Directorate at the 
Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center.
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Quality Air Force Assessment
In the spring of 1996, the Air Force Materiel Command implemented an initiative 
to develop precise, outcome focused mission statements, identify accurate and 
meaningful measures of performance for a variety of logistics-related areas and to 
formulate plans for improvement.  Directed by then-Commander of the Air Force 
Materiel Command, General Henry Viccellio, Jr., the Quality Air Force Assessment 
(QAFA) became the new guide Inspectors General would use to evaluate the 
performance of the Air Force depots, better known as the Air Logistics Centers. Table 6.2 
provides a summary of the findings for each of the seven critical factors and a detailed 
account of the actual implementation follows.
Table 6.2 Quality Air Force Assessment Summary
• Link to the GPRA:  Emphasis on Outcomes
• Impetus:   The working managers and operators responded to the directives emanating
 from the Air Force Materiel Command.    
• Focus:  The intent of the Quality Air Force Assessment was to improve the internal 
    day-to-day operations of the Air Force Materiel Command and provide outcome-based
    measures to better assess the Command’s internal performance. 
• Decision Making:  General Viccellio and the Air Force Materiel Command Staff 
    reviewed several alternatives before deciding on the Quality Air Force Assessment as
    the preferred method for evaluating performance within the Command.  Once the
    selection was made, the new metrics were identified and the initial assessment 
    completed within a year.  Therefore, I found the decision-making process more 
    rational than incremental. 
• Key Actors:  The managers and operators were critical to the implementation of the 
    Quality Air Force Assessment because they were tasked to identify and develop
    metrics that would more accurately measure their performance.
• Accountability:  Enhancing accountability was not an important objective of the 
    Quality Air Force Assessment.  Neither was there a trade-off  between accountability
    and flexibility.
• Knowledge & Information:  Managers and operators have the most knowledge of
how the actual work of the Air Force Materiel Command is accomplished.  Since the
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    goal was to develop more accurate measures of outcomes, this knowledge was critical
    to the success of the Quality Air Force Assessment.
• Time:  The metrics were actually identified by the end of the first year.  However, it
     took another 3 years before changes implemented as a result of the new metrics began 
     to be visible. Therefore, an evaluation of the Quality Air Force Assessment at the end 
     of the first budget cycle would not have revealed the success that could be seen 3-5 
     years later.
• Results of Change:  Outcome-focused metrics that provided a more accurate and 
realistic assessment of the performance within the Command.
The objectives of the Quality Air Force Assessment were to establish quality 
outcome-focused performance measures applicable to all Air Logistics Centers to ensure 
standardization of performance ratings and to facilitate compliance with the GPRA and 
reinvention agendas.  To this end, General Viccellio developed five questions upon which 
to build the Quality Air Force Assessment: 
 How are you doing?
 How do you know how you are doing?
 Are you improving?
 How do you know you are improving?
 What are your "Best Practices"?
From these five questions, representatives from each of the Air Logistics Centers’ 
operating branches identified Mission Essential Areas applicable to the overall mission of 
the Air Force Materiel Command.  From the identified Mission Essential Areas, the Air 
Force Materiel Command began its implementation of the GPRA with a new 
organizational structure designed to better work within the new Air Force Corporate 
Structure.  The Air Force Materiel Command refined the multiple Mission Essential 
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Areas by ultimately dividing the Command’s functions and responsibilities into 8 





5) Science and Technology
6) Installations and Supports
7) Information Management
8) Test and Evaluation
These mission areas cross facility and functional lines and each has developed its 
own mission statement and strategic objectives from which key performance measures 
are drawn.  Within each Mission Essential Area, the five questions were used to gather 
information on specific processes and organizational objectives applicable to specific 
directorates within the Air Logistics Centers.  Responsibility for developing the actual 
performance measures was assigned to the appropriate working branch.  The activities of 
the Propulsion Directorate at the Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center fall primarily into 
the Depot Maintenance and Supply Management Mission Areas.  Therefore, as a working 
branch-level Requirements Control Officer (RCO), it was the performance measures for 
these two mission areas that I worked to develop.   
Developing performance measures requires that one first fully understand what 
the various jobs are actually expected to accomplish.  I very quickly learned that it was 
not as simple a task as I thought.   One would think I only needed to look at the position 
descriptions that the federal personnel system is quite famous for.  However, the only 
position descriptions that are mostly accurate are those of the wage grade employees.  
This is because the American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE) Union 
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scrutinizes the wage grade position descriptions during the process of negotiating the 
wage grade salaries.  For those of us that work in the administrative areas of the federal 
government and have our salaries determined by Congress, we know that our position 
descriptions very seldom reflect the work that we actually do. 
The next option was to ask the employees in the various career fields what were 
their actual duties.  That also turned out to be much more challenging than I expected.  It 
seems that when I asked one hundred people with the same position description to tell me 
about their daily activities, I got at least ninety-nine different answers! 
Ultimately, representatives from each of the Air Logistics Centers and the Air 
Force Materiel Command Headquarters participated in numerous work groups over a 
year’s time to describe each mission area and their responsibilities.  But before the first 
set of performance measures were ready for review, the Air Force Materiel Command got 
a new commander…and a new challenge!
You Want Us To Be WHAT–Cost as a Variable in theAir Force Materiel Command
One of the challenges all military organizations must face is the three-year 
rotation rule for officers, especially General Officers.  Three years actually is a short 
period of time to effect any major change in a large organization…unless you come in 
with a plan and a road map!  And that is exactly what General George T. Babbitt did!  
The Quality Air Force Assessment still was being implemented when General Viccellio 
retired in the spring of 1997.  In May 1997, General George T. Babbitt pinned on a fourth 
star and assumed command of the Air Force Materiel Command.  
Unlike some new commanders who take a few weeks or months to get to know 
their new organization, General Babbitt had spent the time waiting for his Senate 
112
confirmation to familiarize himself with the Air Force Material Command, its strengths 
and weaknesses.  Babbitt was very familiar with his predecessor’s efforts to build a 
culture focused on performance and he determined he would leave General Viccellio’s 
structure to improve performance in place with only a few minor name changes.  This, he 
believed would allow him to pursue other objectives just as important as improving 
performance.  After all, the GPRA also directed improved financial performance.  
Therefore, General Babbitt began to formulate a plan to commit his time and authority to 
correcting the command’s longest-term problem—inefficiency!  Table 6.3 summarizes 
General Babbitt’s efforts to make managing cost as important a part of the Command’s 
operations as managing performance.  A more detailed account of how General Babbitt  
institutionalized the relationship between cost and performance follows the summary.
Table 6.3    Cost as a Variable in the Air Force Materiel Command Summary
• Link to the GPRA:  Improved Effectiveness AND Efficiency
• Impetus:   General Babbitt was clearly the force directing the efficiency initiative.
• Focus:  General Babbitt was singularly focused on institutionalizing the relationship
    between cost and performance by improving the accuracy of the Command’s budget, 
    stopping the losses in the working capital funds, and ensuring that there would be no
    more must pay bills in the year of execution from his Command.  All of these 
    objectives were part of the internal operations of the Air Force Materiel Command.
• Decision Making: The implementation of efforts to improve efficiency was
incremental but on a strict and a very short time-line. The fact that there was a
    definite implementation schedule made the incremental decision-making less 
    important to the success of the overall initiative. 
• Key Actor:  Without a doubt, General Babbitt was the most important player 
    throughout this initiative. 
• Accountability:  Enhancing accountability was an important objective of the plan to 
manage costs within the Air Force Materiel Command but it was not a critical factor.
• Knowledge & Information: General Babbitt had the business education and 
  experience to set the Command on a new path to becoming more efficient.  He put
    forth the effort to educate not only his own staff but also the managers at the Air 
    Logistics Centers.  General Babbitt firmly believed that if the managers understood 
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    costs they could manage costs.  Because he realized that most of the Command did 
    not have the knowledge or education required to manage costs, he allowed for a 
    learning curve but a very short one.  
• Time:  Time was important to General Babbitt’s agenda but not critical.  The first 
    unit cost target was in place at the end of the first year.  By the time the Fiscal Year 
    2000 Program Objective Memorandum was submitted to the Air Staff, the
    Command’s budget represented a $2.7 billion reduction in the total obligation 
    authority requested. 
• Results of Change:  Institutionalized relationship between cost and performance.
During his research, one of the most important facts General Babbitt learned 
about his new command was that the operational Air Force and the power centers in 
Washington, D.C. felt that the Air Force Materiel Command worked reasonably well.  
However, all also agreed that no matter how well they worked, the Air Force Materiel 
Command simply cost way too much! Therefore, at the change of command ceremony, 
General Babbitt announced that the Command’s mission would now include being 
efficient as well as effective!  The entire audience seemed to gasp all at once (Barzelay 
and Thompson, 2003)!  
Following his retirement in 2000, General Babbitt recalled the Air Force Materiel 
Command’s predicament when he assumed command: 
After the Clinton administration’s bottom-up defense review, the 
military were told that we could have more modernization or more 
readiness or more infrastructure, but we had to make the trades 
among them.   If that was the question, the answer was easy.  
Nobody likes infrastructure.  So the answer was, “Let’s go kill the
            infrastructure.”  Well, a lot of AFMC [Air Force Material 
           Command] is infrastructure.3
3 The interview with General Babbitt was conducted by Michael Barzelay, London School of Economics 
and Political Science and Fred Thompson, Atkinson Graduate School of Management Willamette 
University in August 2001 with a follow-up interview revised and updated in March 2002.  The transcript 
of the entire interview was made available on the web-site for the Air Force Materiel Command and 
excerpts were later reprinted in a case study prepared by Barzelay and Thompson for the IBM Center for 
The Business of Government in August 2003.  All direct quotations are from the original transcript except 
the ones taken from the briefings I personally attended.    
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A second problem for the Air Force Materiel Command was that every year, 
when it came time to execute the annual Air Force budget, their working capital funds 
became must pay bills in the current year.  They had to be paid because the Command 
had spent hundreds of millions of dollars more to operate its centralized supply and 
maintenance activities the year before than had been planned for in the budget.  Because 
the working capital funds do not receive direct appropriations, the excess expenditures 
were legal.  However, the ongoing lack of efficiency left the Air Force Materiel 
Command vulnerable to large and arbitrary budget cuts that could lead to ultimate 
mission failure.  Again, General Babbitt clearly defined the problem:
There were significant financial losses in the two major working
capital funds—supply and maintenance.  In my earlier tour at the
Pentagon, I had seen the chief and the secretary anguish over these
huge financial losses.  They were especially frustrated because 
nobody could explain them.  It was a terrible situation and clearly
an indication that nobody was really managing financial performance
…I had to stop losing money in the two working capital funds.  
If I couldn’t fix that problem, the rest was just talk…My aim was to
get people to understand costs.  You can’t make progress if you don’t
understand what it costs.  I figured that if they understood what 
caused costs, they could explain them.  If they could explain them, 
they could manage them.
General Babbitt tackled the “problem” and the long-lived culture of the Air Force 
Materiel Command head on.  Because he thought a major reorganization of the entire 
command would divert attention from his plan to make it efficient as well as effective, 
Babbitt decided to stick with the organizational structure put in place by General 
Viccellio that was designed to focus on improving performance.  He reasoned that if it 
were suitable for improving performance, a few minor changes would make it just as 
suitable for managing costs.  First, Babbitt changed the name mission areas as identified 
under General Viccellio’s Quality Air Force Assessment to business areas.  He then 
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separated supply and maintenance into separate business areas because they operated 
different working capital funds.   Next, because the command did not have anything that 
an accounting professional or business executive would recognize as a management 
control structure, General Babbitt expanded the roles of senior members of his staff to 
make them responsible for specific business areas.  He called these individuals Chief 
Operating Officers. Because the entire command was not reorganized, the chief operating 
officers did not have line authority over the organizations that would actually perform 
their business’ delivery function.  However, General Babbitt consistently made it clear 
that they were responsible and accountable directly to him for the efficiency and 
effectiveness of their assigned business areas (Barzelay and Thompson, 2003).
General Babbitt spent the summer of 1997 teaching his philosophy to his 
headquarters staff and traveling around to all the command’s installations to explain the 
new mission to the actual workforce.   In a very unusual move, General Babbitt wrote up 
all of his own briefing charts to ensure his message to commanders and managers was 
clear and consistent:
You are cost managers, not budget managers—your job is to deliver
products and services that meet performance standards and lower 
unit-cost targets through continuous process improvement…your 
job is not to acquire bigger budgets and spend it all…for products 
and services that meet performance [quality] standards, your job is
to drive down the unit cost; for products and services that do not 
meet performance standards, your job is to improve performance
           [quality] without increasing cost.
The first time I heard these words was in the summer of 1997 at the base theater 
at the Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center.  I am certain I had the very same look of 
shock and increasing panic on my face as did the other 599 people in that auditorium.  As 
an item manager, I had never had to worry about managing cost…I only had to be sure I 
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asked for more budget authority in every given year than I had asked for the previous 
year.  Then, in the year of execution, I simply made sure I spent every last cent before the 
end of the fiscal year.  Everyone knew that the military never looked at cost…it was 
considered unpatriotic!
During the 2001 interview with Barzelay and Thompson, General Babbitt recalled 
some of the early confrontations over cost management:
I initially felt that this approach was easy to understand, but hard to 
implement.  Later I realized that I had underestimated the difficulty 
of getting people to focus on managing costs.  It is an emotional issue.  
They just know in their heart that it is not the right thing for a military
person to do, and they resist it much more than I do.
Not only was it an emotional issue for the workforce but it was also an accounting 
concept totally unfamiliar to the headquarters staff of the Air Force Materiel Command 
as well as most of the managers in the field.  General Babbitt was well aware of the 
education that was needed across the command.  Therefore, he handed out hundreds of 
copies of a quick-study primer on the subject of cost entitled Accounting for Dummies.  
Babbitt then used a more familiar concept from the systems engineering field—a work 
breakdown structure—as the first step in the process of unit cost calculations.  
When applied to a business area model, “…a work breakdown structure becomes 
a hierarchically ordered taxonomy.  Each taxonomic category within this functional 
hierarchy would be described in terms of the output that the effort was meant to produce.  
Thus, the first phase of the process for knowing unit costs was to represent business areas 
as functional hierarchies of work effort and associated products” (Barzelay and 
Thompson, 2003).  Even the new vocabulary presented a major challenge to many of the 
working organizations at the Air Logistics and Product Centers.  For the entire three 
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years that General Babbitt was in command of the Air Force Materiel Command, I never 
went to a meeting without a dictionary and the Accounting for Dummies manual…and I 
was not the only one!!!   
General Babbitt gave the chief operating officers only six weeks to develop the 
initial work breakdown structure for their individual business areas and to present it to 
General Babbitt and their peers at the weekly executive council meeting.  The reason for 
the short suspense was that the programming cycle for the medium-term spending plans 
for the five years beginning with fiscal year 2000 would be up for review and revision 
very soon.  In addition, the spending plan for the out-years of 2005-2006 would be 
unveiled for the first time.  General Babbitt made it very clear that the Air Force Materiel 
Command program would NOT be built as before but would be based on the new 
concept of performance AND cost management.  
To ensure that the command stayed on track, General Babbitt announced to 
people inside and outside the command that, for the first time, the Air Force Materiel 
Command would submit to the Air Staff a program that actually requested less total 
obligation authority than previously programmed.  Next, General Babbitt directed that 
future spending plans would be derived by multiplying targets for unit costs and the 
volume of quality outputs that would need to be produced to satisfy the command’s 
customers.  Finally, General Babbitt required that unit costs for fiscal year 2000 must be 
lower than the baseline level of unit costs.  
There were many challenges that had to be overcome during that first 
programming cycle.  However, when it was all said and done, the Air Force Materiel 
Command submitted a fiscal year 2000 Program Objective Memorandum to the Air Staff 
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that represented a $2.7 billion reduction in the command’s requested total obligation 
authority.  Two years later, when it was time to prepare the Air Force Materiel 
Command’s future program proposal for fiscal years 2002-2007, unit costs were again 
used to develop the program.  Again, the Air Force Materiel Command submitted a 
Program Objective Memorandum to the Air Staff that would return $1.3 billion to the Air 
Force to meet other requirements.  
Under General Babbitt’s leadership, the Air Force Materiel Command submitted 
budgets that were in line with Air Staff budget guidance; the working capital funds no 
longer lost money; and when it came to the year of execution, the corporate Air Force 
received no surprises and no more phenomenal must pay bills for the Air Force Materiel 
Command.  It is a true testimonial to General Babbitt’s leadership and dedication to 
changing the Air Force Materiel Command from a liability to an asset that when he 
retired in 2000, his successor, General Lester Lyles continued the process put in place by 
General Babbitt.  However, General Lyles did make one small change…he directed that 
the older label of mission areas be restored and substituted for Babbitt’s business areas.  
In further testimony to the success of General Babbitt’s transformation of the Air Force 
Materiel Command, the command did not have to request any additional funds until 
2002, after the events of 11 September 2001 dramatically increased the operational tempo 
of the Air Force and the entire DoD. 
Managing Performance AND Cost in the Propulsion Directorate
As stated previously, the responsibilities of the Propulsion Directorate (LP) at the 
Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center fall primarily into the Depot Maintenance Mission 
Area and the Supply Management Mission Area.  Therefore, these two mission areas are 
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the focus of the following section on how the Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center met 
the challenges initiated by the GPRA.  Table 6.4 provides a summary of how the 
Propulsion Directorate at the Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center learned to manage 
performance and cost.
Table 6.4        Managing Performance and Cost in the Propulsion Directorate (LP)
• Link to the GPRA:  Improved Effectiveness AND Efficiency
• Impetus: The working managers and operators responded to the directives emanating
    from the Air Force Materiel Command.    
• Focus: The focus of this initiative was for the working levels to understand cost 
    management, its relationship to performance and improve both the effectiveness 
    and the efficiency of the Propulsion Directorate.  The next step was for the Propulsion
    Directorate to develop more accurate measures of the costs associated with varying
    levels of performance.  The focus was clearly internal as all of these objectives 
    represented day-to-day activities in the Propulsion Directorate.
• Decision Making: The implementation of efforts to improve efficiency was
incremental but on a time schedule designed to support General Babbitt’s overall cost
    management initiative.  Therefore, the incremental decision-making was less 
    important to the overall success of the local initiative. 
• Key Actors:  The working managers and operators were critical to the success of this
    initiative because it fell to them to scrutinize every requirement to ensure every effort 
    was being made to meet Unit Cost Target objectives established by the Air Force
    Materiel Command.  The working managers and operators were also responsible for 
    developing better measures of effectiveness and efficiency.  
• Accountability: Enhancing accountability was only somewhat important in planning
  for better cost and performance management in the Propulsion Directorate. However, 
  accountability was enhanced because focusing on Unit Cost Targets clearly identified
  each item that failed to meet the goal and the responsible manager.  
• Knowledge & Information: The majority of the working level had no previous 
    experience with managing cost.  Therefore, it was important that the appropriate 
    knowledge and information be developed in the managers and operators as quickly 
    as possible.  Once provided the applicable training, the managers and operators 
    actually implemented actions to improve Unit Cost Targets and to better measure 
    both effectiveness and efficiency.
• Time:  Time was a critical factor for implementing better cost and performance
    management in the Propulsion Directorate.  Actual outcomes were not clearly visible
    for more than 3 years. 
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• Results of Change:   Further institutionalized relationship between cost and 
performance. More accurate measures of effectiveness and efficiency were 
   developed. 
The Air Force Materiel Command’s Depot Maintenance Mission Area industrial 
infrastructure comprises government and contractor repair centers performing depot level 
repair functions.  Together they provided over $5 billion of repair work and other 
services to customers throughout the Air Force, as well as to other service branches, U.S. 
government agencies and foreign governments (Air Force Materiel Command Fiscal 
Year 2000 Annual Report).  The Depot Maintenance Mission Area repairs a wide range 
of customer assets including aircraft, missiles, aircraft engines and engine modules, 
landing gear, electronics, avionics, composites, and computer hardware and software.  
The mission statement for the Depot Maintenance Mission Area calls for the Air Force 
Materiel Command to:
Provide organic and contract depot repair capability for fielded and
                          emerging weapon systems.
The Air Logistics Centers are also the primary suppliers of repaired components 
to the Supply Management Mission Area operations.  According to its mission statement, 
the Supply Management Mission Area:  
Provides policy, guidance, and resources to fulfill the United States
Air Force’s need for spare parts in war and peace.
The Supply Management Mission Area is responsible for the inventory management of 
approximately 2.2 million items, including weapon system consumables and depot level 
repairable spare parts (Air Force Materiel Command Fiscal Year 2000 Annual Report). In 
addition to the management of parts, the Supply Management Mission Area provides a 
wide range of logistics support services.  These include requirements forecasting, item 
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and production management, cataloging, provisioning, procurement, repair, technical 
support, data management, item disposal, distribution management and transportation. 
From the mission statements developed by the Air Force Materiel Command for 
the Depot Maintenance and Supply Management Mission Areas, the Propulsion 
Directorate at the Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center derived the following mission 
statement:
Provide world-class propulsion products and increased readiness
             through depot/intermediate repair using Program, Technical and 
            Logistics Management in partnership with our customers and suppliers.
The Propulsion Directorate’s mission statement is concise, identifies overarching goals 
and the means by which the Directorate expects to achieve the goals. However, the goals 
are still too ambiguous to be accurately measured.  After all, what constitutes a “world-
class propulsion product” and “increased readiness?”
Moving down the organizational structure, the Propulsion Management Division 
developed the following, more detailed mission statement:
Serves as a focal point in maintaining the surveillance of contractual tasks,
program objectives, workload, schedules, manpower, budgeting, funding,
distribution and costs.  Provides policy guidance and direction for
two-level and long-range projects.  Ensures the implementation of all
subordinate personnel who are engaged in furnishing total engine
management support to all using activities.  Serves as a focal point for
prime engines, accessories, components and containers.  Serves as the
Propulsion Management Directorate focal point to ensure appropriate
             action and timely accomplishment of projects, either self-initiated or
             established by higher authority. Confirms the need for policy,
operational requirements, organizational changes, movement of service
activities, and mechanical failures or malfunctions affecting safety of
flight, personnel and property.  Confirms the need for and requests of 
appropriate offices to maintain accuracy in data reporting. Serves as a 
focal point for reviewing and analyzing plans and actions of other divisions
             in order to relate new developments to the programs of the Division.  Ensures
programs are adequately planned to provide optimum logistics support of
U.S. Air Force programs and future requirements.  Serves as a focal point
within the Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center’s Propulsion Directorate to
furnish the Air Logistics Center Commander, lateral and higher U.S. Air
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Force organizations expert advice and assistance in formulating policy
relative to the Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center’s prime engines.
While the Propulsion Management Division’s mission statement is much longer than the 
directorate and command mission statements, it is still concise and identifies broad goals 
from which the working branches can derive their own mission statements.  Again, 
however, the goals are still too ambiguous to generate appropriate measures of 
performance on their own.  
Finally, we turn to the operational level, the Item and Production Management 
Branch of the Propulsion Management Division for a still more specific mission 
statement, intended to describe actual work being performed:
Exercises surveillance over all assigned engine spare items, including
requirements management, supply distribution, management of assigned
funds, projects and procurement authority.  Provides long and short
range plans relative to assigned engines spares Materiel Management
Aggregation Code (MMAC) classes covering programs, requirements
materiel support, buying and budget programs.  Provides appropriate
representation at Headquarters Air Force, the Air Force Materiel
Command and other Air Logistics Centers regarding changes in programs
and policy matters. Exercises surveillance over recurring problematic
situations causing program delay requiring revision of procedures and/or
establishment of policy, materiel support peculiarities.  Coordinates and
monitors the maintenance program for assigned propulsion systems. Ensures
effectual control of programs and/or current logistics support concepts for
utilization by repair contractors and specialized repair activities. Provides
production feasibility and cost studies to enable higher authority to make
decisions and/or justify funds requirements for implementation through one
unit. Ensures impact of operational readiness, required cost, and general
knowledge of the ability for commands to generate required reparable assets.
Provides procedures promulgated by Headquarters, U.S. Air Force to the
extent necessary to achieve production management objectivity.
These mission statements demonstrate the Propulsion Directorate’s interest in 
numerical indicators of economy, effectiveness and efficiency; the Propulsion 
Management Division’s concern with ensuring the measures accurately reflect the work 
the operational branches actually are doing in meaningful terms; and, finally, the 
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operational branches’ interest in ensuring their performance is being measured 
appropriately.  The measures originally formulated at the operational branch level must 
accurately measure the work they do and be meaningful to the Directorate, the Air Force 
Materiel Command, Headquarters Air Force, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and, 
ultimately, to the Office of Management and Budget.
The strategic objectives of the Air Force Materiel Command for the Depot 
Maintenance Mission Area are:
1) Expeditionary Aerospace Force
• By the end of fiscal year 2005, reduce total flow days for aircraft undergoing 
depot maintenance 20% from the fiscal year 2000 baseline.
• Meet end item delivery commitments 95% of the time by end of fiscal year 2005.
2) Weapon Systems Support
 Sustain and improve weapon systems by meeting or exceeding specific cost, 
schedule, safety, and certification commitments by fiscal year 2005.
3) Cost
 Reduce unit cost of Air Force Materiel Command products and services in real 
terms (without inflation) 8% from the fiscal year 98 baseline by fiscal year 2007, 
while maintaining appropriate performance standards.
4) Work Force
 Develop a qualified flexible workforce in sufficient numbers with appropriate 
employment/skills mix by fiscal year 2005 to support the Air Force Materiel 
Command’s fiscal year 2007 performance and cost objectives.
5) Infrastructure
 Support the missions and personnel at the Air Force Materiel Command 
installations with capital infrastructure that is properly sized, configured, and 
maintained to enable productive operations and achieve Air Force quality of life 
standards.
The strategic objectives set forth for the Supply Management Mission Area are:
1) Aerospace Expeditionary Force
 Increase issue effectiveness to 72% by fiscal year 2006.
 Increase stockage effectiveness to 83% by fiscal year 2006.
 Reduce logistics response time to 23 days by fiscal year 2006.
 Reduce backorders to 121,000 units by fiscal year 2006.
2) Cost
 Meet or exceed a net operating result of zero each fiscal year.
 Hold unit cost increases of Supply Management Mission Area products and 
services to no more than the rate of inflation each fiscal year.




 Determine the fiscal year 2005 Supply Management Mission Area work force 
end state.
4) Infrastructure
 Size and configure the Supply Management Mission Area infrastructure for the 
fiscal year 2005 mission.
As directed by the GPRA, the goals and objectives established by the Air Force Materiel 
Command are concise, measurable and should provide the type of information 
stakeholders and decision-makers at all levels need.  The stated goals and objectives also 
serve as the basis for the Air Force Materiel Command’s performance plan by providing 
“...a clear picture of intended performance across the agency.”  For evidence of the 
strategies and resources that will be required and the credibility of information provided, 
we must look to the strategic goals, objectives and selected metrics for the Propulsion 
Directorate at Oklahoma City:
1. GOAL:  Support our customers’ needs and be their partner in achieving engine
mission requirements.
a. Objective 1.1: Maintain 90% or greater authorized Base Stock Levels 
for all engines managed by the Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center.
i. Metric:  Actual Base Stock Level versus Required Base Stock 
Level
b. Objective 1.2:  Maintain 100% or greater authorized War Readiness 
Engine Levels for all Oklahoma City managed engines.
i. Metric:  Actual number of War Readiness Engines available 
versus the number of War Readiness Engines required.
c. Objective 1.3:  Provide support to insure that the Engine Not Mission 
Capable rate for all Oklahoma City managed engines does not exceed ten 
each or ten percent of each engine series.
i. Metric:  Number and percent of Engines Not Mission Capable 
by series by month.
d. Objective 1.5:  Maintain an overall improving issue effectiveness 
(percent of requisitions filled automatically upon receipt) for all 
Oklahoma City managed engine components.  
i. Metric:  Monthly fill rate report.  
2. GOAL:  Foster a productive and positive working atmosphere through 
communication, training, and recognition.
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a. Objective 2.3:  Climate Surveys – Conduct climate surveys once per 
year and publish the results to indicate the morale, attitude, and general 
welfare of the workforce.
i. Metric:  Publication of survey results.
b. Objective 2.5:  Quality of Life – Provide the best possible workplace 
environment for Propulsion Directorate personnel.
i. Metric:  Department of Defense Climate Survey Trends.
3. GOAL:  Maintain excellence in environmental stewardship.
4. GOAL:  Continuously improve propulsion management and production 
processes.
a. Objective 4.3:  Lean Logistics – Implement Lean Logistics principles to 
reduce flow time and variability in repair processes and insure maximum 
issue effectiveness with minimum investment.
i. Metric:  Track inventory turnover in dollars. 
b. Objective 4.5:  Improve Supplier Performance – Work with and monitor 
our contractors so that we continuously improve the on time contract 
delivery rate.
i. Metric:  Contract on time delivery rate.
c. Objective 4.6:  Item Manager/Equipment Specialist Effectiveness -
Maintain Item Manager and Equipment Specialist effectiveness through 
the monitoring of semi-annual quality reviews.
i. Metric:  Branch Quality Review Reports.
d. Objective 4.8:  Improve Part Support to the Engine Production Line 
through Increased Responsiveness – Improve part support to the engine 
line through reduction of line stoppages and critical item totals by source 
of supply.  
i. Metric:  Number of critical items and number of missed 
schedules due to part shortage.
e. Objective 4.11:  Lean Logistics in Contracting – Implement lean 
logistics concepts and improved commercial practices into propulsion 
contracts.
i. Metric:  Percent of contracts and money on lean logistics or 
commercial practices.
5. GOAL:  Improve propulsion fiscal management.
a. Objective 5.1:  Initiate Financial Programs on a Timely Basis – Pursue 
an aggressive initiation of buy requirements in order to meet execution 
goals.
i. Metric:  Initiation status for buy requirements.
6. GOAL:  Improve quality of products and services.
7. GOAL:  Provide a safe working environment.
126
By end of fiscal year1997, the first year the above metrics were used to evaluate 
the Oklahoma City Propulsion Directorate’s performance, the findings were nowhere 
near the desired objectives.  Very briefly, the Propulsion Directorate identified the 
following deficiencies:   
 Failed to achieve a 90% Base Stock Level for the most critical engines managed at 
the Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center;
 War Readiness Engine levels for critical fighters and bombers were, in some cases, 
0% of the validated requirement;
 The Engine Not Mission Capable Rate for critical fighters and bombers far exceeded 
the identified goal of 10 each or 10% of the fleet and was climbing monthly;
 Overall issue effectiveness (fill rate) was below 60% for all quarters reviewed;
 The 1997 Climate Survey results showed that of fourteen areas, the employees of the 
Oklahoma City Propulsion Directorate gave only four higher than a 60% approval 
rating. The three lowest ratings were given to Adequate Unit Resources (22%), 
Positive General Organizational Climate (35%) and Adequate Employee Recognition 
(37%);
 Contract on time delivery rates were well below Air Force standards;
 Number of quarterly computations requiring corrections due to errors committed by 
Item Managers and Equipment Specialists was greater than 75%;
 Number of critical items was increasing;
 Maintenance was unable to meet scheduled repair times for critical fighter and 
bomber engines due to parts shortages;
 Contracting was not taking advantage of identified best commercial practices; and
 Buys frequently took longer than three months for purchase requests to be initiated. 
As a result of these problems, the Propulsion Directorate at Oklahoma City was 
unable to meet the goals established by the Air Force Materiel Command for the Depot 
Maintenance Mission Area and the Supply Management Mission Area.  There was no 
doubt that spare parts supportability and engine availability were far below what was 
needed to meet Air Force desired objectives for improved support to the warfighter, i.e., 
improved combat readiness (Livingston, April 1999 and GAO-01-587). 
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Armed with statistical proof of a failing performance level and a unit cost far 
above the target, the Propulsion Directorate at the Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center 
set out to fix what was clearly broken!  To identify specific problems, the Propulsion 
Directorate management sought input from the operational branches and the employees 
trying to deal with the problems on a day-to-day basis.
Inventory Management
The place to begin looking at engine supportability issues is the Inventory 
Management Branch within the Propulsion Management Division at the Oklahoma City 
Air Logistics Center.  It is here that problems with spare parts supportability are first 
identified, resolved or made worse!  Table 6.5 summarizes the findings for the study of 
inventory management in the Propulsion Management Division.
Table 6.5                                Inventory Management Summary
• Link to the GPRA: Improved Effectiveness and Efficiency. 
• Impetus: The managers and operators in the Propulsion Management Division at the 
    Oklahoma Air Logistics Center were focused primarily on complying with Air Force
    Materiel Command instructions.    
• Focus: Management of Air Force inventories is an internal day-to-day operation. 
 Therefore, any actions taken to improve inventory management must focus on 
    internal activities.  
• Decision Making: Incremental decisions regarding efforts to improve effectiveness
 and efficiency through better inventory management was less important than ensuring 
    that making improvements remained an ongoing process. 
• Key Actors: No one understands inventory management better than Item Managers
  and their working-level management.  Consequently, the managers and operators
  were the most critical players in efforts to improve inventory management. 
• Accountability: Item managers are already held accountable for the accuracy of their 
    requirements.  Therefore, there was no real change as a result of this initiative.
• Knowledge & Information: The knowledge and information necessary to improve
 inventory management resides with the Item Managers and their working-level 
    management.  
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• Time: Time was a critical factor for improving inventory management.  Actual
    outcomes in terms of better supportability and more accurate requirement’s forecast 
    were not clearly visible for more than 3 years.  
• Results of Change: Further institutionalized relationship between cost and 
performance. Developed more accurate measures of effectiveness and efficiency.
Inventory Management Specialists, better known as Item Managers, perform 
several major functions related to what parts are needed.  The Item Managers initiate 
buys or repair of needed parts; budget for funds to support buy and repair requirements; 
and, finally, are responsible for storing, maintaining, distributing and disposing of 
inventory items (GAO/NSIAD-00-5, p. 4).  They also review their requirements and 
adjust forecasts every three months to ensure timely support to the warfighter.  The 
primary performance measures for the item management community are:  
1) Issue Effectiveness (Fill Rate);
2) Engines Not Mission Capable due to supply support;
3) Decreasing quantity of War Readiness Engines due to supply support;
4) Engine Base Stock Levels below minimums due to supply support; and
5) Excess – On Order and On Hand  
The management of DoD inventories has been an ongoing concern closely 
monitored by the Government Accounting Office (GAO) for many years (GAO-03-98; 
GAO-03-18; GAO-01-587; GAO-01-244; GAO/NSIAD-00-21; GAO/NSIAD-00-5; 
GAO/T-NSIAD-99-83; GAO/NSIAD-99-43R; GAO/NSIAD-99-39; GAO/NSIAD-98-
143; and GAO/NSIAD-98-86).  Problems identified by the GAO suggest that inaccurate, 
ineffective and inefficient inventory management practices result in buying or repairing 
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items where there is already sufficient inventory to support needs or failing to buy or 
repair parts in short supply (GAO/NSIAD-00-5, p. 12).  
Requirements are computed and initially budgeted more than two years in 
advance to allow for items with long procurement lead times and the lengthy 
appropriation process.  The result of planning, programming and budgeting for too many 
or too few is an inaccurate budget and, ultimately, a failure to adequately support the men 
and women in the United States Air Force put in harm’s way, i.e., the warfighter!   
Unsatisfactory outcomes begin with errors in the quarterly requirements’ 
computations.  Although many systems overlay data and other individuals also input data, 
the individual responsible for the accuracy and validity of the entire requirements’ 
computation is the item manager.
Budget Requirements Review and On Order Excess
First implemented in 1992 for the FY93 budget, the Budget Requirements Review 
initially lacked formal structure and focused primarily on the current budget year only.  
As a result of the GPRA, beginning in 1996 for the FY97 budget, the Budget 
Requirements Review became a more formalized process for review of Air Logistics 
Centers' budgets for accuracy in the current fiscal year, the following budget year and the 
forecast budget requirements for an additional extended year.  The budgets for 
procurement and repair of spare parts are both subject to review.  Table 6.6 summarizes 
the findings for this initiative.
Table 6.6      Budget Requirements Review and On-Order Excess Summary
• Link to the GPRA:  Improved Effectiveness and Efficiency. 
• Impetus: As a result of strict oversight, the managers and operators in the Propulsion
Management Division at the Oklahoma Air Logistics Center were focused primarily
    on complying with Air Force Materiel Command instructions.
• Focus:  Budget preparation in the Air Force begins at the Item Management level. 
Therefore, any actions taken to improve the budget must begin at this same level and
    that makes the focus on the internal workings of the agency. 
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• Decision Making: Incremental decisions regarding efforts to improve effectiveness
 and efficiency through a more formalized budget review were important in that the 
 Air Logistics Centers were given more time to reach the ultimate goal. I did not find, 
 however, that the staggered decision-making process was critical to the improvements
 that resulted from the Budget Requirements Review.
• Key Actors:  Because of their expertise in the requirements and forecasting area, the
 Item Managers and their working-level management were the most critical players in 
    efforts to improve the accuracy of the budget and reduce on-order excess.
• Accountability: Item managers are already held accountable for the accuracy of their 
    requirements.  Therefore, there was no real change in the level of accountability as a 
    result of this initiative.
• Knowledge & Information: The knowledge and information necessary to improve
 the accuracy of the budget and forecast requirements resides with the Item Managers 
    and their working-level management.  
• Time:  Time was a critical factor for improving the accuracy of the budget and 
forecast requirements.  Outputs were seen at the end of each budget cycle, however, 
    actual outcomes in terms of better supportability were not clearly visible for more 
    than 3 years.  
• Results of Change:   Improved budget accuracy and ensured the right parts were on-
order to support the warfighter through reduction in excess assets on-order. 
The participants in the local Budget Requirements Review conducted at each 
individual Air Logistics Center are Requirements Control Officers, Technical Control 
Officers and Headquarters Air Force Materiel Command budget managers.  The review 
focuses specifically on usage rates and factors, i.e. base level condemnations and depot 
replacements, historical and adjusted; accuracy and length of pipeline times; non-
recurring requirements; assets in inventory and on order; and, procurement lead times.    
The objective is to ensure adherence to all applicable policies and procedures; to identify 
errors that will impact the budget accuracy; and to provide appropriate justification for all 
changes.  In short, the goal is to ensure that requirements sent forward through the Air 
Force Corporate Structure for inclusion in the budget request of the Air Force Materiel 
Command are accurate and defendable.  
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Based on the review, an Air Logistics Center’s budget validity factor is assessed.  
The error rate is determined by dividing the net dollar value of errors for a specific 
directorate by the Automated Budget Compilation System (ABCS) value of the total Air 
Logistics Center sample.  Penalties are associated with excessive error rates.  Cost 
authority for the current fiscal year can be reduced in accordance with that error rate.  
Budget submissions for the future years can also be adjusted in accordance with the 
budget validity factor.  
To further ensure that the Air Logistics Centers recognize the importance the Air 
Force Materiel Command attaches to the error rate as a key performance measure, the 
pluses and minuses do not wash each other out.  In other words, a $1 million 
overstatement is added to a $2 million understatement and is ultimately counted as $3 
million in requirement errors. 
As a result of the first formal Budget Requirements Review in 1996, the 
Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center absolute error rate was 18 percent.  Because it was 
the first year for the formal review, the Air Force Materiel Command did not impose the 
entire penalty.  Rather, the Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center’s funding for FY 97 was 
reduced to only 85 percent of its budget request.   The more inaccurate your budget 
requirements are found to be, the less money you will have to fulfill the requirements.   
To improve the error rate identified by the Budget Requirements Review, 
management in the Propulsion Directorate at the Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center 
reviewed the list of errors provided by the review team to ascertain what were their most 
serious problems.  One of the areas with the most critical deficiencies in the item 
management community was the number of assets on order in excess of computed needs.  
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The problem was not new.  The GAO in 1990, 1992, 1995 and, ultimately, again in 1997 
and 1999, identified inventory management as a high-risk area because of high levels of 
inventory in excess of current needs (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-83 and GAO/NSIAD-99-40). 
One of the main causes of excess inventory on hand is excess inventory on order.  Key 
reasons why the Air Force has excess on order are unnecessarily lengthy contract 
cancellation or termination procedures and the lack of adequate systems for determining 
inventory requirements (GAO/NSIAD-00-5, pp. 3-4).  Both problems became the focus 
of the Propulsion Directorate’s energies over the next two years.  However, the problems 
were not easily fixed.   
According to the GAO, the primary problems confronting the Air Force in the 
realm of contract cancellation and termination are:
1) the Air Force process for canceling contracts takes a long time (60-90 days to provide 
managers with requirements information), during which time contractors incur costs for 
which the government is liable, thereby reducing the savings opportunities from 
canceling the contracts;
2) the Air Force model that estimates requirements provides for over five years of supply, a 
period greater than the normal period needed to replace the items; and
3) the model uses invalid requirements, thus reducing the quantities to be
             canceled (GAO/NSIAD-00-5, p. 5).
In March of 1997, the Propulsion Directorate’s excess on order was 11.5 percent 
of all items on order.  The Oklahoma Air Logistics Center was clearly buying the wrong 
parts to support their assigned engines.   Armed with the Budget Requirement Review 
results and recommendations, the Item Management Branch in the Propulsion 
Management Division set out to fix the problem. Numerous changes were made in 
requirements development procedures and contract termination processes.    
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The first goal was to reduce the amount of time required to validate requirements.  
The item manager and equipment specialist for an item are the most knowledgeable of 
specific item characteristics and requirements.  The next level of review is the 
Requirements Control Officer and the Technical Control Officer.  These individuals are 
the resident experts in policies and procedures for requirements development.  One of the 
first steps was to eliminate all required signatures that added no value to the accuracy or 
validity of the requirements before a need to cancel a contract was identified to the 
contracting officer.  Therefore, only the item manager, equipment specialist, Technical 
Control Officer and Requirements Control Officer needed to review and validate the 
requirements computation to issue a termination notice to the contracting officer.  
Under the new guidelines, all requirements computations recommending 
cancellation of on order assets were the first computations reviewed each quarter and 
were required to be completed within ten days.  Prior to this time, it had taken as much as 
sixty to ninety days to process a requirements computation all the way through the 
signature cycle before a termination notice was issued to the contracting officer.  
A second change initiative addressed the length of time used by the requirements 
termination model to identify potential cancellations.  Utilizing a locally developed 
computer program, the item managers in the Propulsion Directorate were able to 
manually re-compute worldwide excess and termination levels required to be supported.  
Instead of retaining assets on order to support requirements for five or six years, the item 
managers could now make a management decision to reduce the number of assets on 
order to just those quantities required to support the operational period (current year plus 
one budget year) and the amount of time actually required to re-procure assets.
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Finally, a critical finding of the GAO was that the Air Force was using invalid 
requirements to determine if assets on order should be cancelled.  One of the invalid 
requirements identified by the GAO was the use of only two years of reclamation assets 
to fulfill future requirements.  The process of how assets expected to be reclaimed are 
now considered in the requirements computation is quite technical and beyond the scope 
of this research.  Suffice it to say, the item managers in the Oklahoma City Propulsion 
Directorate accomplished the changes recommended by the GAO so that all assets 
potentially available from reclamation activities are now considered in the final 
requirements development and validation process.  
Many other changes and improvements were accomplished by the item managers 
in the Oklahoma Air Logistics Center Propulsion Directorate.  Changes such as 
improving the on hand inventory records, increased accuracy in usage data and several 
acquisition reform efforts all contributed to a much more accurate determination of future 
requirements.  While there is much more that can be done to further improve the accuracy 
of Air Force requirements, the changes made by the Propulsion Directorate at the 
Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center from March 1997 through September 1999 did result 
in a decrease in excess assets on order.  In March 1997, the on order assets excess to 
stated needs of the Propulsion Directorate was 11.5 percent.  By FY 1999, General 
Babbitt had implemented his transformation for efficiency so the Air Force Materiel 
Command goal for on order excess at the end of FY 1999 was 4 percent.  The actual on 
order excess for the Propulsion Directorate at Oklahoma City as of the September 1999 
quarterly requirements computation was 3.2 percent, well below the Air Force Materiel 
Command’s goal for that year.
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Next, I looked at item management practices that could result in decreased 
supportability such as Engines Not Mission Capable Supply (ENMCS); War Readiness 
Engines (WRE) and Base Stock Level (BSL).   Each of these represent key performance 
measures and are used by the Propulsion Directorate to Headquarters, Air Force to 
measure the level of support to the war-fighter, i.e., combat readiness.  Each of these 
metrics had shown a steady decline since 1992.  However, after the passage of the GPRA, 
the problems seemed to be getting worse instead of better!  Several factors influenced this 
adverse trend.  Two of the most critical deal with consolidating inventory management 
responsibilities and the support of items used by more than one service.
Consolidation of Inventory Management
Following the end of the Cold War and the subsequent reductions in defense 
budgets, the DoD sought to reduce its infrastructure by consolidating similar functions 
and workloads among the services and Defense agencies (GAO/NSIAD-97-157).  
Two such initiatives had a direct impact on the Propulsion Directorate’s performance 
report in 1997.  Table 6.7 summarizes the first of the two initiatives.
Table 6.7            Consolidation of Inventory Management Summary
• Link to the GPRA: Improved Effectiveness and Efficiency. 
• Impetus: Because this initiative crossed service lines, the Department of Defense 
    (DoD) was the primary source of direction for its implementation.    
• Focus:  The focus of this initiative went far beyond just the Propulsion Division at 
  Oklahoma City to include the internal day-to-day operations of all services and DoD
  agencies.  
• Decision Making: The top level of all the services and DoD agencies, reviewed and 
    considered numerous alternatives before finally deciding to consolidate all 
    consumable inventories under the single umbrella of the Defense Logistics Agency.
    Therefore, incremental does not accurately describe the decision-making process 
    associated with this initiative.  However, the implementation was incremental in that
    the actual transfer of management took place over a period of four years.
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• Key Actors:  Because all DoD inventories are managed by Item Managers regardless
 of the service or agency, the Item Managers and their working-level management 
    were the most critical players in transferring the management of all DoD consumable
    items to a single agency.  
• Accountability: The primary objective of consolidating inventory management under
 the Defense Logistics Agency was to improve effectiveness and efficiency.  However,
    with a single agency responsible for all DoD consumable inventories, it was expected
    that accountability also would improve.  Again, there was no expectation that 
    additional flexibility beyond that already enjoyed by the DoD would be required.  
• Knowledge & Information: The Item Managers and their working-level
management were the ones with the requisite knowledge and information necessary 
    to accomplish the consolidation with as little disruption to warfighter support as
    possible.
• Time:  Time was a critical factor for transferring the management of all consumables 
from the individual services to the Defense Logistics Agency.  The transfer was 
    scheduled to be accomplished over a period of four years but it was after that that 
    actual outcomes in terms of better supportability were clearly visible.  
• Results of Change:   Improved support to the warfighter and reduced costs through
    reduction in infrastructure and elimination of duplication in management services.  
In 1994, following the passage of the GPRA, the DoD began to consolidate 
management responsibility for all consumable items by transferring them to the Defense 
Logistics Agency (DLA).  Previously, the individual military services managed their own 
weapon system consumable parts, both unique and common to other services.  The 
Defense Logistics Agency’s primary experience was in the management of non-weapon 
system related items such as medical supplies, clothing and office supplies. 
The Defense Logistics Agency’s overarching performance objective was to fill 
85% of requisitions immediately upon receipt (GAO/NSIAD-97-157).  This goal was 
acceptable for the type of items the Defense Logistics Agency historically had managed. 
It was not, however, acceptable for critical engine components.  Even the lack of 
something as seemingly simple as an o-ring or a unique bolt could prevent an engine 
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from being mission capable.  By 1996, Defense Logistics Agency-managed parts were 
holding up the repair and overhaul of engines at the Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center.  
And the problems were growing worse by the day.  
Item managers and logistics managers identified the lack of spare parts managed 
by the Defense Logistics Agency as a contributing factor to the Oklahoma City 
Propulsion Directorate’s inability to meet its stated goals regarding the production of 
engines.  For example, Oklahoma City’s ultimate responsibility is to produce the engines 
necessary to meet targets for mission capable rates, required number of War Readiness 
Engines and required numbers of engines on site at the using bases.  An overhauled 
engine requires an overhauled rotor.  The rotor is also managed at Oklahoma City so its 
scheduled repair is coordinated with the organization reassembling the engine to ensure 
the rotor will be ready when needed.  
Although the rotor is managed by Oklahoma City, some of the piece parts that go 
into the rotor are managed by the Defense Logistics Agency instead of local Air Force 
item managers. Because Defense Logistics Agency item managers were new to the 
management of weapon system unique parts, they did not yet realize the changes in 
management policies and procedures that would have to be made to adequately support 
active weapon systems. As a result of these circumstances and the time required for a true 
paradigm change, supply support from the Defense Logistics Agency for Oklahoma City 
engines continued to present problems.  However, the Defense Logistics Agency’s 
management and operational support centers became truly committed to changing the 
way they do business and also used acquisition reform initiatives.  As a result, supply 
support from the Defense Logistics Agency has steadily improved over the past two years 
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to an average of 91%.  I will describe one of the changes in how the Defense Logistics 
Agency now acquires spare parts in the section on Acquisition Reform.
Interservicing
Another critical factor influencing the Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center 
support metrics in 1996 was a DoD directed move to Interservicing, i.e., one service 
repairs and supports another service’s parts.  Table 6.8 summarizes the efforts of the 
Propulsion Management Division at the Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center to support 
the repair and overall of both Air Force and Navy engines. 
Table 6.8                                    Interservicing Summary
• Link to the GPRA: Improved Effectiveness and Efficiency. 
• Impetus: Because this initiative crossed service lines, the Department of Defense 
    (DoD) was the primary source of direction for its implementation.      
• Focus:  The focus of this initiative was on the day-to-day operations of the 
Propulsion Management Division and the Maintenance Directorate at the Oklahoma
    City Air Logistics Center. Navy logistics personnel were physically co-located with 
    Air Force logistics personnel in the Propulsion Management Division but were still
    Navy employees.  All Maintenance personnel were Air Force employees.    
• Decision Making: Implementation for this initiative was incremental, however, it did
not actually represent incremental decision-making.  Implementation occurred in 
    several distinct stages that can only happen in a certain order.  Therefore, the
    incremental implementation was important because it was unavoidable.  
• Key Actors:  Because the actions required to make the changes happen were by
 regulation the responsibility of the Item Managers, the Item Managers and their 
     working-level management were the most critical players.    
• Accountability:  Item managers were already responsible for the management of the
    items common to Air Force and Navy engines.  Therefore, there was no real change
    in the level of accountability as a result of this initiative.
• Knowledge & Information: The Item Managers and their working-level 
management were the ones with the requisite knowledge and information necessary
    to accomplish the review of common items and accomplish the necessary data
    corrections.  
• Time: Time was a critical factor for improving the management of items common to
    Air Force and Navy engines.  Outputs were seen thirty days after the data changes 
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    were made.  However, actual outcomes in terms of better supportability were not 
    clearly visible for more than 3 years. 
• Results of Change:   Improved support to the warfighter and reduced costs through
    reduction in infrastructure and elimination of duplication in management services.  
In 1994, the DoD directed the Air Force and the Navy to join forces to improve 
the support and maintenance of common non-consumable components in the F110-100 
and F110-400 engines used on the Air Force F-16 and Navy F-14 fighter aircraft, 
respectively.  This joint venture included the actual closing of the Navy's engine overhaul 
facility at Norfolk, Virginia and transferring the maintenance workload as well as the 
logistics management function to the Propulsion Directorate at the Oklahoma City Air 
Logistics Center.  Adequate visibility of Navy requirements and common parts shortages 
were identified by item managers as major problems in meeting daily demands for spare 
parts and in forecasting future requirements. To address these identified obstacles to 
achieving stated goals, the Oklahoma City Propulsion Directorate focused on lower level 
efforts to improve effectiveness, efficiency and economy in the acquisition, operational
support and maintenance areas of inventory management.  
In the fall of 1997, representatives from the Air Force item management section 
responsible for the F110-100 engine and the inventory managers for the Navy F110-400 
engine met in Oklahoma City to discuss the problems with support plaguing both engines 
and services.  As the Section Chief for the F110-100 item managers, I was one of three 
Air Force participants.  
Several issues were raised, such as incompatible, computerized supply systems, 
differing technical limits imposed on identical parts due to the differences in the 
environment in which the Air Force and Navy operate their aircraft, and a disagreement 
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on the definition of a repairable part due to different types of storage facilities.  Clearly,
this group of concerned inventory managers could not change the entire supply systems 
of the United States Air Force and Navy, they could not change the operating 
environment of the Air Force or the Navy and they could not change the entire concepts 
of appropriate storage facilities held by the Air Force or the Navy.  
The participants accepted from the beginning that they could not change the 
world.  However, they could try to improve their own little piece of it by adopting better 
business practices such as more effective communication between the two service 
inventory management communities. 
At that first meeting, representatives from both sides agreed to go back to their 
home stations and put together a list of items, common to both engines,  that were
adversely affecting the supportability of both the Air Force and the Navy engines.  
Within thirty days, each service would provide their list to the other so that all parties 
would be prepared to address critical issues when they met the next time.  In order to 
retain momentum, the next meeting was scheduled for December 1997 at the Navy 
Inventory Control Point in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.  
The issue the group had chosen to focus on was to review their assigned items to 
ensure they were being managed by the correct service under the correct Non-
Consumable Item Material Support Code. The Non-Consumable Item Material Support 
Code identifies the primary inventory control point, the secondary inventory control point 
and whether or not the parts used on each engine are identical.  When the group came 
back together in December, they had identified 298 items for review.  Following a week-
long review in which each item’s history, current usage rates, and technical limits were 
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thoroughly scrutinized a total of 132 items were coded incorrectly. Of the total items 
coded incorrectly, 65 were Navy prime items and 67 were Air Force prime items.  At 
least the errors were equitably distributed!
The problem was that the items were coded so that it appeared the Air Force part 
and the Navy part had different technical limits and were required to be kept separate in 
supply and could not be used in each other’s engine.  Even though the Navy had assets in 
their supply room, the Oklahoma City Maintenance Directorate was unable to produce 
engines for the Air Force because the assets procured by the Air Force had not yet been 
delivered.  Because the parts were coded incorrectly, maintenance was prohibited from 
using Navy assets to build Air Force engines.   Therefore, the Air Force’s mission 
capable rates, number of available War Readiness Engines and Base Stock Levels of 
engines continued to decline.   
Several substantial benefits were possible even with correcting only a few parts.
 Procurement of items for both Air Force and the Navy requirements by a single 
item manager should result in lower unit costs as total requirement quantities 
would be solicited as a single purchase;
 Need for separate supply storage facilities was reduced;
 Facilitated maintenance requisitioning and installation of common parts; and
 Improved supportability for critical components as a result of coordinated
      requirements being identified for piece parts.  
Over the course of the following year, cataloging actions were completed to correct the
coding of all 132 items to reflect their commonality.  Unfortunately, the follow on
initiatives never came to pass as the original participants for both the Air Force and the 
Navy retired, moved or were transferred to new positions.  Supportability did improve for 
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the corrected items.  However, it was not enough to raise the overall supportability metrics for 
the Propulsion Directorate at the Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center.  
The Air Force and Navy are not the only services experiencing difficulties in the 
management of identical parts.  In fact, the management of identical parts seems to be one of the 
most entrenched inventory problems for the entire DoD.  In October 1999, the GAO concluded 
another in a long line of audits of Defense inventory initiatives on this very topic.  The primary 
GAO finding was that despite numerous efforts, attempts by the DoD “to improve the 
management of identical parts have been largely ineffective” (GAO/NSIAD-00-21, p. 4).   The 
GAO went on to say that, “Although DoD’s goal is to have a single manager for identical parts 
used by more than one service, this goal has not been achieved.”  As of February 1999, more 
than 57,000 identical repairable parts continued to be used and managed by more than one 
service (GAO/NSIAD-00-21, p. 5).   
The GAO has not been able to quantify the precise savings that could be realized 
by the DoD adopting a policy of single management for identical repairable parts.  
However, they do report that it would likely be substantial (GAO/NSIAD-00-21, p. 7). 
An example of the affects of failing to correct the problems associated with identical 
repairable parts managed by more than one service is that a secondary item manager is 
frequently disposing of assets while the prime item manager may be purchasing the same 
part for use by another service  (GAO/NSIAD-00-21, p. 11). 
The GAO found that the primary cause of the DoD’s lack of progress in this area 
is much the same as the small group of inventory managers at the Oklahoma City Air 
Logistics Center and the Navy Inventory Control Point learned when they tried to change 
the way only a few items were managed.  The lack of progress throughout the DoD in 
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addressing the difficulties caused by identical parts being managed by more than one 
service “...stems largely from a lack of sustained and clearly formulated commitment to 
the program” (GAO/NSIAD-00-21, p. 13) on the part of management at several levels.  
The DoD does not disagree with the GAO.  However, the DoD contends that the problem 
cannot be significantly fixed until a more modern information system is developed and 
used by all DoD components (GAO/NSIAD-00-21, p. 13).  Developing such a system 
that will provide the total asset visibility the GAO recommends remains one of the DoD’s 
long-term strategic goals (GAO-03-98).
Issue Effectiveness, Logistics Response Time and Customer Wait Time
The best performance measures are those that provide a clear cause and effect 
relationship between what an agency does (outputs) and what results the agency seeks to 
achieve (outcomes).  The GPRA is very clear that it expects appropriate outcome 
measures…not just numbers based on output.  With that mandate in mind, I now turn to 
one of the more successful inventory management initiatives undertaken by the 
Propulsion Directorate at the Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center to comply with the 
requirements of the GPRA but to also improve supply support.  That initiative was the 
effort to develop an appropriate measure for how well supply is supporting the user in the 
field, i.e., the warfighter.  The basic concept employed was that you must first have 
accurate measurements of where you are before you can make changes to improve.  
Table 6.9 summarizes the initiative to develop a better measure for supply support.  
Table 6.9    Issue Effectiveness, Logistics Response Time and Customer Wait Time
Summary
• Link to the GPRA: Improved Effectiveness and Efficiency. 
• Impetus: Initially, managers and operators in the Propulsion Management Division
    at the Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center were responding to Air Force Materiel 
    Command directives to provide more accurate measures of supply support.  However, 
    this impetus was only somewhat important because the initiative was still in the very
    early stages of implementation when the Middle Managers essentially became the
    champion for developing a better metric.   
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• Focus:  The focus of this initiative was on the day-to-day operations of the 
Propulsion Management Division as its primary mission includes supply support.   
• Decision Making: This initiative provided the clearest example of incremental
    decision-making and incremental implementation of all the cases.  The original metric
    for supply support was Issue Effectiveness.  After several months of collecting data to
    show that Issue Effectiveness was not providing accurate information on the level of 
    supply support to the field, it was evolved into measuring Logistics Response Time. 
    After several more months of collecting data, the Propulsion Management Division  
    again went to Headquarters to show that Logistics Response Time was a better 
    measure than Issue Effectiveness, however, it was still not as accurate as it should be. 
    From there,  the Middle Managers ultimately developed Customer Wait Time as a
    preferred metric and it continues to be used today.   
• Key Actors:  The Middle Managers took over this effort early on and quickly 
    became the most important players.  
• Accountability:  The Propulsion Management Division was already responsible for
    the accuracy of the supply support metric.  Therefore, there was no real change in the
    level of accountability.  However, this example did demonstrate the degree of 
    discretion and flexibility managers are already authorized to use and the results show 
    that this had no adverse impact on the level of accountability.  
• Knowledge & Information: Developing an accurate metric requires knowledge of
    statistics and knowledge of the work actually being accomplished.  This type of 
    duel knowledge and expertise is a critical characteristic of a good middle manager.
    Consequently, the Middle Managers at Oklahoma City were the most important 
    players in this initiative.  
• Time: Time was a critical factor for developing a better measure of supply support. 
    It took more than three years to actually evolve to Customer Wait Time as a
    preferred metric.  Because the average procurement lead time to buy new parts is 2 
    years, it took another 2-3 years for actual outcomes in terms of better supportability
    to be clearly visible.  
• Results of Change:   Improved requirements accuracy that lead to better supply
    support to the warfighter. 
The measure the Air Force Materiel Command selected to reflect supply 
performance following the Quality Air Force Assessment in 1996 was a metric identified 
as Issue Effectiveness.  Issue effectiveness was to measure the number of times a 
requisition for parts was filled the instant it hit the supply system computer rather than 
being placed on backorder.  The thought was that a fill action issued immediately 
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demonstrated that supply had the right parts available at the right time.  Issue 
effectiveness also was used to rate how well the item managers were doing their jobs of 
buying or scheduling repair for the right part at the right time.  The target goal was set at 
85%.  In other words, the Air Force Materiel Command believed if 85% of all 
requisitions received from the users were filled immediately upon receipt by the supply 
computer system, the warfighter was being adequately supported.  
In reality, issue effectiveness was just a new name given to an old metric—fill 
rate.  The name was changed to make it appear the metric had changed because fill rate 
was notoriously inaccurate, had been for years and managers and operators knew it!  Fill 
rate was inaccurate because it did not measure what it was intended to measure, i.e., 
assets available for immediate support of the warfighter.  The flaw was that a requisition 
could be placed on backorder when it was received by the supply computer system even 
if there were assets on the shelf and available for distribution.  Control of distribution was 
firmly in the hands of the item managers not the supply computer system.
There are numerous codes used by the supply computer system to identify many 
different characteristics of an item and to reflect the distribution instructions from the 
item manager.  For example, there are codes that instruct the supply computer system to 
not release an asset even if one is available on the shelf until the item manager has 
reviewed the requisition.  These are called Manager Review Codes (MRC).  There are 
several different Manager Review Codes that exert various levels of control over 
distribution.  For example, one Manager Review Code (F) will only allow assets to ship if 
the requisition is of a certain priority.  Another Manager Review Code (L) will not allow 
any assets to ship at all until the item manager has reviewed the requisition and put a 
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manual release action into the supply computer system.   Neither issue effectiveness nor 
fill rate allow for these circumstances.  If the requisition is placed on backorder for even 
a second, no credit is considered in computing the fill rate for having the right part at the 
right time.   
There are many valid reasons for an item manager to assign a Manager Review 
Code to an item.  The automatic release function of the supply computer system operates 
on the principle of oldest/highest priority is filled first.  But there are reasons why an item 
manager wants to change this order of release.  For example, the item may be one that is 
replaced when an engine comes in for scheduled overhaul.  These parts can be 
requisitioned as much as sixty days before the engine is scheduled to come into 
maintenance and they automatically are assigned a high priority.  Generally, the assets 
required for overhaul are bought and scheduled to deliver just before time for the engine 
to come into the depot.  
In the mean time, there may be other requisitions received for that same item that 
have a slightly lower priority but need to be supported with the assets on hand to provide 
optimum support to the users in the field.  Without the Manager Review Code, the supply 
computer system would release the first requisition for the part that is really not needed 
for another sixty days.  Therefore, an engine in the field that could be made mission 
capable immediately will remain broken while the part needed to fix it sits on a shelf 
waiting for the next engine to generate.  
There are other examples of situations where an item manager needs to strictly 
control the distribution of assets instead of allowing the supply computer system to do it 
for them.  But the point here is the reasons for assigning a Manager Review Code are 
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valid.  Therefore, a valid performance measure for supply support must consider the fact 
that not all requisitions will be filled immediately even when assets are available.  
Neither issue effectiveness nor fill rate meet the criteria.  
The GPRA’s insistence on outcome based performance measures placed the 
matter of issue effectiveness and fill rate inaccuracy squarely on center stage at the Air 
Staff.  The Headquarters wanted to know how well the Air Force Materiel Command 
was, in fact, supporting the warfighter.  Therefore, it was time for a new metric.  
The Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center concurred with the Air Force Materiel 
Command’s decision to put forth Logistics Response Time (LRT) as a more accurate 
measure of supply support to the warfighter.  Logistics Response Time was already being 
tracked and measured so there was a great deal of information already available.  
Logistics Response Time measures the time from when a requisition is received until the 
time the supply computer system initiates a release action.  The Air Force Materiel 
Command considered Logistics Response Time a more valid measure because it counted 
all release actions whether it occurred the moment of receipt or several days or weeks 
later.  In FY 2000, the Air Force Materiel Command reported an average Logistics 
Response Time of 38 days.  One of the major goals identified by the Supply Management 
Mission Area of the Air Force Materiel Command was to reduce Logistics Response 
Time to 23 days by 2006.   The Air Staff, however, was still not satisfied that this was in 
fact, the most valid measure of supply support to the warfighter.   
The Air Staff was looking for a measure that would encompass the entire logistics 
tail.  Very simply, the Air Force wanted to know how long it took from the time a need 
was identified until the need was satisfied.  This, they believed, would provide a true 
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picture of how well the Air Force Materiel Command was doing its job and it also would 
help to identify particular problems that needed to be resolved!   The metric developed is 
called Customer Wait Time...and it measures exactly what it says!  The clock for 
Customer Wait Time begins when a requisition is input to the supply support system 
requesting a part...the need is identified.  The clock stops when the customer, i.e., the user 
in the field requesting the part, receives it...the need is satisfied.  However, the Customer 
Wait Time clock is not just one clock.  It is a series of clocks. By using five clocks, it is 
easier to isolate and identify areas for improvement.  Here is how it works.
When a requisition is input, the first clock starts.  When the requisition is received 
by the depot supply computer system, the first clock stops and a second clock starts.  In 
actuality, the first measure should be only a few seconds because it is a computerized 
transaction.  However, if the depot supply system rejects the requisition due to some type 
of internal error, it can take days to notify the initiator of the problem, get it fixed and re-
initiate the requisition.  Once the second clock begins to run, it runs until the requisition 
is filled.  In other words, the second clock runs until an asset is released for shipment.  It 
does not matter whether the release is triggered by the depot supply computer system 
automatically or manually by the item manager.  
A third clock begins to run when the second one stops and continues until the 
asset has been moved from storage to Shipment and Planning where it is packaged and 
made ready to be transported to the user that requisitioned it.  Once the asset is packaged 
for shipment, the third clock stops and the fourth clock takes over and runs until the asset 
is delivered to the central receiving facility at the user’s location.  Once it is received at 
the base facility, the fifth and final clock starts and runs until the asset is actually placed 
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in the hands of the user that identified the original need.  The times for all five clocks are 
then added together to become the Customer Wait Time metric...the actual length of time 
it takes for the user to order a part and receive it.  By using five clocks, it is possible to 
more easily isolate and identify bottlenecks.  
The Air Force Materiel Command had been directed to establish strategic goals 
for Customer Wait Time to be met by the end of 2004. The goal was developed by 
collecting data from the three depots and all other using activities on the total times for 
each of the five clocks. The goal the command established was 6.38 days. The Air Force 
Materiel Command reported the target goal for Customer Wait Time to the Deputy Chief 
of Staff for Installations and Logistics at Air Force Headquarters in Washington, D.C. for 
inclusion in the next update of the annual Air Force Strategic and Performance Plans 
required by the GPRA.  
At the Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center, all active directorates identified their 
individual their numbers and then the Center developed an over all average. At the end of 
January 2003 the average Customer Wait Time for the Oklahoma City Air Logistics 
Center was 9.14 days.  As of January 2004, the average Customer Wait Time at the 
Oklahoma City Air Logistic Center was 4.75 days.  It has been said that, “…neither the 
act of measuring performance nor the resulting data accomplishes anything itself; only 
when someone uses these measures in some way do they accomplish something” (Behn, 
2003, p. 586).  In the case of the Customer Wait Time, the logistics management and 
maintenance organizations at the Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center made Customer 
Wait Time the target of all their efforts.  
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The individual directorates were required to brief their actual numbers and actions 
they had taken to improve those numbers every week at the General’s staff meeting.  
Each director was responsible for presenting every suggestion to reduce Customer Wait 
Time whether it came from the jet engine mechanic on the floor or the program 
management office.  The presentations included feasibility, costs and expected results.  
By keeping the focus on Customer Wait Time as the most important measure of 
performance, the Oklahoma Air Logistics Center was able to exceed the target goal in the 
very first year. 
As reflected in the strategic objectives, the Air Force Materiel Command 
continues to establish goals for Issue Effectiveness and Logistics Response Time.  The 
command also continues to track progress toward achieving those established goal.  They 
are not, however, the metric tracked by the Air Staff to measure supply support to the 
warfighter.  To see how well the Air Force Materiel Command is supporting the Air 
Force warfighter, the current key performance measure is Customer Wait Time.  It will 
be interesting to see if the Air Force Materiel Command persists in the tracking of Issue 
Effectiveness and Logistics Response Time after the data on Customer Wait Time is 
tracked for two or three years.  But what is most interesting about the evolution of this 
metric is that it is exactly what the framers of the GPRA wanted the law to accomplish.   
Organizational Climate Survey
The following is an excerpt from the introduction to the 2002 Air Force 
Organizational Climate Survey:  
The Air Force’s Organizational Climate Survey answers the question “What
 is the health of my organization?”  These characteristics are relatively enduring 
over time and influence the behavior of people in the organization.  By examining 
climate, actionable data concerning the ability of a unit to sustain effective 
performance is obtained. Research indicates that sound management practices 
151
lead to an increase in employee job satisfaction, customer satisfaction and loyalty, 
organizational productivity, growth and profitability. 
The climate survey is an excellent tool for leaders because it provides information about 
how employees perceive their unit, it is a mechanism for leaders to engage in 
conversations with their employees and it can be used as a tool to improve the 
organization.  The Propulsion Directorate at the Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center 
seemed to recognize the value of the Organizational Climate Survey when they included 
it in their list of strategic objectives for 2000.  
Table 6.10 summarizes my case study of the use of the Organizational Climate 
Survey as a means of engaging the workforce and providing information to the Chief of 
Staff of the Air Force.  A more detailed discussion of the survey will follow.  Also 
included will be a discussion of the survey I conducted specifically for this research and 
some of the applicable results.
Table 6.10                      Organizational Climate Survey Summary 
• Link to the GPRA: Improved Effectiveness.  
• Impetus: The driving force behind the Organizational Climate Survey is the Chief of
    Staff of the Air Force and his Staff.  The interest of the Chief of Staff is important in 
    conducting the survey in that it encourages leaders at all levels to also support the 
    survey and to pay attention to the results.   
• Focus:  The focus of the Climate Survey is to gather critical information from all Air
    Force active duty and civilians on how well the organizations are actually working. 
    In 2002, more than 279,000 people participated in the survey.  Leaders use the 
    information garnered from the survey results to make the working environments 
    better for all Air Force people.  Focus is the only factor found to be critical to the 
    success of this initiative.
• Decision Making: In the case study on the Climate Survey, we find examples of both
    rational and incremental decision-making and implementation.  Other alternatives
    were considered before the Climate Survey was selected as the Chief’s preferred tool 
    for listening to the men and women under his command.  The survey is conducted 
    every 2 years, the results are distributed to all working levels in the Air Force and
    supervisors are encouraged to review the findings in a group setting with all 
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    employees.  Beginning at the first-level of supervision, leaders are required to develop
    formal plans of action for all areas with a score below 70%.  However, corrective 
    actions are not accomplished all at once.    
• Key Actors:  There are no specific key actors because all Air Force people are 
    encouraged to participate and the survey is completely anonymous.
• Accountability: Although leaders at all levels are held responsible for correcting any
    identified problems in the working environment, there was no real change to the
    degree of accountability.  
• Knowledge & Information: The survey is designed to seek information from all 
    military ranks and civilian grades.  Therefore, the knowledge and information needed 
    to make the survey successful is found throughout the Department of the Air Force.
• Time:  The results of the Climate Survey are available within 90 days after the survey
     is completed so in that respect the outcome was visible in less than 3 years.
     However, any problems identified could require anywhere from 6 months to 6 years 
     to correct or improve.  
• Results of Change:   Increased focus on most valuable Air Force asset – people.
Through the survey, people are asked to evaluate factors that have the greatest 
influence on the service—general satisfaction, core values, unit performance outcomes, 
recognition, teamwork, leadership, supervision, training and development, job 
enhancement, the job, resources, participation/involvement, and unit flexibility.  The 
Climate Survey is a method for people to anonymously provide honest information and 
feedback on these factors, so that leadership has an accurate picture of their organization.  
With this information, leaders are able to pinpoint areas that need improvement and then 
take action.  The Air Force leadership stresses that feedback from ALL levels of rank and 
pay grade is required to effectively create positive change.   
Before I go on with the discussion of specific survey results, I remind the reader 
again, as discussed in Chapter 2, this data may be of limited value because of reduced 
participation in the survey I conducted in 2001.  I also advise that the validity of the 
comparisons may also be suspect because the 1997 survey offered only three choices of 
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responses (Agree, Disagree and Don’t Know) where I offered eight in 2001. Based on my 
findings, I suspect that a percentage of those that Disagreed in 1997 may have Somewhat 
Agreed in 2001.  However, I have no way of knowing if all the respondents in 2001 also 
participated in the 1997 survey.
The Organizational Climate Survey is divided into sections with questions 
designed to evaluate specific types of behavior. I found two of the sections particularly 
pertinent to this research.  First, the section entitled Core Values.  In recent years, the Air 
Force Public Affairs Office has conducted a major campaign emphasizing Air Force Core 
Values:  Integrity First, Service Before Self and Excellence in All We Do.  Four questions 
were included in the 1997 Organizational Climate Survey specifically to provide 
commanders and supervisors with information about workers’ perceptions regarding how 
well the Core Values are practiced on a daily basis.  Besides the three values themselves, 
the survey also addressed whether people were held accountable when they did not 
uphold these values.  
Table 6.11 displays the results for the Propulsion Management Division only from 
the 1997 survey.  As we see, the only “passing” score of 70% or higher is on question 
twelve regarding the high standards of their co-workers.  The lowest score is on question 
fourteen regarding their perception of the degree of accountability within the Division.  
For each of the results with a score below 70%, the Propulsion Management Division had 
to prepare plans of action and submit them to the Air Force Materiel Command and the 
Air Staff within 90 days of receiving the results.  The Air Force Materiel Command and 
the Air Staff must approve the plans--with or without changes.  
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When the next survey is done, the new results will be compared to the results 
from the previous survey.  Special attention is paid to the areas that scored less than 70% 
on the previous survey.  
Table 6.11                            1997 Core Values Survey Results




I am able to do my job without compromising my 
integrity. 67% 33% 0%
12
Overall, people in my unit uphold high standards 
of excellence. 74% 26% 0%
13
Overall, People in my unit demonstrate that duty 
takes precedence over personal desires. 56% 44% 0%
14
Overall, people in my unit are held accountable 
for behavior which contradicts Air Force core 
values. 48% 33% 19%
Because of the difference in the number of response options, a straight 
comparison of the 1997 results and the 2001 results as shown in Table 6.12 is not 
possible.  However, by combining all three “agree” options and the three “disagree” 
options, Table 6.13 suggests that there has been improvement in the total category. 












(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
11
I am able to do my job 
without compromising 
my integrity. 23% 42% 23% 4% 2% 5% 0% 0%
12
Overall, people in my 
unit uphold high 
standards of excellence. 12% 47% 26% 4% 4% 7% 0% 0%
13
Overall, People in my 
unit demonstrate that 
duty takes precedence 
over personal desires. 4% 28% 40% 16% 5% 7% 0% 0%
14
Overall, people in my 
unit are held accountable 
for behavior which 
contradicts Air Force 
core values. 6% 22% 32% 25% 6% 9% 0% 0%
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Table 6.13 2001 Core Values Survey Results Adjusted




I am able to do my job without compromising my 
integrity. 88% 11% 0%
12
Overall, people in my unit uphold high standards 
of excellence. 85% 15% 0%
13
Overall, People in my unit demonstrate that duty 
takes precedence over personal desires. 72% 28% 0%
14
Overall, people in my unit are held accountable 
for behavior which contradicts Air Force core 
values. 60% 40% 19%
Although, the comparison is questionable, I find it interesting that the one 
question that remains below 70% even after the data is adjusted is the one that addresses 
the perception of accountability.  Based on these results and my own experiences in the 
Propulsion Management Division at the Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center, there seems 
to be uncertainty among operators (GS-11 and GS-12) regarding the ability of 
management to maintain clear accountability during times of change.  This is an area that 
the Division continues to work on today.
The second section of interest is entitled Unit Flexibility.  Air Force leaders can 
challenge traditional ways of doing business and encourage members to attempt new and 
sometimes risky techniques.  The survey uses key characteristics of unit flexibility: 
1) Speed at which unit responds to change;
2) The degree to which the unit fosters an attitude that it is OK to take 
acceptable risks; and
3) The degree to which the unit looks for and implements newer, supposedly
                                 better ways of working.
As we see in Table 6.14, the 1997 survey results reflect a workforce rather evenly 
divided regarding their perception of their organizations’ commitment to change.  The 
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1997 survey results also reflect a somewhat negative perception of their organizations’ 
willingness to take risks.  All questions reflect a positive score of less than 70% so all 
areas under Unit Flexibility required plans of action.  
Table 6.14                           1997 Unit Flexibility Survey Results
Four years later, Table 6.15 shows that the option selected by the largest number 
of survey respondents is Somewhat Agree and the second largest number of responses fell 
under the Somewhat Disagree option.  This may suggest that the actions taken by 
management have not adequately addressed this issue. 
Table 6.15                            2001 Unit Flexibility Survey Results
When we again combine the three Agree options and the three Disagree  options, 
we see in Table 6.16 that there may have actually been some improvement.  However, 
given the percentage of respondents who Somewhat Agreed or Somewhat Disagreed by 
Unit Flexibility Agree Disagree Don't Know
46 My unit adapts to change quickly. 48% 48% 4%
47 My unit encourages appropriate risk taking. 37% 52% 11%
48
My unit challenges old ways of doing 












(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
46
My unit adapts to 
change quickly. 4% 16% 42% 21% 9% 6% 2%  0%
47
My unit encourages 
appropriate risk taking. 5% 14% 35% 25% 5% 11% 6% 0%
48
My unit challenges old 
ways of doing 
business. 9% 11% 37% 20% 9% 10% 5% 0%
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2001, I suspect that there may have been more uncertainty in 1997 than the original 
survey actually reflects.  
Table 6.16                 2001 Unit Flexibility Survey Results Adjusted
Overall, given the questionable nature of the comparison data, the best conclusion is that 
there appears to be a continuing uncertainty regarding the operators’ (GS-11 and GS-12) 
perceptions of the Propulsion Management Division’s commitment to change.  Since the 
positive responses to all three questions remain well below 70%, this is certainly an area 
that the Division needs to continue working on to improve.
Again, I stress the very limited value of this data because of reduced participation 
in the 2001 survey and the differences in response options.  I would add, however, that 
although the actual initiatives are outside the scope of this research, the Organizational 
Climate Survey has been directly responsible for many positive improvements in the total 
Air Force working environment since its initial implementation in 1997.
Acquisition Reform – Corporate Contracting
Much of corporate America realized by the late 1980s and early 1990s that 
remaining competitive in a global marketplace would require corporations to re-engineer 
themselves to operate more efficiently.  The result of this realization was that many 
corporations became much leaner and more responsive to their customers demands for 
goods and services.  A logical expansion of the concept of streamlined organizations was 
Unit Flexibility Agree Disagree Don't Know
46 My unit adapts to change quickly. 62% 36% 2%
47 My unit encourages appropriate risk taking. 54% 41% 6%
48
My unit challenges old ways of doing 
business. 57% 39% 5%
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to carry the idea over from the private sector to the public sector.  There were numerous 
governmental studies that made many recommendations to improve the government’s 
acquisition system.  The results fell far short of the intentions  (Beck, et al, 1997).  
However, there was one acquisition reform effort that did achieve success—corporate 
contracting.  Table 6.17 presents a summary of the first attempt at corporate contracting.
Table 6.17      Acquisition Reform – Corporate Contracting Summary
• Link to the GPRA: Improved Strategic Planning, Effectiveness and Efficiency.  
• Impetus: Because Acquisition Reform overall crossed service lines, the Department
    of Defense (DoD) was the primary source of direction for the implementation of what
    became the General Electric (GE) Corporate Contract.  
• Focus:  The focus of this initiative was on the overall DoD acquisition policies and
    the day-to-day procurement processes in the Propulsion Management Division, the
    Navy and the Defense Logistics Agency.    
• Decision Making: The decisions made to support the GE Corporate Contract were 
    incremental mostly out of necessity.  Because this was the first corporate contract 
    attempted in the DoD, much of the early stages required a lot of trial and error.  I
    found the incremental decision-making to be important rather than critical because the
    GE Corporate Contract could have been put in place without some of the adjustments 
    that were made over time.  However, the evidence suggests the contract might not 
    have been as successful without the ongoing adjustments.  
• Key Actors:  The most important players in the effort to write the first corporate 
    contract were the managers and operators in the Propulsion Management Division at 
    the Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center.  Especially critical to the success of this 
    initiative were the program manager and the lead contracting officer.    
• Accountability:  The discretion and flexibility of Air Force civilians were critical
    factors to the development of the GE Corporate Contract.  Because it was the first of 
    its kind, there were no hard-and-fast policies or regulations to guide the initiative. 
    The corporate contracting initiative was expected to and did enhance accountability of
    both Air Force personnel and GE’s efforts to better meet delivery schedules.  
• Knowledge & Information: As previously noted, there were no clear-cut regulations
    or policies to guide the GE Corporate Contract initiative.  The primary source of 
    knowledge and information came from the managers and operators as they worked 
    through the contract development process.  Fortunately, all who worked on the
    contract maintained detailed documentation that ultimately served as guidance for 
    future corporate contracting initiatives.  
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• Time: Time was a critical factor for developing the GE Corporate Contract.  It took
    more than 2 years to put the contract in place and another 2 years before there was 
    visible impact on reductions in procurement lead-time and improved supply support.  
• Results of Change:  Reduced Procurement Lead-Time and Improved Parts
    Availability Leading to Improved Overall Supply Support to the Warfighter.
The Acquisition Law Advisory Panel (Section 800 Panel), already in place when 
the GPRA was passed in 1993, the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act and the Federal 
Acquisition Reform Act in 1994, brought new emphasis to reforming the way the Federal 
Government acquires goods and services.  In large organizations such as the DoD 
acquisition system, leadership at all levels is critical to implementing change.  The 
resurgent emphasis on acquisition reform provided Secretary of Defense Les Aspin and 
Under Secretary of Defense Perry the opportunity to assemble a senior leadership team 
committed to major changes in the DoD acquisition system.  Most of the team members 
selected were individuals who had a good working knowledge of the DoD, had 
experience in industry, and were knowledgeable about organizational change.
In 1994, Dr. Perry replaced Mr. Aspin as the Secretary of Defense.  Dr. Perry had 
a long history of work in the government acquisition system and he now assumed full 
control of the team he had helped put in place.  With the change team in place and the 
Section 800 Panel results presented to Congress, Dr. Perry and his team unveiled their 
vision of acquisition reform entitled Acquisition Reform – Mandate for Change .  Later in 
1994, Dr. Paul G. Kaminski was sworn in as Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition 
and Technology to lead DoD acquisition.  With the leadership team in place, the vision 
developed, and Congressional and senior leadership support all the way to the President, 
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the stage was set for a new, and what was destined to be far more successful, effort at 
reforming the way the DoD acquires goods and services (Beck, et al, 1997, p. 2-3).  
Over the past 25 years, there have been numerous in depth discussions at all 
levels regarding whether or not the DoD can, with its many rules, regulations and 
legislative entanglements, actually do business more like business.  The fact is that the 
DoD acquisition system, as well as those of the individual services, predominantly are 
staffed and led by civilians.   Therefore, the defense acquisition system already is much 
more like a business than a fighting unit.  
Since 1994, there have been many acquisition reform initiatives in each of the 
individual services as well as the DoD as a whole.  However, I will focus on one 
acquisition reform initiative actually begun, led and accomplished by the Propulsion 
Directorate at the Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center.  The initiative became know as 
the GE Corporate Contract.  A corporate contract is simply a contract that includes 
multiple requirements with a single major supplier with pre-priced and pre-negotiated 3-
10 year terms which allow decentralized ordering of spares, repairs or both by one or 
more using entities. 
The first Corporate Contract was awarded February 12, 1999 at the Oklahoma 
City Air Logistics Center to General Electric Aircraft Engines (GEAE) and General 
Electric Supply Services (GESS) for the combined support of the Propulsion 
Management Division at the Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center, Defense Logistics 
Agency at Philadelphia, PA and Richmond, VA and Navy Inventory Control at 
Philadelphia, PA.
161
The GE corporate contract was the brainchild of a program manager and 
contracting officer in the Propulsion Directorate at the Oklahoma City Air Logistics 
Center.  This initiative for procurement of sole-source spare engine components 
belonging to the General Electric F110 family of engines was begun in 1996 as an 
Acquisition Reform effort associated with the GPRA and the reinvention of government. 
In 1996, I was the Team Lead in the item management unit for the F101 (B-1 bomber), 
F110-129 (F-16 fighter) and F118 (B-2 bomber) engines, all of which are part of the 
F110 family.   In 1997, I became the Section Chief for the item management of all GE 
engines managed in the Propulsion Directorate at the Oklahoma City Air Logistics 
Center.  In that position, one of my responsibilities was to develop a method of 
computing requirements to facilitate the new concept of corporate contracting.  
Traditionally, individual contracts were issued for the majority of acquisitions 
processed to support the F110 family of engines.  The traditional method of acquiring 
spare engine parts took approximately 3 years from initiation of the review of the 
requirements computations to placement of the part in a mechanics hands.   
In September 1995, the Propulsion Directorate issued a requirements contract for 
46 sole source items from the F110 engine family to General Electric.  A requirements 
contract combined multiple items on a single contract but the requirements were fixed 
and capped at the time of award.  The GE requirements’ contract, however, served as a 
foundation for what would become the GE corporate contract. 
The GE requirements contract enabled the Propulsion Directorate to shorten the 
amount of time necessary to procure new parts by approximately eight months.  The 
time-savings realized was the result of reducing the time used for purchase request 
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processing by the item manager by three months and reducing time required for the 
acquisition process by the contracting officer by five months.  After the signing of the GE 
requirements contract, the Propulsion Directorate and GE jointly explored methods to 
expand on the approach to include all sole source GE items from this engine family into a 
single contract to maximize the use of commercial practices. 
One of the first major challenges encountered in the development of the GE 
Corporate Contract was coordinating the initiative with the other F110 engine family 
managing centers.  The Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center had management 
responsibility for the majority of the items and dollars that would be a part of the 
contract.  However, the Navy and two Defense Logistics Agency’s supply centers at 
Richmond, VA and Columbus, OH were also expected to be parties to the GE Corporate 
Contract.  Therefore, their requirements development processes, computer support 
systems and current contracting procedures had to be considered along with those of the 
Propulsion Directorate at the Oklahoma Air Logistics Center. 
A previous recommendation by the GAO for improving DOD financial and 
inventory management via acquisition reform was the use of Prime Vendors for 
procurement of spare parts.  Prime vendors are merely contractors that buy inventory 
from a variety of suppliers, store them in commercial warehouses and then ship them to 
customers when a need is identified (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-83; GAO/GGD/AIMD-99-69; 
GAO/NSIAD-99-46; GAO/NSIAD-99-44; and GAO/NSIAD-98-141).  The Defense 
Logistics Agency had been using the prime vendor concept for quite some time.  Because 
the Defense Logistics Agency was expected to be a party to the GE Corporate Contract, 
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the concept of prime vendors was expected to play a major role in the development of the 
GE Corporate Contract.
The goals for this initiative were quite clear from the beginning and remained 
basically the same throughout the negotiation period.  The Propulsion Directorate 
expected the GE Corporate Contract to:
1) Improve support to the mechanics on the engine and flight lines;
2) Reduce acquisition lead time;
3) Reduce pipeline inventories;
4) Improve accuracy of requirements forecasting; and
5) Improve cash flow by deferring obligation of funds to a point in time
        closer to when the actual need exits (Anderson and Tabor, April 1999).
In brief form, the GE Corporate Contract required all participating parties to come 
together every quarter to review the computed requirements of all users.  What made this 
particular aspect of the GE Corporate Contract so very unique was that multiple Air 
Force and DoD regulations prohibited item managers from ever discussing future 
requirements with private contractors.  The rule was made to preserve the integrity of the 
full and open competition process.  For this reason, the GE Corporate Contract was 
strictly limited to items that only GE manufactured, but a waiver was still obtained to 
ensure the item managers would face no legal consequences.  
Once the requirements were reviewed, priority of needs established and agreed to 
by all parties, GE would then make business decisions regarding which items they would 
agree to go into production on without funded orders from the government in hand.  For 
those items that GE agreed to advance release,  a decision to buy or not to buy must be 
made by the government parties to the contract at least ninety days prior to production 
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completion.  If the decision is to proceed with the buy action, an order is issued 
obligating the necessary funds and the parts will be delivered within ninety days of that 
action.  If the decision is to not buy, the items are transferred to General Electric Support 
Services where they are placed in storage and/or sold to other customers such as foreign 
countries who also purchase versions of the F110 engine from GE.  
All of this is accomplished with the Government assuming absolutely no risk. If 
the Oklahoma City Propulsion Directorate, the Navy or one of the Defense Supply 
Centers, later determine that they do require the item, the overall cost is increased to 
include a fee for storage and handling.  However, in this first contract, GE was not 
assessed any penalty if they failed to deliver the item within the agreed upon ninety days.
Once the normal production lead-time had elapsed after the GE Corporate 
Contract was signed, the projected production lead-time required for parts support was 
established at ninety days.  Because of certain features of the several computerized 
requirements systems involved, a number of issues regarding the shortened lead-time and 
what would be used in the requirements computation had to be resolved before the 
contract could be put in place.  Although resolving these issues delayed the award of the 
GE Corporate Contract, the Air Force Materiel Command, the Air Staff and the 
applicable Congressional committees approved the necessary deviations.
Improving support to the mechanics on the engine and flight lines was expected to 
improve mission capable rates, war readiness engine rates, and base stock level rates.  
Reduced acquisition lead times would mean reducing the amount of time required for 
administrative activities such as individual audits and negotiations for each requirement.  
Traditionally the administrative functions associated with contract award took as much as 
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60-180 days.  The Propulsion Directorate and the Contract Administration Office 
expected this time to be reduced to as little as three days once the GE Corporate Contract 
was in place. 
The Propulsion Directorate estimated that as much as $120 million would be 
saved as a result of reducing the size of the pipeline inventories required to support the 
F110 engine family.  A major benefit of improved requirements forecasting was expected 
to be a significant reduction in on order excess and the number of contracts projected for 
termination.  And, finally, not having to obligate cost authority (an Air Force version of 
money used by the Working Capital Fund) in 1999 for a requirement not expected to 
actually generate until 2002 should provide the Propulsion Directorate, the Air Force 
Materiel Command and the Air Force improved distribution and better use of very 
limited funds.  The estimated value of the GE Corporate Contract is $1.74 billion 
(Anderson and Tabor, April 1999).
By 2000, the goals had largely been achieved for the majority of items on the GE 
Corporate Contract.  New items were added at every requirements review and continue to 
be added today.  However, perhaps the greatest benefit achieved through the GE 
Corporate Contract is the whole new approach to spares acquisitioning that it generated.
From October 2000 until December 2002, a total of five additional sole source 
corporate contracts have been negotiated and awarded by the Propulsion Directorate at 
the Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center.  The contracts include a second GE Corporate 
Contract to support the TF39, TF34 and J85 engines ($94 million); a corporate contract 
with Pratt & Whitney to support the F100 engine ($218 million); and contracts to support 
accessory items manufactured by Honeywell Corporation ($45 million), Parker-Hannifin 
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($40 million) and Rolls-Royce ($105 million).  Two additional corporate contracts for 
non-engine related items have been established by Warner Robins Air Logistics Center 
with Boeing ($70 million) and by Ogden Air Logistics Center with Hamilton Sunstrand 
($147 million).  The follow-on corporate contracts made great use of the lessons learned 
from the original GE Corporate Contract.  
The new contracts focus on an inventory sustainment concept that is an 
integrated, team approach between the government and a private contractor to ensure 
required assets are available to the warfighter on a timely basis.  The basic inventory 
sustainment concept places the responsibility on the contractor to maintain set inventory 
levels.  When the Government places an order, the contractor becomes responsible for 
monitoring usage and delivering assets to ensure the pre-established inventory level is not 
breached.  The concept provides financial incentives to the contractor for performance 
and disincentives in the event inventory levels are breached via the use of an award fee.  
Corporate contracting is certainly one of the true success stories of acquisition reform.
Government Purchase Card
One final example of how the government-wide reform efforts of the 1990s have 
fared in the DoD is another acquisition reform initiative equally as successful as the 
corporate contracts – the government purchase card.  Unlike the previous examples I 
have presented, this particular initiative does not focus expressly on the Oklahoma City 
Air Logistics Center or even the Air Force Materiel Command, although both enjoy the 
benefits of the government purchase card.  The government purchase card is a DoD-wide 
acquisition reform initiative.  The evidence presented here is drawn from DoD and Air 
Force experiences.  Despite its breadth, I feel this example is critical to understanding the 
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importance and success of government-wide reform efforts in the 1990s.  Table 6.18 
provides a summary of the Government Purchase Card initiative.
Table 6.18                      Government Purchase Card Summary
• Link to the GPRA: Improved Efficiency.  
• Impetus: Because this initiative crossed service lines, the Department of Defense 
    (DoD) was the source of direction for its implementation.    
• Focus:  The focus of this initiative was on the internal day-to-day operations of the
    DoD to improve the process whereby DoD acquires goods and services.  
• Decision Making: The original decision was more rational as the DoD analyzed 
    several alternatives to streamline its acquisition process before the purchase card was
    selected.  However, the policy continues to be reviewed and decisions made to 
    increase dollar limits and expand its use to more and more types of products.    
• Key Actors:  Transitioning to the government purchase card required the efforts of 
    DoD personnel at all levels.  Therefore, one particular group was no more important
    to its ultimate success than another.
• Accountability:  The primary objectives that the purchase card was expected to
    address were improvement and streamlining of the acquisition processes and lower
    prices.  However, improving accountability is always at least a secondary objective in
    all matters dealing with DoD’s money.  In this case, accountability was enhanced 
    quite significantly because all transactions are now fully traceable and, therefore, it
    was a critical influence on the successful implementation of this initiative.
• Knowledge & Information: Again, because transitioning to the government 
    purchase card required the efforts of DoD personnel at all levels, the knowledge and 
    information necessary for successful implementation also came from all levels. 
• Time: Time was a critical factor for this initiative.  Although some improvements 
    could have been seen during the first 3 years of its implementation, the most 
    significant improvements directly related to the government purchase card were not
    readily visible until the mid-1990s.  The reasons for the more dramatic improvements 
    was that the purchase card was identified by the National Performance Review in 
    1993 as a reform initiative that could save millions of dollars and the small purchase 
    acquisition threshold was increased in 1994 from $25,000 to $100,000.  
• Results of Change:   Expedited Acquisition, Better Prices, More accurate Financial 
Records, and Improved Accountability.
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The government purchase card was actually first introduced in the mid-1980s as a 
response to an executive order issued in March 1982.  At that time, President Reagan 
directed all executive agencies to reduce their administrative procurement costs.  In 1986, 
several agencies initiated pilot tests of a government commercial credit card, called a 
purchase card.  The agencies conducting the pilot tests soon learned that using the 
purchase card for simple purchases resulted in significantly reduced labor and payment 
processing costs and was a far more efficient way to buy goods and services.  One 
interagency study showed that using the purchase card for simple purchases often 
resulted in costs being cut as much as half (GAO/NSIAD-96-138, pp. 2-3).
As a result of the successful pilot projects, the purchase card was made available 
government-wide in 1989.  In 1993 the use of the government purchase card increased 
after it was identified by the National Performance Review  “...as an acquisition reform 
that could save $180 million annually” if only one-half of small purchases were made 
with the card.  In 1993, small purchases were those under $25,000.  In October 1994, the 
Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act raised that threshold to $100,000.  The National 
Performance Review recommended that the Federal Acquisition Regulations be changed 
“...to promote and facilitate purchase card use for making small purchases and in ordering 
from established contracts.” In December 1994, in response to the Federal Acquisition 
Streamlining Act, Executive Order 12931 and an Office of Management and Budget 
memorandum to agency senior procurement executives and the Deputy Under Secretary 
of Defense for Acquisition Reform, purchase card use was further facilitated and 
encouraged when an interim Federal Acquisition Regulation rule was issued declaring the 
purchase card the preferred method for making all small purchases (GAO/NSIAD-96-
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138, p. 3).  From 1994 on, the use of the government purchase card skyrocketed –
especially in the DoD!
In fiscal year 1990, the first, full fiscal year the cards were available government-
wide, more than 271,00 purchases worth approximately $64 million dollars were made by 
all government agencies.  By 1995, the number of card purchases had increased by 
approximately 1,500 percent to more than four million purchase card transactions.  The 
dollar value of those card purchases had grown by almost 2,400 percent to over $1.6 
billion (GAO/NSIAD-96-138, p. 7).
The DoD made enhancing the ease of using the purchase card one of its major 
1997 Defense Reform Initiatives.  Increasing purchase card use to 80 percent of all 
micro-purchases below $2500 was established as a strategic goal for 2001.   However, 
DoD exceeded that goal the very next year!  In 1998, 86 percent of eligible purchases 
were made by purchase card.  By 1999, purchases with the card reached 91 percent.  
According to the Department of Defense FY 2000 Performance Report (March 2001, p. 
52), prepared for the GPRA, the stated goal for purchase card expenditures in fiscal year 
2000 was 90 percent.  Again, the DoD exceeded the goal by using the purchase card for 
95 percent of eligible purchases.   Through reduced labor and payment processing costs, 
lower prices over the counter and the elimination of many warehouses, the DoD 
estimated that the Department had saved $92 per transaction in procurement costs 
(Government Executive, February 9, 2000).   According to Under Secretary of Defense 
(Comptroller) and Chief Financial Officer, Dov S. Zakheim, over the course of eight 
years, 1994-2001, the DoD saved over $900 million through the use of the purchase card 
(News Release, June 27, 2002).
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The DoD continues to promote department-wide use of the purchase card for all 
acquisitions at or below the $2500 micro-purchase threshold and payments on contracts.  
In December 2000, Director of Defense Procurement, Deidre A. Lee, issued a 
memorandum to all Service Acquisition Executives calling the purchase card one of the 
most popular and successful simplified acquisition tools and encouraged “...its use as part 
of our continuing efforts to reduce administrative lead times and costs through acquisition 
reform.”  In fiscal year 2001, approximately 207,000 DoD employees used the purchase 
card to make about 10.7 million transactions worth a total of $6.1 billion.  The Air Force 
part of the DoD total was about 80,000 cardholders that made 3 million purchases of 
goods and services worth approximately $1.4 billion (GAO-03-292, p. 73).
In 2002, the GAO declared the enhanced use of the government purchase card one 
of five completed 1997 Defense Reform Initiatives intended to reshape the DoD’s 
management strategy (Government Executive.Com, December 16, 2002).  As popular and 
successful as the purchase card is, both the DoD and Congress continue to keep a close 
eye on all the services’ purchase card expenditures (Kozaryn, American Forces Press 
Service, March 27, 2002).  The GAO conducts regular audits of all agencies, including 
the individual military services, to ensure that adequate internal control procedures are in 
place to protect the government from fraud, waste and abuse (GAO-03-292, p. 1).  In the 
most recent audit of Air Force purchase card transactions, the GAO made thirty-nine 
recommendations for improving internal control procedures.  The Air Force concurred 
with twenty-nine of the recommendations in total and partially concurred with an 
additional nine. Despite the identified shortcomings the GAO found in some Air Force 
purchase card processes, they did recommend that the DoD assess the value of some of 
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the Air Force’s strengths, such as automated monitoring controls implemented in 2002, 
for use across the Department (GAO-03-292). 
Summary
I believe these examples show the ongoing commitment to improving 
effectiveness, efficiency and economy as demonstrated by the Propulsion Directorate at 
the Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center, the Air Force Materiel Command, Headquarters 
Air Force and the Department of Defense.  These examples also provide clear evidence 
of a further commitment by these same entities to following not just the letter of the 
GPRA but to truly embrace its intent.  There is a long way to go before the Air Force or 
the DoD achieves all of the desired goals.  The GPRA, however, will continue to be the 
guide and the standard by which the Congress measures the DoD’s progress.
From the Air Staff to the Air Force Materiel Command to the Item Management 
Branch at the Oklahoma Air Logistics Center, major changes have been and continue to 
be accomplished in the name of the GPRA.  The sustained commitment to the GPRA 
found at all levels of the Air Force as well as the DoD is at least partially the result of the 
longevity the GPRA enjoys as a result of its legal status.  The force of law has cleared 
many obstacles on the road to reform.  For example, it is unlikely the waivers needed to 
allow the GE Corporate Contract to proceed could have been obtained if the GPRA was 
not a law.  
There also seems to be little doubt that the intent of the GPRA was to change the 
day-to-day activities within the Executive Branch agencies.  In each of the examples, it is 
shown how the directive may have come from above, but the actual changes implemented 
were accomplished at much lower levels.  Even the Air Force Corporate Structure 
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demonstrates the importance of the managers and operators to achieving lasting reform 
when the Air Staff placed responsibility for the first level of program and budget 
development in, not the Air Staff, but the working level Integrated Product Teams located 
throughout the Air Force.  
It is at the working level, the first and mid-level of management that the most 
extensive and detailed knowledge necessary to define a program and estimate a budget is 
found.  The improvements in the accuracy of the requirements computations came from 
the efforts of the item managers and equipment specialists.  It was item managers and 
their immediate supervisors who worked through the issues impeding the support of both 
the Navy and the Air Force F110 engines.  It was a dedicated group of logistics managers 
from the Propulsion Management Division at the Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center 
who worked diligently with their counterparts at the Defense Logistics Agency to make 
the changes necessary to ensure the support of all weapon systems.  It was a program 
manager and a contracting officer with a new vision of how to acquire spare parts faster, 
better and cheaper that initiated a full-fledged revolution in the acquisition world when 
the GE Corporate Contract was signed in 1999.
The path the program and budget decisions travel on their way from the working 
level through each step of the Air Force Corporate Structure reflects a truly incremental 
approach to decision-making.  This approach allows for review and scrutiny at various 
levels to ensure the budget finally submitted to the President and to the Congress for Air 





The question addressed in this dissertation was: How does our evaluation of 
reform change when viewed from inside an agency?  Based on the case study presented 
here, the simple answer is that when you evaluate the implementation of reform 
initiatives from inside an agency, it is likely that you will find many more changes taking 
place than previously thought.  Therefore, it is also probable that the reform initiative is 
achieving far more success than a conventional method of evaluation would have 
revealed because the focus was primarily on the budget interaction of the president and 
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), top agency officials, and congressional 
budgeters.  According to David N. Ammons (1999), 
The public sector has come a long way in measuring performance and
“managing for results,” but there is much still to do.  Delving even 
modestly into the history of public management yields the discovery that 
performance measurement and related management initiatives have been 
encouraged for many years.  In that respect, it has been a long haul.  The 
seemingly slow pace, however, should not blind us to the progress that has 
been made…Government agencies have established performance standards,
            many of which are directed toward meeting the expectations of service 
recipients, and service has improved in documentable ways (pp. 105-106).
 The guiding framework for this research was the seven factors generally viewed 
as critical to the success or failure of reform initiatives. Each of the initiatives presented 
in the previous chapter was evaluated according to these factors.  In addition, a specific 
question regarding each of these factors was also included in the multiple interviews 
conducted specifically for this research.  
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All of the factors did, in fact, influence the implementation of the selected 
initiatives driven by the GPRA.  Some of the findings were as expected while others 
revealed what was generally expected but with a slightly different twist than anticipated. 
Overall, evaluating the implementation of the GPRA in the DoD from inside the agency 
clearly revealed far more successful changes taking place than previously reported. As it 
turns out, however, the most important factors in evaluating major reform initiatives may 
simply be looking in the right place at the right time.  A discussion of each factor will 
include the information reflected in the following three summary tables.
Findings
First, Table 7.1, Summary By Factor, summarizes the findings regarding the 
importance of each factor to the success of the twelve individual reform initiatives.
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Impetus VI I VI I I VI VI VI SI I VI VI 
Focus VI VI VI VI VI VI VI VI VI VI VI VI
Decision 
Making VI VI SI SI SI I VI                    I VI SI I SI
Key Actors VI VI VI VI VI VI VI VI VI NI VI NI
Accountability VI NI I SI SI SI I SI I SI VI VI
Knowledge             
&            
Information
VI VI VI I VI VI VI VI VI I VI I
Time VI SI I VI VI SI VI SI VI I VI VI
Table 7.1
VI - Very Important: The factor was a critical contributor to the success of the initiative.  The initiative would have not have 
succeeded if this factor had been overlooked. Or  the success of  an initiative would not have been visible if this factor had been 
overlooked.
I – Important: The factor played a significant role in the implementation of the initiative.  However, the initiative could have 
succeeded to a lesser degree without the influence of that factor.  
SI – Somewhat Important: The influence of the factor was generally seen during implementation of an initiative.  However, the 
initiative could have fully succeeded without that influence.
NI – Not Important: Factor was either not visible during implementation phase or it had no visible impact on the final outcome.
Next, Table 7.2, Case Summaries, presents a more detailed summary of the 
findings associated with each of the seven critical factors for each reform initiative.  
Table 7.2 reflects not only the degree of importance associated with each factor but also 
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identifies the actual finding.  Also included are two additional columns.  The first 
summarizes the actual changes that occurred as a result of the initiative and the second 
identifies specific elements of the GPRA that each of the initiatives addressed.
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VI - Very Important: The factor was a critical contributor to the success of the initiative.  The initiative would not have succeeded 
if this factor had been overlooked or  the success of  an initiative would not have been visible if this factor had been overlooked.
I – Important: The factor played a significant role in the implementation of the initiative.  However, the initiative could have 
succeeded to a lesser degree without the influence of that factor.
SI – Somewhat Important: The influence of the factor was generally seen during implementation of an initiative.  However, the 
initiative could have fully succeeded without that influence.
NI – Not Important: Factor was either not visible during implementation phase or it had no visible impact on the final outcome.
Acct:
ENH – Enhanced
N/C – No Change
Time:
OC = Outcome
OP  = Output
Finally, Table 7.3, Interviews Summary By Position, summarizes responses to 
questions that specifically addressed the seven critical factors that were posed during all 
interviews.  The responses are categorized according to the position of the interviewee. 
Table 7.3                           Interviews Summary By Position     
Position 
Label Total
 Impetus           
%
 Yes




Making                
% 
Incremental
Key Actors                   
%
 MM & OP




Information      
% 
MM & OP





%             
1 - 3 
Years




OP 38 47% 100% 55% 45% 16% 37% 39% 45% 16%
MM 37 87% 100% 97% 86% 76% 86% 0% 41% 59%
MGR 10 100% 100% 100% 80% 100% 80% 0% 20% 80%
SR MGR 13 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 0% 8% 92%
Total 98 76% 100% 82% 71% 58% 68% 15% 66% 49%
Operators (OP): GS-11, GS-12, Majors and Contractors
Middle Managers (MM): GS-13, GS-14 and Lieutenant Colonels
Managers (MGR): GS-15 and Colonels
Senior Managers (SR MGR): Political Appointees, Senior Executive Service, Brigadier General, Major General 
                                                   and Lieutenant General
The specific questions were:
1. Impetus:  Does it matter that the GPRA is a law?
2. Focus: What does the GPRA expect to change?
3. Decision Making: Do major changes in your organization generally come 
about as a result of incremental or rational decision-making?
4. Key Actors: Who are most important to achieving successful change –
Middle Managers and Operators or Upper Level Management?
5. Accountability:  Can you increase flexibility and still maintain 
accountability?
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6. Knowledge & Information: Where will you find the most knowledge and 
information required for successful change in an organization – top or 
bottom?
7. Time:  How much time does it generally take to accomplish major change in 
your organization –
Less than 1 year?
1-3 years?
More than 3 years?
Discussion of Findings
Impetus
From the beginning, I expected to find that it made a difference that the GPRA is 
a law.  I especially expected impetus to be a very important factor to the item 
management community because of their involvement in the budget process.  Item 
managers are well aware that Congress controls the federal government’s purse strings.  
They are also accustomed to preparing for Congressional budget reviews and the 
significance placed on those reviews by management from the Oklahoma City Air 
Logistics Center, Air Force Materiel Command, Air Staff and the DoD.  Therefore, I 
expected that the primary reason they would give for reform activities was that the GPRA 
was a law.  However, what I expected is not exactly what I found.
 As a general question during the interviews, the fact that GPRA is a law appeared 
to be important to all respondents, especially as it contributes to its ongoing successes 
and longevity.   As seen in Table 7.1, in 7 of 12 initiatives, the impetus was found to be 
Very Important, in four cases it was Important and Somewhat Important in the one 
remaining initiative.   However, the impetus referenced in all 12 initiatives was primarily 
within the agency or command upper level management.  All participants in the various 
initiatives seemed to know that the GPRA is a law and that many changes were being 
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directed under its auspices.  However, if asked why something specific was being done, 
the most common response referred to the management level visibly directing the change.  
For example, everyone on the Air Staff was very aware of the GPRA’s status as a 
law and Congress’ interest in improving effectiveness and efficiency in all Executive 
Branch agencies.  However, when the Air Force Corporate Structure stood up, the 
emphasis on compliance stressed by the Air Force Materiel Command and the Oklahoma 
City Air Logistics Center management was that the Air Staff was directing the change.  
Therefore, the importance of and the requirement for submitting an accurate and balanced 
Program Objective Memorandum were attributed to the demands of the Air Staff rather 
than to the law passed by Congress. As Table 7.2 reflects, the Air Force Material 
Command was found to be the driving force behind five of the initiatives; the DoD 
provided the impetus for four; and two were directly attributed to individuals.  
In Table 7.3, we see that 76% of all interviewees believed that it was important to 
the success of current reform initiatives that the GPRA carried the force of law.  
However, when those responses are broken down by the individual’s position, it is clear 
that the GPRA’s status as a law is more important to those in management positions than 
it is to the operational workforce.  
All Managers and Senior Managers interviewed considered it important that the 
GPRA is law.  An additional 87% of Middle Managers also considered the fact that the 
GPRA is a law to be a significant factor contributing to the GPRA’s success and 
longevity.  However, only 47% of the operators interviewed indicated that they would be 
more likely to take action because the GPRA is a law.  Rather, at the operational level, 
the primary concern was with accomplishing tasks directed by a specific level of 
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management within their immediate chain of command.  The fact that the GPRA is a law 
seemed secondary to the operational level.  
Based on all these findings, I believe that the impetus for a reform effort is 
important but it may not be from the original source of the reform such as Congress or 
the President.  Rather, the importance of a specific reform to the operational levels may 
lie more in the longevity of an initiative and the dedication of various levels of 
management committed to its implementation.  
Focus
I expected to find that the focus of the GPRA was on changing the way agencies 
conduct day-to-day business rather than directly changing the budget decision-making of 
the president and OMB, top agency officials or key congressional committee chairs.  In 
all twelve cases evaluated, it was very evident that the participants knew that achieving 
the goals of the GPRA meant making changes in the daily operations of the Air Force.   
In fact, focus was the only critical factor found to be Very Important to all the reform 
initiatives studied.  In addition, 100% of all individuals interviewed agreed that the 
GPRA intended to make changes in federal agencies' internal policies and operations. 
Therefore, it appears that correctly identifying what is expected to change is absolutely 
critical to accurately evaluating reform success. 
One aspect of the factor focus that I found most intriguing was that everyone I 
talked with seemed to think it should be a given.  I was even asked on several occasions 
why I would ask such a pointless question—if you want to improve performance what 
else would you change except the agencies responsible for that performance.  When I 
suggested that some viewed the GPRA as intending to change the political process 
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associated with budgeting, I usually got some type of comment such as: Congress can 
only make things work better by giving the DoD the money needed to modernize 
sooner…Other than that Congress has no idea how to make our programs work better or 
cost less!
In looking at the summary of individual initiatives reflected in Table 7.2, we see 
that the objective of reorganizing the Air Staff into what is now known as the Air Force 
Corporate Structure was to improve the linkages among planning, programming and 
budgeting.  This change was directed at complying with the GPRA’s call for enhanced 
strategic planning, development of performance plans with stated and measurable goals 
and to ultimately build a true program-based budget.   For the Quality Air Force 
Assessment, the goal was to initiate a focus on outcomes and to develop more realistic 
and accurate measures to address those outcomes.  In the case covering efforts to make 
cost management a part of everyday life in the Air Force Materiel Command, General 
Babbitt had no delusions of changing the political aspect of the decision-making process 
of budgeting.  However, he did intend to improve the information that went to Congress 
upon which they would base their decisions.  All of these goals, objectives and changes 
in policies and processes are activities that are strictly part of the agencies internal 
operations. Therefore, the change can only be accomplished from within the agency.
The goal of the Propulsion Directorate at the Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center 
and the Air Force Materiel Command is to improve supply support to the warfighter.  
This means reducing the Not Mission Capable Rates for engines, ensuring the number of 
War Readiness Engines required are available, ensuring that Base Stock Levels of engines 
are full and spare parts are available when needed.  But it takes numerous initiatives to 
181
improve the measures and accomplish these goals.  Individually, the Budget 
Requirements Review, the reduction in excess inventory on hand and on order, the 
consolidation of consumable inventory management and long-term corporate contracting 
will not improve the metrics or the overall support to the warfighter.  Collectively, 
however, the potential for continued major improvements is substantial!  
From the works of academics such as Light and Kettl and then from the words 
and experiences of the managers and operators at the Oklahoma City Air Logistics 
Center, there is general consensus that the GPRA was intended to change the way 
agencies actually accomplish their day-to-day tasks. Furthermore, a review of the column 
in Table 7.2 labeled DV – Change, clearly demonstrates that the changes that the GPRA 
was expected to encourage were all operational activities that can only be successfully 
changed by the organization responsible for their performance.   
In the last column of Table 7.2, Link to GPRA, the intended focus on the agencies 
is further enhanced by the goals of the GPRA.  Strategic planning, developing 
performance plans, building a program budget, improving effectiveness and efficiency 
can only be accomplished through actual performance of work.  Measuring the changes 
in that performance provides more accurate information for decision-makers at all levels.
Finally, if a reform initiative is intended to change the politics of government 
budgeting, then it is appropriate to measure its success or failure by the degree of political 
change.  However, if the goal of the reform effort is to improve the performance of the 
Executive Branch agencies, as is the goal of the GPRA, then researchers must focus on 
activities within the agencies.
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Decision-Making
Decision-making refers to how change is expected to happen--incrementally or in 
a single budget cycle.  Budget cycles in the DoD are two years long.  In the original 
legislation Congress carefully constructed an implementation plan that allowed for 
multiple pilot programs beginning in different years with staggered evaluations.  
Essentially, Congress set a timeframe for pilot programs to focus on strategic planning; a 
separate timeframe was established for pilot studies on performance plans and then, 
finally, a deadline was established for incorporating the performance information into the 
agency’s budget submission.  I expected to find that the incremental implementation plan 
was critical to the success or failure of the reform initiatives.  In 8 of the 12 cases, 
implementation was being accomplished in distinct stages.  However, the incremental 
decision-making was only Very Important in two of the cases, the Air Force Corporate 
Structure and Issue Effectiveness, Logistics Response Time and Customer Wait Time.  
The Air Staff, itself, was reorganized in a single budget cycle.  However, when 
the 70 Integrated Product Teams were initially put in place it was still 3 to 4 more years, 
depending on the size of the program as well as the size and mission of the command, 
until the Program Objective Memorandums could be fully developed at that lower level.  
The second case was one that focused on developing the most appropriate 
measure for supply support.  It was inherently incremental and could not have succeeded 
any other way.  The use of Issue Effectiveness, i.e. old Fill Rate, as the measure of how 
well the Air Force Materiel Command was supporting the warfighter was well-
entrenched throughout the Air Logistics Centers.  Changing this measure through a 
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logical progression of steps seemed to be the way the effort was able to overcome what 
could only be described as institutionalized resistance.  
In three cases, Budget Requirements Review and On Order Excess, Interservicing 
and Acquisition Reform – Corporate Contracting, incremental decision-making was 
Important to their success but not critical.  The Budget Requirements Review and On 
Order Excess were implemented with progressive reduction targets over a three year 
period.  However, the Propulsion Division exceeded the target goal by the end of the 
second year.  Therefore, the initiative could have been implemented in less time than was 
originally planned.
In the case of Interservicing, there were distinct stages of activity but they did not 
represent incremental decision-making.  In order to improve the support for both Air 
Force and Navy F110-100 engines, the General Electric Engine Section had to
accomplish several tasks that can only happen in a certain order.  First, a list of common 
items was identified.  Next, the cataloguing data for each of the identified national stock 
numbers had to be reviewed and corrected, if necessary. At the time this initiative took 
place, file maintaining the Air Force cataloguing system was a batch computer process 
that ran only once a month.  Therefore, all data changes were input at once and the output 
products were then manually reviewed for accuracy. Consequently, although it actually 
took over two years to make all the changes, the decision to make the changes occurred 
only once, at the beginning.
For the case of Acquisition Reform – Corporate Contracting, incremental 
decision-making was Important but it was important because it almost derailed the entire 
effort!  Efforts to establish the first corporate contract with General Electric began in 
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earnest at Oklahoma City in 1996.  However, it was not actually awarded until February 
1999.  Even when it was finally awarded, it included less than 10% of the eligible items 
because of ongoing price negotiations.  Items continue to be added to the original General 
Electric Corporate Contract today.  I did not consider this incremental decision-making 
regarding the use of corporate contracts because that decision was never challenged.  
However, I said that it was important because pricing decisions were being made 
incrementally, one stock number at a time, and at different times both the Air Force and 
General Electric walked away from the table during price negotiations because their 
differences seemed insurmountable.  The General Electric Corporate Contract 
represented a whole new approach to Air Force relationships with their suppliers.   
Fortunately a few dedicated managers and operators were able to persevere and the 
General Electric Corporate Contract served as the benchmark for all the corporate 
contracts established since.  
Again, utilizing Table 7.2, we see that in two other cases, implementation 
decisions were being made both rationally and incrementally and in the final two cases, 
all decision making was rational. I found the decision-making associated with the 
Climate Survey and the Government Purchase Card to be both rational and incremental.  
In both cases, many alternatives were considered before the Air Force Chief of Staff 
decided that the Climate Survey was the best option for acquiring input from all Air 
Force personnel and the DoD Comptroller decided a simple purchase card was the 
preferred method for beginning efforts to improve the DoD’s financial management. I 
found that these two cases were also using incremental decision-making in that the dollar 
limits and types of goods that can be purchased with the Government Purchase Card 
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continue to expand.  As for the Climate Survey, many concerns and issues have been 
raised, reviewed and actions taken to correct or at least improve identified areas.   
However, not all of the concerns raised in even a single Climate Survey can be addressed 
all at once. Therefore, many of the decisions made regarding corrective actions are and 
must be made incrementally.  
In answer to the generic question on decision-making in the formal interviews, 
82% of all respondents said decision-making was incremental.  Of the respondents that
indicated decision-making was generally incremental, 74% were in middle management 
positions or higher.  All Senior Managers and Managers and all but one middle manager 
said decision making was incremental.  Some of the operators seemed to have a slightly
different view—55% of operators felt implementation decisions were being made 
incrementally.  However, the remaining 45% of operators said decisions were often 
“…made too quickly” and they expressed concern that upper management did not 
appreciate how long it takes to actually “get something done.”  Whether or not that 
concern is valid was beyond the scope of this research. 
Finally, I found that rational decision-making best described the way the Quality 
Air Force Assessment and Consolidation of Inventory Management initiatives came 
about.  In both cases, the decision to implement these initiatives was made after a long 
and arduous review of several alternatives.  Once the decision was made, however, initial 
implementation began almost immediately.  The new metrics for Inspectors General 
evaluations were put in place the very next year.  Although it took several years to 
actually complete the transfer of management for all consumable items and warehouse 
storage to the Defense Logistics Agency, once the decision was made, all efforts were 
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directed toward that single goal.  Because of the speed with which implementation was 
begun for these two initiatives, the fact that the primary decisions had been made in a 
very rational manner actually turned out to be very critical to their success.
Key Actors
Key-actors refer to who are the most important players in successful reform 
implementation.  I expected to find that the managers and operators within the agency 
were the most directly involved in the implementation of reform efforts.  However, the 
actual answer turned out to be, “It depends!”  If the focus of the reform is on the 
performance of the agencies, then the working managers and operators are the ones who 
most influence the success or failure of implementation.     
As we see in Table 7.2, in 8 of the 12 cases, I did find that the managers and 
operators were highly important to reform success.  It is noted that in the case of the Air 
Force Corporate Structure, the Integrated Product Teams were clearly the players in 
making the Air Staff reorganization work.  However, since the Integrated Product Teams 
are made up of managers and operators, I included them in the eight cases.  In the case of 
General Babbitt’s effort to make Cost a Variable in AFMC, a single individual, General 
Babbitt, was clearly the major influence on that reform initiative which suggests that 
leadership is often at least as important as the managerial and operational levels.  
In the case of Issue Effectiveness, Logistics Response Time and Customer Wait 
Time, middle management was the most needed player.  I suspect that this is because it is 
inherent in the middle management position that the individual sitting there must act as a 
filter for communication flowing up and down.  Very simply, the middle managers 
understood the type of measure that upper management needed and wanted.  At the same 
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time, the middle manager is still close enough to the workforce to understand their 
concerns and recommendations, as well.  The evolution of Customer Wait Time as the 
most accurate and realistic measure of the Air Force Materiel Command’s supply support 
to the warfighter owes its success to the determination and perseverance of the middle 
managers across the Command!  
In two cases, Climate Survey and Government Purchase Card, no key actors were 
identified.  In both of these cases, there were too many people involved at too many 
different levels to conclude that any one group was more important to the success of the 
initiatives than another.  Because the Climate Survey includes personnel from across the 
Air Force and the Government Purchase Card spans the entire DoD, their success stems 
from all levels rather than just one or two.  
Again returning to Table 7.3, we see that 71% of all interview participants,
without hesitation, said that the Middle Managers and Operators are clearly the most 
important players when it comes to implementing reform initiatives such as the GPRA 
within an agency.  That leaves only 34% who felt the Managers and Senior Managers 
were the key-actors in implementing successful reform.    However, interestingly, 55% of 
all the Operators interviewed felt it was the Managers and Senior Managers who drove 
successful reform while 80% of Managers and 100% percent of Senior Managers said 
that no major reform effort could succeed without the active support of the Operators and 
Middle Managers.  Perhaps where one sits remains quite significant to where one stands!
Accountability
This factor addressed whether or not enhanced bureaucratic discretion and 
flexibility is incompatible with strict accountability.  I expected to find that enhanced 
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flexibility and discretion did not preclude strict accountability.  Surprisingly, none of the 
participants involved in any of the initiatives believed they needed increased flexibility or 
discretion beyond what agencies can already exercise.  Therefore, the original question 
became more or less moot.  
All of the initiatives, to some degree, relied on the discretion and flexibility of 
agency personnel.  However, no one expressed any concern that this might undermine 
accountability.  In fact, a common thread running through all the initiatives was that the 
success of the reform effort would actually enhance accountability at all levels.  
As a result of this unexpected finding, the measures of importance associated with 
Accountability in Table 7.2 simply reflect how important improving on or maintaining 
the current level of accountability was to the overall success of the initiative.  In 6 of the 
12 cases, Air Force Corporate Structure, Cost as a Variable in AFMC, Managing 
Performance and Cost in LP, Consolidation of Inventory Management, Acquisition 
Reform – Corporate Contracting and the Government Purchase Card, enhancing 
accountability was an objective.  However, it was only critical to successful reform in 
three of the initiatives.   In two cases, Cost as a Variable in AFMC and Consolidation of 
Inventory Management, enhancing accountability was Important but not critical.  In 
Managing Performance and Cost in LP it was only Somewhat Important as this initiative 
could have been fully successful even if their had been no change in the level of 
accountability in the Propulsion Directorate.  
Of those interviewed, only 58% said that enhanced flexibility and discretion 
would not adversely impact accountability.  However, when I separated the responses 
according to the positions the interviewees held, Table 7.3 offers additional insight.  First, 
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100% of Managers and Senior Managers supported the position that enhanced flexibility 
and discretion did not preclude the maintenance of strict accountability.  Of the Middle 
Managers interviewed, only 76% supported this position and only 16% of the Operators 
believed they could exercise discretion without undermining accountability.  This rather 
significant disparity among the four groups of individuals questioned about the 
relationship between flexibility and accountability may be because each group sees their 
level of flexibility quite differently.  In follow-on questioning, the majority of Middle 
Managers, Managers and Senior Managers considered their current degree of flexibility 
to be rather high while the Operators viewed their discretionary authority as more limited.  
This would seem to be an area suitable for and in need of further research.
Knowledge and Information
This factor asks the question, “Are knowledge and information greatest and most 
concentrated at the top of a hierarchical bureaucracy or with the middle managers and 
operators?”  There seems to be little doubt that the managers and operators are very 
critical players when it comes to actually implementing reform.  However, as to the level 
at which knowledge and information are concentrated, the answer is not as clear. 
I expected to find that the middle managers and operators were the ones with the 
type of knowledge and information most necessary to make reform work and that this 
factor was critical to the reform initiative’s success.  I did find that the necessary 
knowledge and information primarily resided in the Middle Managers and Operators in 8 
of the 12 cases as shown in Table 7.2.   This factor was Very Important in seven cases but 
only Important in the case study on Managing Performance and Cost in LP.  The primary 
reason I believe it was not as critical to the one case was because the Middle Managers 
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and Operators in the Propulsion Directorate were getting significant direction and even 
micro-management emanating from the Air Force Materiel Command’s Headquarters.  
In two cases, Climate Survey and Government Purchase Card, the knowledge and 
information necessary for these two initiatives to succeed are actually found internally in 
the agency.  However, these two cases were so broad that different types of knowledge 
and information were found to be necessary across all levels involved from Agency 
Directors to clerical personnel in field operating locations.  
In the case on Cost as a Variable in AFMC, there was simply no doubt that the 
knowledge and information necessary for this effort to succeed rested firmly with 
General Babbitt.  General Babbitt then put forth the necessary effort to educate his staff 
and the workforce throughout the Air Force Materiel Command.  Next, just as I found in 
the evaluation of key-actors, the type of knowledge and information necessary to the 
success of the progressive changes in the case on Issue Effectiveness, Logistics Response 
Time and Customer Wait Time was found primarily in the middle managers alone.  
Finally, of those interviewed, 68% agreed that the type of knowledge and 
information required to successfully implement major reforms is found in the working 
managers and operators of an agency.  Interestingly, as we see in Table 7.2, only 37% of 
Operators and 86% of Middle Managers said they had the greatest knowledge and 
information.  By count, 24 Operators, 5 Middle Managers and 2 Managers said the 
greatest and most concentrated knowledge was at the top of the hierarchy.  However, all 
of the Senior Managers believed the type of knowledge most necessary to successfully 
implement reform was found at the managerial and operational levels of an organization.  
Again, it seems that where one sits strongly influences where one stands on this issue.
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Time
The factor time was intended to evaluate the actual amount of time needed for 
successful implementation of major reforms.  I expected to find that successful 
implementation of major reforms takes more than a single budget cycle and that this is a 
critical issue when evaluating reform initiatives.  I decided to break it down into 3 sub-
factors--1 year or less; 1-3 years; and more than 3 years. 
Again returning to Table 7.2, in three cases, Quality Air Force Assessment, 
Budget Requirements Review and On Order Excess, and Interservicing, outputs were 
visible in less than three years but there was still no visibility of the outcome objectives.  
Outcomes were visible in less than 3 years in only two cases, Cost as a Variable in 
AFMC and Climate Survey.  Finally, in 7 of the 12 cases, it took more than three years 
for the outcomes to begin presenting visible evidence of major reforms.  
Based on these findings, I arrived at three primary conclusions.  First, it appears 
that outputs can be seen long before outcomes emerge. All three of the cases in which the 
outputs were visible in a relatively short period of time while the outcomes took much 
longer to see had a very narrow focus and output products that were identified before the 
initiative was actually implemented. Therefore, it is most likely that the type of initiative 
exerts considerable influence on the time required for reform initiatives to be sufficiently 
visible for accurate evaluation.  
Next, the two cases in which actual outcomes were visible in less than three years 
also had a narrow focus but most importantly they each had very powerful, influential 
and determined advocates.  In the case of Cost as a Variable in AFMC, General Babbitt 
set very specific objectives and allowed only very short periods of time for 
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implementation.   The Chief of Staff of the Air Force, a four-star general, is the champion 
for the Climate Survey.  In 1997, when the first Climate Survey was completed, the Air 
Force Chief of Staff directed that the survey be completed within 90 days. Next, the 
Chief directed that results were to be compiled and analyzed within the following 90 
days.  And finally, all organizations were ordered to submit their plans of action for all 
areas with a score of 70% or less at the end of the next 90 days.  That left 15 months to 
rectify areas of concern and address all problems identified before the next Climate 
Survey began.  
Finally, it took more than three years for outcomes associated with 7 of the 12 
reform initiatives evaluated in this research to become visible or measurable.  This 
strongly suggests that major reforms are better evaluated over longer periods of time in 
order to most accurately assess their success or failure.  
Last, but certainly not least in the discussion of time are the responses of the 
individuals interviewed over the course of this research.  As reflected in Table 7.2, only 
15% thought that major reforms could be implemented in less than 1 year and all 15% 
were in the operator category.  Surprisingly, a total of 66% of those interviewed thought 
it should take only 1-3 years to successfully implement major reform initiatives.  Finally, 
49% across all positions believed it would generally take more than 3 years for major 
reform initiatives to be “ripe” for evaluation purposes and ready to be declared a success 
or failure.  The 49%, however, is somewhat misleading.  
Of the Middle Managers, Managers and Senior Managers, 59%, 80% and 92%, 
respectively, believed reforms could not be accurately evaluated in less than 3 years.  
Only 16% of the Operators thought researchers should allow at least 3 years for 
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implementation of major reforms before evaluating the reform’s success or failure.  
Through follow-on questioning, I was able to identify what may be the cause of the 
disparity.  When I asked Operators what they considered to be a major reform initiative, 
they listed a variety of endeavors that would best be described as components of a major 
reform.  However, when I posed the same question to Middle Managers, Managers and 
Senior Mangers, I got very different responses.  The majority of Middle Managers and all 
of the Managers and Senior Managers identified broad, strategic efforts, such as the 
GPRA, as constituting major reforms initiatives.  Therefore, this research suggests that 
how one defines major reform determines their assessment of how long it will take to
implement that reform initiative.  Again, this may be a candidate for further research.
Summary of Findings
The previous findings do not reflect all of what I expected or none of what I 
expected to accomplish with this research.  But even those findings that were not exactly 
what I expected do provide insight on alternative methods for evaluating the success or 
failure of reform initiatives—past and future.   
First, I expected to find that the GPRA’s status as a law influenced the potential 
for successful reform.  I did find evidence that making reform initiatives law does matter.  
But the influence is more indirect in that its primary contribution seems to be that being a 
law helps to ensure that the initiative will not simply go away after the next election.  
More influential, however, are the directives emanating from the various managerial 
levels within the agency.  
Having said this, I should add the caveat that one should never discount the 
impact of a law, either.  As a result of the GPRA, performance reports have been a 
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mandatory part of agency budget requests since 2000. It is also a key facilitator of the 
President’s Management Agenda initiated by President George W. Bush.  If the GPRA 
had been simply an executive order from President Bill Clinton, would it still have been 
embraced by the current administration?  Obviously, it is not possible to know the 
definitive answer.  However, during the formal and informal interviews, I asked every 
participant if it made a difference to them whether the GPRA was initiated by 
Congressional legislation or an executive order.  Overall, 76% responded that it did 
matter that the GPRA is a law.  The general consensus regarding why it is important 
seemed to be that it is possible and not particularly difficult to get a waiver for Air Force 
regulations and even DoD directives.  But changing a law is something much different.  
One contracting officer described it this way:  “A public law is practically gospel in the 
acquisition arena…and the Judge Advocate General makes sure we never forget it, too.”
Second, I expected to find that correctly identifying the focus of reform efforts or 
what is expected to change was important to our evaluations of reform.  What I found 
was that correctly identifying the focus is probably the most crucial factor to ensuring 
that reform initiatives are being accurately evaluated.   Not only did I find that correctly 
identifying the focus was individually Very Important to the success of reform efforts in 
all of the cases, what is expected to change seemed to also exert significant influence on 
the remaining factors!  
Whether or not decision-making was likely to be incremental was influenced by 
the type of reform to be implemented.  The type of reform to be implemented is directly 
related to what is expected to change.  
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Who were identified as the key-actors and at what level the knowledge and 
information necessary to successfully implement reform was located also depended on 
what was expected to change. If the reform is directed at changing the political system, 
then the key-actors probably are the president, OMB, top agency officials or Congress 
and the knowledge and information necessary for successful implementation will likely 
be found in their staffs.  However, if the internal operations of the Executive Branch 
agencies are expected to change, then the key-actors and the knowledge necessary for 
implementation are more likely to be found at the managerial and operating levels within 
the agency.  This does not, however, mean that leadership is not important.  
Committed leadership is critical to successful reform in the Executive Branch 
agencies—it just does not have to be Presidential or Congressional leadership.  The 
examples of General Viccellio and General Babbitt surely demonstrate how important 
good leadership is to reform.  We also cannot totally discount the visionary knowledge 
and information generally found at the upper levels of management.  Again using General 
Viccellio and General Babbitt as examples, both had a definite vision of changes they 
wanted to make in the Air Force Materiel Command.  They were quite clear on the 
outcomes they sought and they made sure that everyone throughout the Command 
understood exactly what those goals were.  However, they left it up to the managers and 
the operators of the command to actually make the visions a reality.  I suggest that 
implementing major reform without visionary leadership is much like trying to fly an 
airplane without compasses and horizon indicators…you are most likely to get nowhere!
The focus will also affect how much enhanced flexibility and discretion might be 
needed within the agencies to successfully implement the reform initiatives.  Finally, 
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what is expected to change will certainly affect how much time is likely to be required for 
successful implementation.  Based on the preponderance of the findings associated with 
this research, it is evident that correctly identifying the focus of a reform may well be the 
most critical factor when developing evaluation plans for reform initiatives. 
Lessons Learned To Apply To Future Research
Overall, I believe the most significant finding of this research is the importance of 
correctly identifying what is expected to change before an evaluation of reform initiatives 
begins.  Many previous government-wide reform efforts were declared failures because 
they did not take politics out of the budget process.  I suggest that re-evaluating these 
reforms by first correctly identifying what was expected to change may yield results far 
different than originally found by academicians such as Schick, 1995 and 1973; 
Wildavsky, 1992 and 1984; Gosling, 1992; and Radin, 1998.    
Second, if the focus of reform initiatives is the day-to-day operations of an 
agency, evaluating that reform from inside an agency may also reveal far more changes 
going on than are visible from the outside. The long-term case study approach I have 
utilized in this research is especially appropriate for evaluating agencies’ internal 
operations.  Although I benefited from my professional positions, access to personnel and 
information inside an agency is not impossible for outside researchers to arrange.  It is 
important, however, that outside researchers allow themselves extra time to become very 
familiar with the missions and day-to-day operations of an agency before beginning 
reform evaluations.   
An example of changes not truly visible from the outside was the major 
reorganization accomplished by the Air Staff.  Despite the size of the DoD budget, 
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defense has never been funded at 100 percent.  Therefore, choices have always had to be 
made.  However, it was not those closest to the warfighter that made the choices.  It was 
the Air Staff.  When Headquarters Air Force reorganized the Air Staff into an 
organization more similar to the world of private business, the changes were far more 
than cosmetic.  No longer could commands bring their programs to the Air Staff 
unfunded and expect additional funds to materialize from some elusive pot of money 
well-hidden in the Pentagon.  
After the reorganization, all Air Force commands were required to bring in 
balanced Program Objective Memorandums.   Very simply, they had to balance their 
most critical and immediate needs versus long-range goals or less critical wants.  If they 
had new programs they wished to fund, they had to give up something else...that meant 
they had to make choices!  The choices were seldom easy.  For example, if you fund 
aircraft maintenance and do not include the funds in your budget to purchase the 
necessary support equipment, you have not supported the warfighter with a usable 
weapon system.  Or if you fund aircraft operations but do not fund engine maintenance, 
you will simply end up with a very expensive static display, not a usable weapon system!  
The Air Staff was no longer going to decide what the commands needed the 
most...the commands had to decide for themselves what programs were most critical to 
accomplishing their mission.  Once they prepared their Program Objective Memorandum 
and proposed budget, each command presented and defended their programs before the 
panels of the Air Force Corporate Structure.  
In addition to the funded programs, the Air Force Council combined and 
prioritized all command submissions so that a composite list of Air Force additional 
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needs were already identified if funds became available.  The prioritization of the 
commands’ programs also identified programs that could be cut with the least impact if 
appropriations decreased.  An example of how important the Unfunded Priority List 
really is has to do with the Defense Emergency Relief Fund appropriated by Congress in 
the aftermath of September 11, 2001.  
In a matter of days after September 11, 2001, more than $20 billion dollars was 
made available to meet the needs of the DoD as it prepared to go to war.  Unlike the 
normal Defense appropriations, the emergency funds had no color and no year.  
Essentially, the emergency funds could be used to support any validated need of the DoD 
even if it was originally identified as a future need.  When the DoD called the services to 
the table, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force already had his validated list of needs in his 
pocket.  This was one of the reasons that the Air Force requirements could be and were 
among the first funded.
Finally, there is an additional area of interest that I do not feel this research 
adequately covered.  That is the importance of recognizing and appreciating the 
significance of the changes taking place inside an agency.  The problem with that, 
however, is that the significance is frequently lost on those not familiar with the existing 
culture of an agency. For example, allowing private contractors to sit down in the same 
room with item mangers to discuss future requirements might not seem particularly 
noteworthy to an outsider. But to those inside the Propulsion Management Division at the 
Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center, it was completely opposite to everything they knew. 
For decades, item mangers had been strictly prohibited from discussing future 
requirements with any one outside the requirements community.  The item managers are 
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even required to carry a secret security clearance to protect the integrity of the 
requirements and budget processes.  Maintaining a close hold on information related to 
future requirements simply became an engrained fact of life for all item managers.  As 
General Babbitt learned about directing the Air Force Materiel Command to manage cost 
in addition to performance, altering that fact of life was very emotional and certainly not 
an easy task.
At the time, I was the Section Chief for the item mangers responsible for the GE 
engines.  I spent many hours explaining the waivers in place, the importance of 
acquisition reform to supporting the warfighter and even reassuring the item managers 
they would not end up in Leavenworth when GE representatives were allowed to view 
and discuss future Air Force requirements.  In one case, the item manger even insisted I 
put it in writing!  Ultimately, the item mangers did participate in the quarterly joint 
requirements reviews established as a part of the GE Corporate Contract.  And they 
continue to do so today.  But their participation represented a truly major change in the 
way the Air Force does business. 
Future of the GPRA at Oklahoma City and in the Air Force Materiel Command 
As shown in the case studies, the Propulsion Directorate did improve its budget 
validity factor and, by 1999, the excess inventory on order decreased significantly.  
Overall, however, support to the warfighter was not yet improving.  By the Air Force’s 
own measures, the percentage of all Air Force systems reported as not mission capable 
due to supply problems steadily increased from 11 percent in FY 1996 to 14.3 percent in 
FY 2000 (GAO-01-587).  
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In 1999, based on the revised and improved requirements computations, the Air 
Force Materiel Command identified its major supportability problem as an ongoing 
shortage of spare parts. Because of concerns that spare parts shortages were causing 
serious readiness issues, the Air Force received an additional $904 million in obligation 
authority.  Of the additional funds, $132 million of it went to the Oklahoma City Air 
Logistics Center to buy engine-related spare parts identified in the new requirements.  In 
addition to the funds given directly to the Air Force, the DoD announced its plan to 
provide the Defense Logistics Agency with an additional $500 million over fiscal years 
2001-2004 to purchase consumable spare parts for all services.  The Air Force’s share of 
the Defense Logistics Agency’s funds is $213.8 million (GAO-01-587, pp. 4-5).  
Congress did their part by providing additional funding.  Now it is up to the Air Force to 
improve performance.
Both the Air Force Materiel Command and Headquarters Air Force took steps to 
address the critical issue of spare parts support.  In 1999, the Air Force Deputy Chief of 
Staff, Installations and Logistics, Directorate of Supply, established the Supply 
Foundation Project as a comprehensive means of improving the total supply system.  The 
Supply Foundation Project originally identified ten objectives with separate initiatives 
associated with each.  The Air Force’s number one objective is to improve spare parts 
management.  In conjunction with the Air Force program, the Air Force Materiel 
Command initiated other actions, such as the Constraints Analysis Program and a task 
force to improve Purchase Supply Chain Management processes to address more specific 
aspects of spare parts management and policies.  
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Future projects are also planned to develop a model to more accurately forecast 
repair facilities’ needs for consumable parts and electronically transmit the information to 
the Defense Logistics Agency and the applicable contractor.  In addition, a pilot program 
has been initiated where contractors will bypass the supply system and directly fill the 
supply bins at maintenance facilities (GAO-01-587, pp. 18-19).  This pilot program has 
been in place at the Oklahoma Air Logistics Center less than a year so a definitive 
evaluation is not yet possible.  Initial reports, however, are quite promising.
According to the GAO, “The Air Force has developed a Supply Strategic Plan 
that includes a management framework and specific goals and outcome-oriented 
measures for its initiatives.”  The Plan is intended “...to help create an integrated process 
for supply planning, to facilitate the exchange of information throughout the supply 
system and to improve measures of effectiveness for the supply system.”  Last updated in 
2001, the Plan establishes five goals the Air Force supply community is expected to 
achieve by 2010.  The goals are:
1) Manage assets effectively;
2) Organize, train, and equip supply personnel;
3) Support Department of Defense operations;
4) Establish and implement fuel policy; and 
5) Implement effective financial management.
Each of the identified goals has objectives associated with it that the Air Force 
expects to achieve in the next 4 to 7 years (GAO-01-587, p. 16-17).  It has now been 11 
years since the passage of the GPRA.  It is clear, however, that the Air Force continues to 
be guided by the GPRA’s demand for more effective, efficient and economic governance.  
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Future of the GPRA in the DoD
At this point in time, there is no indication that the GPRA is going to go away.  So 
where does the DoD go from here?  One of the DoD’s most important responses to the 
demands for change imposed by the GPRA was the 1997 Defense Reform Initiatives.  
This was a list of actions the DoD committed to taking to address concerns raised by the 
GAO in their High-Risk Series and to better comply with the requirements of the GPRA.  
The November 1997 Defense Reform Initiative Report provided a strategic blueprint for 
the DoD to adapt better business processes, pursue commercial alternatives, consolidate 
redundant functions, and streamline organizations.  Since the 1997 report, significant 
effort and progress were made to bring competition and best commercial practices into 
the business of defense.  Since launching the reform initiative, a Defense Management 
Council (DMC) of DoD leaders acting as the Secretary’s Board of Directors and a panel 
of Chief Executive Officers from leading private sector corporations were established to 
provide advice about reform opportunities and implementation.  
Another example of the DoD’s commitment to reform has to do with its 
abundance of rules and regulations, for which it is well known. However, DoD rules and 
regulations as well as those of the Air Force are always secondary to the legislation of 
Congress.  This was even more strongly demonstrated in October 2000 when Under 
Secretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz, canceled the existing documents that have served 
as the cornerstones of acquisition policy for decades – DoD Directive 5000.1 and DoD 
Instruction 5000.2. 
The DoD 5000-series is considered the acquisition bible.  It establishes milestones 
and major reviews for weapon systems development, dictating how billions of dollars are 
to be spent in procuring tools for the warfighter.   The goal of rewriting the 5000-series is 
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to streamline the buying rules even if that means tossing out decades-old practices to 
create an acquisition policy environment that fosters efficiency, flexibility, creativity and 
innovation to rapidly deliver affordable and sustainable capabilities to the war fighters.  
The changes to the 5000-series will give program managers as much latitude as 
possible so they can be innovative in structuring and executing their program in a manner 
best suited to its particular circumstances.  According to one official from the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense, “Instead of telling [program managers] they have to satisfy a 
requirement in a certain way, now we’re [saying]: Here’s the requirement, you know your 
program, do what best suits the particular conditions of your program but meet the 
requirement” (Inside the Pentagon, January 16, 2003). Wolfowitz replaced the two 
documents with the Interim Defense Acquisition Guidebook to serve as temporary 
acquisition guidance until the formal regulations can be rewritten to encourage and 
support acquisition reform.
In keeping with the DoD’s emphasis on acquisition reform and to further improve 
the way we buy goods and services to support the warfighter, then-Principle Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition and Management, Ms. Darleen 
Druyun, established the Air Force Acquisition Center of Excellence in December 2001.   
The Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center Acquisition Center of Excellence, to which I am 
now assigned, stood up in March 2002.  
The concept of the Acquisition Centers of Excellence is to create a multi-
functional, stand-alone organization consisting of acquisition experts to assist programs 
through the acquisition process.  The Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center Commander, 
Major General Terry Gabreski, is the designated change agent for the Center and is 
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responsible for applying reform initiatives to all the Center’s acquisition and logistics 
processes.  My current assignment is as the Logistics Management Specialist for 
promoting evolutionary acquisition and spiral development.  These initiatives focus on 
delivering specific capabilities to the war fighter faster by building weapon systems in 
increments with each spiral providing additional capability.  This initiative is designed to 
reduce the amount of time it takes to develop and deliver a new weapon system.  
Currently, the average time from concept definition to airplanes in the sky is 
approximately 15-20 years.  With the War on Terrorism, the DoD has learned that it 
simply cannot wait that long to field new weapon systems.  
My other duty is to facilitate Performance Based Logistics.  Under this concept, 
the role of the item management community will undergo significant changes because we 
are now being driven to manage our suppliers instead of individual parts.  This means 
that we will be trying to establish longer-term contracts of 5-10 years for inventory 
sustainment to meet a certain performance criteria.   It seems clear the force of law 
carried by the GPRA continues to encourage and direct major changes to the way the 
DoD and the Air Force do business.
Since the end of the Cold War, the Armed Forces of the United States have 
demonstrated many times that they are second to none when it comes to their mission of 
defending the United States and its interests militarily.  However, the GAO has found that 
“significant management problems continue to impact the economy, effectiveness and 
efficiency of DoD’s business processes.”  The concern is that inappropriately expended 
funds have put mission capabilities at risk because the funds would have been better 
spent to support modernization and readiness efforts (GAO-03-98).  
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Since 1999, Congress has provided $1.5 billion to address DoD’s shortage of 
spare parts.  However, Congress has also begun to express its concerns regarding “...the 
Department’s inability to articulate funding levels for spare parts needed to support the 
training and deployment requirements of the armed services and provide any meaningful 
history of funds spent for spare parts” (GAO-03-18).  
The DoD does not deny its problems nor is it ignoring them.  Currently, the DoD 
has 400 ongoing initiatives whose sole focus is to improve the quality of logistics support 
across the Department.  In addition to the initiatives I have already described, other 
initiatives address issues concerned with supply, financial management, information-
technology systems’ improvement, the personnel system as well as many other less 
entrenched difficulties.  Because of the DoD’s size and its decentralized concept of 
execution, implementing major changes simply takes time.  The Congress and their 
watchdog, the GAO, are fully aware that the DoD cannot be transformed overnight...or 
even in 11 years. The important part, however, is that the DoD is committed to improving 
the way it does business.
Meeting the Needs of Congress 
The current administration, the Congress and the DoD leadership place a high 
priority and a great deal of attention on the Department’s efforts to transform its business’ 
practices.  Broad transformation is essential, especially in the area of financial 
management, if the Congress is to have reasonable confidence in the information 
provided to decision makers.  And that is the goal of the GPRA—to improve the 
effectiveness, efficiency and economy of the Executive Branch agencies in order to 
ensure that budgetary information passed to decision-makers is accurate and usable. 
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According to Philip G. Joyce (2003), it is not necessary that Congress use 
performance information during the appropriation process.  Joyce argues that agencies 
have sufficient discretion and flexibility to move funds from one program to another even 
after appropriations are received (p. 29). Therefore, Joyce suggests embracing 
...a more comprehensive definition of performance-informed
budgeting and attempts to demonstrate that there is ample 
opportunity to use performance information at each stage of 
the budget process—that is, not only the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) and the Congress but in the agencies and
by the audit community as well.  Further, high-quality
performance measurement can be the key to effective management
of resources, even if that performance information did not affect the initial 
allocation of those resources” (p. 7).
The Congressional budgeting process is and will always be a political process.  
However, it is not impossible to insert performance information into that process.  Joyce 
suggests that 
…the authorization process is crucial to developing expectations
 about the performance of programs, and it is therefore the most
 logical place for performance information to gain a foothold into
 the congressional process (p. 27).
While I find Joyce’s argument regarding the authorization process convincing, I 
more fully agree that the performance information is already improving the budget 
because better information is being provided to the OMB and Congress by the Executive 
Branch agencies.  I believe the initiatives documented in this case study provide clear and 
convincing evidence that budget preparation and funds management have improved in 
the Propulsion Management Division at the Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center, the Air 
Force Materiel Command, the Air Force and, ultimately, the DoD.
The Congress continues to use the requirements of the GPRA to encourage reform 
initiatives.  Therefore, the DoD can be expected to continue its efforts to comply with 
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both the letter and the intent of the GPRA as they focus on transforming their business 
processes to meet the needs of the warfighter in the 21st century.  After all, the DoD is not 
a vending machine...therefore, change is inevitable!   
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Public Law 103-62: Government Performance and Results Act of 1993
One Hundred Third Congress
of the
United States of America
Begun and held at the City Washington on Tuesday,
the fifth day of January, one thousand nine hundred and ninety-three
An Act
To provide for the establishment of strategic planning and
performance measurement in the Federal Government, and
for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the “Government Performance and Results Act of 
1993”.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS AND PURPOSES
(a) FINDINGS.-The Congress finds that-
(1) waste and inefficiency in Federal programs undermine  the confidence 
of the American people in the Government  and reduces the Federal Government’s ability 
to address adequately vital public needs;
          (2) Federal managers are seriously disadvantaged in their efforts to improve 
program efficiency and effectiveness, because of insufficient articulation of program 
goals and inadequate information on program performance; and
          (3) congressional policymaking, spending decisions and program oversight 
are seriously handicapped by insufficient attention to program performance and results 
(Public Law 103-62).
(b) Purposes.-The purposes of this Act are to-
(1) improve the confidence of the American people in the capability of the 
Federal Government, by systematically holding Federal agencies accountable for 
achieving program results;
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(2) initiate program performance reform with a serious of pilot projects in 
setting program goals, measuring program performance against those goals, and reporting 
publicly on their progress;
                   (3) improve Federal program effectiveness and public accountability by 
promoting a new focus on results, service quality, and customer satisfaction;
                   (4) help Federal managers improve service delivery, by requiring that they 
plan for meeting program objectives and by providing them with information about 
program results and service quality;
                   (5) improve congressional decisionmaking by providing more objective 
information on achieving statutory objectives, and on the relative effectiveness and 
efficiency of Federal programs and spending; and
                   (6) improve internal management of the Federal Government.
SEC. 3. STRATEGIC PLANNING.
Chapter 3 of  Title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding after section 305 
the following new section:
“Sec. 306. Strategic Plans
(a) No later than September 30, 1997, the head of each agency shall submit to the 
Director of the Office of Management and Budget and to the Congress a strategic plan for 
program activities.  Such plan shall contain-
(1) a comprehensive mission statement covering the major functions and 
operations of the agency;
(2) general goals and objectives, including outcome-related goals and 
objectives, for the major functions and operations of the agency;
(3) a description of how goals and objectives are to be achieved, including 
a description of then operational processes, skills and technology, and 
the human, capital, information, and other resources required to meet 
those goals and objectives;
(4)  a description of how the performance goals included in the plan 
required by section 1115(a) of Title 31 shall be related to the general 
goals and objectives in the strategic plan;
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(5) an identification of those key factors external to the agency and 
beyond its control that could significantly affect the achievement of 
the general goals and objectives; and
(6) a description of the program evaluations used in establishing or 
revising general goals and objectives, with a schedule for future 
program evaluations.
(b) The strategic plan shall cover a period of not less than five years forward from 
the fiscal year in which it is submitted, and shall be updated and revised at least every 
three years.
(c) The performance plan required by section 1115 of Title 31 shall be consistent 
with the agency’s strategic plan.  A performance plan may not be submitted for a fiscal 
year not covered by a current strategic plan under this section.
(d) When developing a strategic plan, the agency shall consult with the Congress, 
and shall solicit and consider the views and suggestions of those entities potentially 
affected by your interest in such plan.
(e) The functions and activities of this section shall be considered to be inherently 
Governmental functions. The drafting of strategic plans under this section shall be 
performed only by Federal employees.
(f) For purposes of this section the term ‘agency’ means an Executive agency 
defined under section 105, but does not include the Central Intelligence Agency, the 
General Accounting Office, the Panama Canal Commission, the United States Postal 
Service, and the Postal Rate Commission.
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SEC. 4. ANNUAL PERFORMANCE PLANS AND REPORTS.
(a) Budget Contents and Submission to Congress.-Section 1105(a) of Title 31, 
United States Code, is amended by adding at the end of thereof the following 
new paragraph:
(29) beginning with fiscal year 1999, a Federal Government performance plan for 
the overall budget as provided for under section 1115.
(b) Performance Plans and Reports.-Chapter 11 of Title 31, United States Code, is 
amended by adding after section 1114 the following new sections:
SEC. 1115. Performance plans
(a) In carrying out the provisions of section 1105(a)(29), the Director of the 
Office of Management and Budget shall require each agency to prepare an annual 
performance plan covering each program activity set forth in the budget of such agency.  
Such plan shall-
(1) establish performance goals to define the level of performance to be 
achieved by a program activity;
(2) express such goals in an objective, quantifiable, measurable form unless 
authorized to be in an alternative form under subsection (b);
(3) briefly describe the operational processes, skills and technology, and the 
human, capital, information, or other resources required to meet the 
performance goals;
(4) establish performance indicators to be used in measuring or assessing their 
relevant outputs, service levels, and outcomes of each program activity;
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(5) provide a basis for comparing actual program results with the established 
performance goals; and
(6) describe the means to be used to verify and validate measured values.
(b) If an agency, in consultation with the Director of the Office of Management 
and Budget, determines that it is not feasible to express the performance goals for a 
particular program activity in an objective, quantifiable, and measurable form, the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget may authorize an alternative form.  
Such alternative form shall-
(1) include separate descriptive statements of-
a.  a minimally effective program, and
b.  a successful program, or
c. such alternative as authorized by the Director of the Office of 
Management and Budget, with sufficient precision and in such 
terms that would allow for an accurate, independent 
determination of whether the program activity’s performance 
meets the criteria of the description; or
(2) state why it is infeasible or impractical to express a performance goal 
in any form for the program activity.
(c) For the purpose of complying with this section, an agency may aggregate, 
disaggregate, or consolidate program activities, except that any aggregation or 
consolidation may not omit or minimize the significance of any program activity 
constituting a major function or operation for the agency.
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(d) An agency may submit with its annual performance plan an appendix covering 
any portion of the plan that-
(1) is specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive Order 
to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy; and
(2) is properly classified pursuant to such Executive Order.
(e) The functions and activities of this section shall be considered to be inherently 
Governmental functions.  The drafting of performance plans under this section shall be 
performed only by Federal employees.
(f) For purposes of this section and sections 1116 through 1119, and sections 9703 
and 9704 the term-
(1) agency has the same meaning as such term is defined under section 306(f) 
of Title 5;
(2) outcome measure means an assessment of the results of a program activity 
compared to its intended purposes;
(3) output measure means the tabulation, calculation, or recording of activity 
or effort and can be expressed in a quantitative or qualitative manner; 
(4) performance goal means a target level of performance expressed as a 
tangible, measurable objective, against which actual achievement can be 
compared, including a goal expressed as a quantitative standard, value, or 
rate;
(5) performance indicator means a particular value or characteristic used to 
measure output or outcome;
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(6) program activity means a specific activity or project as listed in the 
program and financing schedules of the annual budget of the United States 
Government; and
(7) program evaluation means an assessment, through objective measurement 
and systematic analysis, of the manner and extent to which Federal 
programs achieve intended objectives.
Sec. 1116. Program performance reports
(a) No later than March 31, 2000, and no later than March 31 of each year 
thereafter, the head of each agency shall prepare and submit to the President and 
the Congress, a report on program performance for the previous fiscal year.
(b) (1) Each program performance report shall set forth the performance 
indicators established in the agency performance plan under section 1115, along 
with the actual program performance achieved compared with the performance 
goals expressed in the plan for that fiscal year.
     (2) If performance goals are specified in an alternative form under 
section 1115(b), the results of such program shall be described in relation to such 
specifications, including whether the performance failed to meet the criteria of a 
minimally effective or successful program.
(c) The report for fiscal year 2000 shall include actual results for the 
preceding fiscal year, the report for fiscal year 2001 shall include actual results for 
the two preceding fiscal years, and the report for fiscal year 2002 and all 
subsequent reports shall include actual results for the three preceding fiscal years.
(d) Each report shall-
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     (1) review the success of achieving the performance goals of the fiscal 
year;
     (2) evaluate the performance plan for the current fiscal year relative to 
the performance achieved toward the performance goals in the fiscal year 
covered by the report;
     (3) explain and describe, where a performance goal has not been met 
(including when a program activity’s performance is determined not to 
have met the criteria of a successful program activity under section 
1115(b)(1)(A)(ii) or a corresponding level of achievement if another 
alternative form is used-
           (A) why the goal was not met;
           (B) those plans and schedules for achieving the established 
performance goal; and
           (C) if the performance goal is impractical or infeasible, why that is 
the case and what action is recommended;
     (4) describe the use and assess the effectiveness in achieving 
performance goals of any waiver under section 9703 of this title; and
     (5) include the summary findings of those program evaluations 
completed during the fiscal year covered by the report.
(e) An agency head may include all program performance information 
required annually under this section in an annual financial statement required
under section 3515 if any such statement is submitted to the Congress no later 
than March 31 of the applicable fiscal year.
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(f) The functions and activities of this section shall be considered to be 
inherently Governmental functions.  The drafting of program performance reports 
under this section shall be performed only by Federal employees.
Sec. 1117. Exemption
The Director of the Office of Management and Budget may exempt from 
the requirements of sections 1115 and 1116 of this title and section 306 of Title 5, 
any agency with annual outlays of $20,000,000 or less.
SEC. 5. MANAGERIAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND FLEXIBILITY
(a) Managerial Accountability and Flexibility.-Chapter 97 of Title 31, 
United States Code, is amended by adding after section 9702, the following new 
section:
Sec. 9703. Managerial accountability and flexibility
(a) Beginning with fiscal year 1999, the performance plans required under 
section 1115 may include proposals to waive administrative procedural 
requirements and controls, including specification of personnel staffing levels, 
limitations on compensation or remuneration, and prohibitions or restrictions on 
funding transfers among budget object classification 20 and sub-classifications 
11, 12, 31, and 32 of each annual budget submitted under section 1105, in return 
for specific individual or organization accountability to achieve a performance 
goal.  In preparing and submitting the performance plan under section 
1105(a)(29), the Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall review 
and may approve any proposed waivers.  A waiver shall take effect at the 
beginning of the fiscal year for which the waiver is approved.
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(b) Any such proposal under subsection (a) shall describe the anticipated 
effects on performance resulting from greater managerial or organizational 
flexibility, discretion, and authority, and shall quantify the expected 
improvements in performance resulting from any waiver.  The expected 
improvements shall be compared to current actual performance, and to the 
projected level of performance that would be achieved independent of any waiver.
(c) Any proposal waiving limitations on compensation or remuneration 
shall precisely express the monetary change in compensation or remuneration 
amounts, such as bonuses or awards, that shall result from meeting, exceeding, or 
failing to meet performance goals.
(d) Any proposed waiver of procedural requirements or controls imposed 
by an agency (other than the proposing agency or the Office of Management and 
Budget) may not be included in a performance plan unless it is endorsed by the 
agency that established the requirement, and the endorsement included in the 
proposing agency’s performance plan.
(e) A waiver shall be in effect for one or two years as specified by the 
Director of the Office of Management and Budget in approving the waiver.  A 
waiver may be renewed for a subsequent year.  After a waiver has been in effect 
for three consecutive years, the performance plan prepared under section 1115 
may propose that a waiver, other than a waiver of limitations on compensation or 
remuneration, be made permanent.
(f) For purposes of this section, the definitions under section 1115(f) shall 
apply.
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SEC. 6. PILOT PROJECTS
(a) Performance Plans and Reports.-Chapter 11 of Title 31, United States 
Code, is amended by inserting after section 1117 (as added by section 4 of this 
Act) the following new section:
Sec. 1118. Pilot projects for performance goals
(a) The Director of the Office of Management and Budget, after 
consultation with the head of each agency, shall designate not less than ten 
agencies as pilot projects in performance measurement for fiscal years 1994,
1995, and 1996.  The selected agencies shall reflect a representative range of 
Government functions and capabilities in measuring and reporting program 
performance.
(b) Pilot projects in the designated agencies shall undertake the 
preparation of performance plans under section 1115, and program performance 
reports under section 1116, other than section 1116(c), for one or more of the 
major functions and operations of the agency.  A strategic plan shall be used when 
preparing agency performance plans during one or more years of the pilot period.
(c) No later than May 1, 1997, the Director of the Office of 
Management and Budget shall submit a report to the President and to the 
Congress which shall-
(1) assess the benefits, costs, and usefulness of the plans 
and reports prepared by the pilot agencies in meeting the purposes of the 
Government Performance and Results Act of 1993;
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(2) identify any significant difficulties experienced by the 
pilot agencies in preparing plans and reports; and
(3) set forth any recommended changes in the requirements 
of the provisions of Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, section 
306 of Title 5, section 1105, 1115, 1116, 1117, 1119, and 9703 of this Title, and 
this section.
(b) Managerial Accountability and Flexibility.-Chapter 97 of Title 31, 
United States Code, is amended by inserting after section 9703 (as added by 
section 5 of this Act) the following new section:
Sec. 9704. Pilot projects for managerial accountability and flexibility
(a) The Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall 
designate not less than five agencies as pilot projects in managerial accountability 
and flexibility for fiscal years 1995 and 1996.  Such agencies shall be selected 
from those designated as pilot projects under section 1118 and shall reflect a 
representative range of Government functions and capabilities in measuring and 
reporting program performance.
(b) Pilot projects in the designated agencies shall include proposed 
waivers in accordance with section 9703 for one or more of the major functions 
and operations of the agency.
(c) The Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall 
include in the report to the President and to the Congress required sections under 
section 1118(c)-
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(1) an assessment of the benefits, costs, and usefulness of 
increasing managerial and organizational flexibility, discretion, and authority in 
exchange for improved performance through a waiver; and
(2) an identification of any significant difficulties 
experienced by the pilot agencies in preparing proposed waivers.
(d) For purposes of this section, the definitions under section 
1115(f) shall apply.
(b) Performance Budgeting.-Chapter 11 of Title 31, United States Code, is 
amended by inserting after section 1118 (as added by section 6 of this Act) the 
following new section:
Sec. 1119. Pilot projects for performance budgeting
             (a) The Director of the Office of Management and Budget, after 
consultation with the head of each agency, shall designate not less than five 
agencies as pilot projects in performance budgeting for fiscal years 1998 and 
1999.  At least three of the agencies shall be selected from those designated as 
pilot projects under section 1118 and shall also reflect a representative range of 
Government functions and capabilities in measuring and reporting program 
performance.
              (b) Pilot projects in the designated agencies shall cover the 
preparation of performance budgets.  Such budgets shall present, for one or more 
of the major functions and operations of the agency, the varying levels of 
performance, including outcome-related performance, that would result from 
different budgeted amounts. 
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   (c) The Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall 
include, as an alternative budget presentation in the budget submitted under 
section 11105 for fiscal year 1999, the performance budgets of the designated 
agencies for this fiscal year.
                (d) No later than March 31, 2001, The Director of the Office of 
Management and Budget shall transmit a report to the President and to the 
Congress on the performance budgeting pilot projects which shall-
(1) assess the feasibility and advisability of including a 
performance budget as a part of the annual budget submitted under section 1105;
                        (2) describe any difficulties encountered by the pilot 
agencies in preparing a performance budget;
(3) recommend whether legislation requiring performance 
budgets should be proposed and the general provisio0ns of any legislation; and
(4) set forth any recommended changes in the other 
requirements of the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, section 
306 of Title 5, sections 1105, 1115, 1116, 1117, and 9703 of this title, and this 
section.
      (e) After receipt of the report required under subsection (d), the 
Congress may specify that a performance budget be submitted as part of the 
annual budget submitted under section 1105.
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Appendix B
Defense Acquisition University Non-Attribution Policy
The Defense Acquisition University (DAU) encourages and expects full and candid 
discussions during class instruction, in dialog with guest speakers and also in other 
academic research activities.  The objective is to enable students, instructors, guest 
speakers and other government personnel to express their views freely and without 
possible attribution or embarrassment.  Achievement of this level of openness requires 
that when personal views of a sensitive nature are presented, there must be assurance that 
those views will not be repeated to the possible embarrassment of the person presenting 
them.  In all academic endeavors regarding the Department of Defense, statements or 
remarks should not be attributed to identified individuals unless specific written 




1 Job Title (Mark One Only)
_____Contracting Officer
_____Equipment Specialist
_____Inventory Managem ent Specialist
_____Logistics Officer
_____Production Managem ent Specialist











(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Job Characteristics 
2
 My job requires me to use a variety of 
skills.           1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
3
My job allows m e to see the finished 
products of m y work. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
4
Doing m y job well affects others in som e 
im portant way. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
5
My job is designed so that I know when I 
have perform ed well. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
6
My job allows m e freedom  to work with 
minim um  supervision. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Unit Resources 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
7 I have adequate tim e to do my job well. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
8
W e have enough people in my work group 
to accom plish the job. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
9
I have the right tools, equipm ent, and 
materials to accom plish the job. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
10
I have enough tim e to accomplish m y daily 
workload during my duty hours. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Core Values 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
11
I am  able to do m y job without 
com promising m y integrity. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
12
Overall, people in my unit uphold high 
standards of excellence. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
13
Overall, People in m y unit dem onstrate that 
duty takes precedence over personal 
desires. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
14
Overall, people in my unit are held 
accountable for behavior which contradicts 
Air Force core values. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Communication
15 Leadership in this unit listens to my ideas. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
16
My unit makes me aware of im portant 
events and situations. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
17
I am  com fortable discussing m y ideas with 
the leadership in this unit. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
18 Leaders in my unit are easily accessible. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
19
Leadership in this unit effectively 
com municates the m ission, goals, and 
objectives. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Leadership 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
20 I trust the leadership in m y unit. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
21 My unit leadership is inspirational. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
22 I am  proud of the leadership in m y unit. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
23 My unit leadership sets challenging goals. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
24 My unit leadership provides a clear vision. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
25
My unit leadership m otivates m e to do my 
best. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
26
My unit leadership m akes decisions based 
on facts. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
27
My unit leadership m otivates m e to achieve 
our goals. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
28
My unit leadership encourages m e to look 
for ways to cut costs in m y job. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
29
I see m y unit leaders doing the sam e things 
they publicly promote. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
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Supervision 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
30 My supervisor is good at planning my work. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
31
My supervisor sets high performance 
standards. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
32
My supervisor is concerned with my 
development. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
33
My supervisor models the core values of 
the Air Force. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
34
My supervisor corrects poor performers in 
my work group. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
35
My supervisor keeps me up-to-date on 
what is happening in my unit. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
36
My supervisor provides instructions that 
help me meet his/her expectations. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
37
My supervisor helps me understand how 
my job contributes to my unit's mission. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Training & Development 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
38
I am given opportunities to improve my 
skills. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
39
I am encouraged by my unit leadership to 
learn new things. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
40
I have been adequately trained for the job I 
am expected to do. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
41
I am allowed to attend continuing 
professional training (conferences, 
workshops, etc.) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Participation/Involvement 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
42
I feel free to suggest new and better ways 
of doing things. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
43
I am asked how we can improve the way 
my work group operates. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
44
Sufficient effort is made to get the opinions 
and ideas of people in this work unit. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
45
Suggestions made by unit personnel are 
implemented in our daily work activities. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Unit Flexibility 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
46 My unit adapts to change quickly. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
47 My unit encourages appropriate risk taking. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
48
My unit challenges old ways of doing 
business. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Unit Performance Perceptions 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
49 The quality of work in my unit is high. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
50
The quantity of work accomplished in my 
unit is high. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
51
My unit is known as one that gets the job 
done. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
52
My unit is successfully accomplishing its 
mission. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
53
My unit accomplishes its mission in a cost 
effective manner. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8











(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
